Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
	Participant in Participant in the Syrian Civil War, War on Terror, Iran–Israel proxy conflict, and others
Active	1979–present
Ideology	Khomeinism; Anti-Imperialism; Shia Islamism; Anti-Zionism
Leaders	Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani
Allies	State allies Palestine; Syria; Iraq; Yemen (Supreme Political Council); Russia; Venezuela; Cuba; Bolivia; Armenia; China; North Korea (alleged); Non-state allies: Hezbollah; Palestine Liberation Organization (alleged); Hashd al-Shaʿbi; Harakah al-Sabireen; Mahdi Army; Houthis (alleged);
Opponent(s)	State opponents Saudi Arabia; United States; Israel Israel Defense Forces; ; Egypt; Bahrain; United Arab Emirates; Kuwait; Canada; Jordan; Australia; South Korea; Yemen (Hadi government); Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; European Union; NATO; Gulf Cooperation Council; Arab League; Non-state opponents: Blackwater; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; Al-Qaeda; Al-Nusra Front; Free Syrian Army; People’s Mujahedin of Iran; Kingdom Assembly of Iran; Tudeh Communist Party; Kurdistan Workers’ Party; Kurdistan Free Life Party; Ahvaz National Resistance; ASMLA; Jundullah; Jaish ul-Adl; Harakat Ansar Iran;
Designated as a terrorist organisation by
	Bahrain; Saudi Arabia; United States

Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی (in Persian)
Active	1979–present
Country	Iran
Allegiance	Supreme Leader of Iran
Branch	Joint Staff; Ground Forces; Aerospace Force; Navy; Quds Force; Basij Mobilization Force;
Size	≈120,000–125,000
Motto(s)	“Prepare against them what force you can.” (وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ) [Quran 8:60](Heraldry slogan)
Engagements	See list[show]
Commanders
Chief Commander	Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari
Quds Force	Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani
Chief of the Joint Staff	Commodore Ali Fadavi
Ground Forces	Brig. Gen. Mohammad Pakpour
Aerospace Force	Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh
Navy	Commodore Alireza Tangsiri
Mobilization forces	Brig. Gen. Gholamhossein Gheybparvar
Insignia
Flag

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Persian: سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی‎, translit. Sepâh-e Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb-e Eslâmi, lit. ‘Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution’ or Sepâh for short) is a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces founded after 1979 Revolution on 22 April 1979^[2] by order of Ayatollah Khomeini.^[3] Whereas the regular military (or Artesh) defends Iran‘s borders and maintains internal order, according to the Iranian constitution, the Revolutionary Guard (pasdaran) is intended to protect the country’s Islamic Republic system.^[4] The Revolutionary Guards state that their role in protecting the Islamic system is preventing foreign interference as well as coups by the military or “deviant movements”.^[5] This group has been labelled as a terrorist organization by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United States,^[6]^[7] although top CIA and United States Pentagon officials reportedly opposed the terrorist designation made by President Donald Trump on 8 April 2019.^[8]

The Revolutionary Guards have roughly 125,000 military personnel including ground, aerospace and naval forces. Its naval forces are now the primary forces tasked with operational control of the Persian Gulf.^[9]It also controls the paramilitary Basij militia which has about 90,000 active personnel.^[10]^[11] Its media arm is Sepah News.^[12]

Since its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution has taken a greater role in nearly every aspect of Iranian society. Its expanded social, political, military and economic role under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‘s administration—especially during the 2009 presidential election and post-election suppression of protest—has led many Western analysts to argue that its political power has surpassed even that of the Shia clerical system.^[13]^[14]^[15]^[16]

The Chief Commander of the Guardians since 2007 is Mohammad Ali Jafari, who was preceded by Yahya Rahim Safavi from 1997.^[17]

Terminology

In Iran, due to the frequent use of referencing government organizations with one word names (that generally denote their function) as opposed to acronyms or shortened versions, the entire general populace universally refer to the organization as Sepâh (سپاه). Sepâh has a historical connotation of soldiers, while in modern Persian it is also used to describe a corps sized unit, in modern Persian Artesh (ارتش) is the more standard term for an army. Pâsdârân (پاسداران) is the plural form of Pâsdâr (پاسدار), which means “Guardian”. Members of Sepah are known as Pāsdār, which is also their title and comes after their rank.

Apart from the phrase of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,^[18]^[19]^[20] the Iranian Government, media, and those who identify with the organization generally use Sepāh-e Pâsdârân (Army of the Guardians), although it is not uncommon to hear Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb (پاسداران انقلاب) (Guardians of the Revolution), or simply Pâsdârân (پاسداران) (Guardians) as well. It should be noted though that among the Iranian population, and especially among diaspora Iranians, using the word Pasdaran normally indicates admiration for the organization.

Most foreign governments and the English-speaking mass media tend to use the term Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) or simply the Revolutionary Guards.^[21] In the US media, the force is frequently referred to interchangeably as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).^[22]^[23]^[24]^[25] The US government standard is Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,^[26] while the United Nations uses Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.^[27]

Organization

The force’s main role is in national security. It is responsible for internal and border security, law enforcement, and also Iran’s missile forces. IRGC operations are geared towards asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties. These include the control of smuggling, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and resistance operations.^[28] The IRGC is intended to complement the more traditional role of the regular Iranian military, with the two forces operating separately and focusing on different operational roles.^[28]

The IRGC is a combined arms force with its own ground forces, navy,^[9] air force, intelligence,^[29] and special forces. It also controls the Basij militia. The Basij is a volunteer-based force, with 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. The IRGC is officially recognized as a component of the Iranian military under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution.^[30] It is separate from, and parallel to, the other arm of Iran‘s military, which is called Artesh (another Persian word for army). Especially in the waters of the Persian Gulf, the IRGC is expected to assume control of any Iranian response to attacks on its nuclear facilities.^[9]

History and structure

The IRGC was formed on 5 May 1979^[1]^[31] following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new government and to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military, initially seen as a potential source of opposition because of its traditional loyalty to the Shah. From the beginning of the new Islamic government, the Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami) functioned as a corps of the faithful. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic entrusted the defense of Iran’s territorial integrity and political independence to the regular military (artesh), while it gave the Pasdaran the responsibility of preserving the Revolution itself.

Days after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s return to Tehran on 1 February 1979, the Bazargan interim administration established the Pasdaran under a decree issued by Khomeini on 5 May. The Pasdaran was intended to protect the Revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the new government’s Islamic codes and morality. There were other, perhaps more important, reasons for establishing the Pasdaran. The Revolution needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous regime’s tainted units. As one of the first revolutionary institutions, the Pasdaran helped legitimize the Revolution and gave the new government an armed basis of support. Moreover, the establishment of the Pasdaran served notice to both the population and the regular armed forces that the Khomeini government was quickly developing its own enforcement body. Thus, the Pasdaran, along with its political counterpart, Crusade for Reconstruction, brought a new order to Iran. In time, the Pasdaran would rival the police and the judiciary in terms of its functions. It would even challenge the performance of the regular armed forces on the battlefield.

IRGC’s Naval special forces, S.N.S.F.

Although the IRGC operated independently of the regular armed forces, it was often considered to be a military force in its own right due to its important role in Iranian defense. The IRGC consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops, which parallel the structure of the regular military. Unique to the Pasdaran, however, has been control of Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces.

Also contained under the umbrella of the more conventional Pasdaran, were the Basij Forces (Mobilization Resistance Force), a network of potentially up to a million active individuals who could be called upon in times of need. The Basij could be committed to assist in the defense of the country against internal or external threats, but by 2008 had also been deployed in mobilizing voters in elections and alleged tampering during such activities. Another element was the Quds Force, a special forces element tasked with unconventional warfare roles and known to be involved providing assistance and training to various militant organizations around the world.

Yahya Rahim Safavi, head of the IRGC since 1997, was dismissed as commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards in August 2007. The dismissal of Safavi disrupted the balance of power in Iran to the advantage of conservatives. Analysis in the international press considered the removal of Safavi to be a sign of change in the defense strategies of Iran, but the general policies of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are not personally determined by its commander.^[32]

Military structure

IRGC tank in 2012 military parade in Tehran

In late July 2008 reports originating that the IRGC was in the process of dramatically changing its structure. In a shake-up, in September 2008 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards established 31 divisions and an autonomous missile command. The new structure changes the IRGC from a centralized to a decentralized force with 31 provincial corps, whose commanders wield extensive authority and power. According to the plan, each of Iran’s thirty provinces will have a provincial corps, except Tehran Province, which will have two.^[33]

Basij

The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. The Basij are (at least in theory) subordinate to, and receive their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However they have also been described as “a loosely allied group of organizations” including “many groups controlled by local clerics.” Currently, the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and as morality police and the suppression of dissident gatherings.

Quds Force

The elite Quds Force (or Jerusalem Force), sometimes described as the successor to the Shah‘s Imperial Guards, is estimated to be 2,000–5,000 in number.^[10] It is a special operations unit, handling activities abroad.^[34] The force basically does not engage directly.

Aerospace Force of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution

Qiam (left) and Sejjil 2 (right) ballistic missiles in a 2012 exhibition

Once thought of as the IRGC’s air force, complete with air combat fighter aircraft, the Aerospace Force, now is more likely to be a combination of army aviation unit, the equivalent of the Iranian Army’s Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation, and as a strategic missile force.

Navy of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution

One of the various types of fast attack craft used by the IRGC

IRGC started naval operations using mainly swarm tactics and speedboats during “Tanker War” phase of the Iran–Iraq War.

IRGC Navy and the regular Artesh Navy overlap functions and areas of responsibility, but they are distinct in terms of how they are trained and equipped—and more importantly also in how they fight. The Revolutionary Guards Navy has a large inventory of small fast attack craft, and specializes in asymmetric hit-and-run tactics. It is more akin to a guerrilla force at sea, and maintains large arsenals of coastal defense and anti-ship cruise missiles and mines.^[35] It has also a Takavar (special force) unit, called Sepah Navy Special Force (S.N.S.F.).

Ground forces

Ansar-ul-Mahdi Corps

The Ansar-ul-Mahdi (Followers of Imam Mahdi (12th Shia Imam) Corps is primarily responsible for the protection of top officials of government and parliament (excluding the Supreme Leader). As an elite, secretive force within the I.R.G.C Ground force, its officers are entrusted with many other special assignments, such as Counter Intelligence & Covert Operations beyond Iran’s borders.

The corps has four layers of protection for top officials and the agents go to each layer according to their experience and loyalty. The current commander of Ansar-Ul-Mehdi is Colonel Asad Zadeh.^[36]^[37]

Size

Zelzal-3

The IISS Military Balance 2007 says the IRGC has 125,000+ personnel and controls the Basij on mobilisation.^[38] It estimates the IRGC Ground and Aerospace Forces are 100,000 strong and is ‘very lightly manned’ in peacetime. It estimates there are up to 20 infantry divisions, some independent brigades, and one airborne brigade.^[39]

The IISS estimates the IRGC Naval Forces are 20,000 strong including 5,000 Marines in one brigade of three or four Marine Battalions.,^[40] and are equipped with some coastal defence weapons (some HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker SSM batteries and some artillery batteries) and 50 patrol boats. The IRGC air arm, says the IISS, controls Iran’s strategic missile force and has an estimated one brigade of Shahab-1/2 with 12–18 launchers, and a Shahab-3 unit. The IISS says of the Shahab-3 unit ‘estimated 1 battalion with estimated 6 single launchers each with estimated 4 Shahab-3 strategic IRBM.’

Senior commanders

Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari (Commander-in-chief)^[41]
Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Chief of the Joint Staff)^[42]
Brigadier General Mohammad Pakvar (Revolutionary Guards’ Ground Forces)^[43]
Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh (Revolutionary Guards’ Aerospace Force)^[44]
Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi (Revolutionary Guards’ Navy)^[45]
Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (Commander of the Mobilized Basij forces)^[46]
Major General Qassem Suleimani (Quds Force)^[47] General Suleimani was responsible for negotiating several accords between Iraqi political figures.
Brigadier General Abdol-Ali Najafi (Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps)^[36]

Combat history

Iran–Iraq War

Lebanon Civil War

During the Lebanese Civil War, the IRGC allegedly sent troops to train fighters in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.^[48] In Lebanon, political parties had staunch opinions regarding the IRGC’s presence. Some, mainly the Christian militias such as the Lebanese Forces, Phalanges, and most of the Christian groups declared war on the IRGC, claiming they violated Lebanese sovereignty, while others, including Muslim militias, were neutral to their presence. Groups such as the PSP and Mourabiton did not approve of their presence, but to preserve political alliances they decided to remain silent on the matter.

2006 Lebanon War

During the 2006 Lebanon War, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed by Israeli forces in Baalbek, a town close to the Syrian border.^[49] Israeli officials believe that Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces were responsible for training and equipping the Hezbollah fighters behind the missile attack on the INS Hanit which left four Israeli sailors dead and seriously damaged the vessel.^[50]

2006 plane crash

In January 2006, an IRGC Falcon crashed near Oroumieh, about 560 miles northwest of Tehran, near the Turkish border, Iranian media reported. All fifteen passengers died, including twelve senior IRGC commanders.^[42] Among the dead was General Ahmad Kazemi, the IRGC ground forces commander, and Iran–Iraq War veteran.^[51]

Gen. Masoud Jazayeri, spokesman for the IRGC, told state radio that both of the plane’s engines had failed, its landing gear had jammed, and there was snow and poor visibility at the time.^[52]

Possible attacks on Quds Force

On 7 July 2008, investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh wrote an article in the New Yorker stating that the Bush Administration had signed a Presidential Finding authorizing the CIA‘s Special Activities Division to begin cross border paramilitary operations from Iraq and Afghanistan into Iran. These operations would be against the Quds Force, the commando arm of the IRGC that had been blamed for repeated acts of violence in Iraq, and “high-value targets” in the war on terror.^[53]

October 2009 Pishin bombing

In October 2009, several top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide bombing in the Pishin region of Sistan-Baluchistan, in the south-east of Iran. The Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. The Sunni Baluchi insurgent group Jundullah claimed responsibility for the attack. The Iranian government initially blamed the United States for involvement in the attacks,^[54] as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and later Pakistan for their alleged support of the Jundallah group.^[55]^[56] The United States denied involvement,^[57] but some reports of US assistance to Jundallah during the Bush administration have come from Western sources.^[58] The attacks appear to have originated in Pakistan and several suspects have been arrested.^[59]^[60]

In Syria, 2011–present

Prior to the Syrian war, Iran had between 2,000 and 3,000 IRGC officers stationed in Syria, helping to train local troops and managing supply routes of arms and money to neighboring Lebanon.^[61]

General Qa’ani, Senior officer of Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, said: “If the Islamic Republic was not present in Syria, the massacre of civilians would have been twice as bad. Had physically and non-physically stopped the rebels from killing many more among the Syrian people.”^[62]

Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers, along with fellow Shi’ite forces from Hezbollah and members of Iran’s Basij militia participated in the capture of Qusair from rebel forces on 9 June 2013.^[63]^[64] In 2014, Iran increased its deployment of IRGC in Syria.^[61]

194 IRGC troops have been killed in Syria; almost all of these soldiers were officers, with several even reaching the rank of Brigadier.^[65]^[66] Additionally, 354 Afghan combatants died^[67]^[68] who were fighting under the command of the IRGC, as part of the IRGC-equipped and trained Fatemiyoun Brigade, which is part of Hezbollah Afghanistan.^[69] Another 21 Pakistanis also died as part of the Zainabiyoun Brigade.^[68]^[70] The Afghan and Pakistani immigrants volunteered to go to Syria in exchange for salaries and citizenship. The Afghans were recruited largely from refugees inside Iran, and usually had combat experience before joining the IRGC; their status as members of the Iranian military is only vaguely acknowledged and sometimes denied, despite the troops being uniformed fighters led by IRGC officers. They were trained and equipped in Iran, paid salaries by the Iranian military, and received state funerals involving uniformed IRGC personnel.^[69] Mid to late October 2015 was particularly bloody for the IRGC, due to them stepping up their involvement in offensives around Aleppo. During this time, 30 IRGC officers, including “three generals, battalion commanders, captains and lieutenants” and “one pilot” were killed in fighting in Syria, as were several Afghan and Pakistani auxiliaries.^[71]^[72]

The fallen include General Hossein Hamadani,^[73] Farshad Hosounizadeh (IRGC colonel and former commander of the Saberin Special Forces Brigade), Mostafa Sadrzadeh (commander of the Omar Battalion of the Fatmiyoon Brigade), and Hamid Mojtaba Mokhtarband (IRGC commander).^[72]

Iraq, 2014–present

Two battalions of Revolutionary Guards were reported to be operating in Iraq trying to combat the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive.^[74] The IRGC is considered to be a principle backer of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a loose coalition of Shi’a militias allied with the Iraqi government in its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In addition, Major General Qasem Soleimani has been an instrumental force in the Iranian ground mission in Iraq against ISIS, purportedly planning the Second Battle of Tikrit.^[75] In December 2014, Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi, a veteran of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, was killed by snipers in Samarra.^[76] In May 2017, Shaaban Nassiri, a senior IRGC commander was killed in combat near Mosul, Iraq.^[77]

2014 Israeli drone shoot down

Iran revolutionary guards said that they had shot down an Israeli drone approaching the Natanz nuclear facility.^[78]^[79]^[80] According to ISNA, “The downed aircraft was of the stealth, radar-evasive type … and was targeted by a ground-to-air missile before it managed to enter the area.”^[78]^[80] The statement by revolutionary guards didn’t mention how they recognized it as an Israeli drone. Israel offered no comment.^[79]

Influence

Political

Ayatollah Khomeini urged that the country’s military forces should remain unpoliticized. However, the Constitution, in Article 150, defines the IRGC as the “guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements” which is at least partly a political mission. His original views have therefore been the subject of debate. Supporters of the Basiji have argued for politicization, while reformists, moderates and Hassan Khomeini opposed it. President Rafsanjani forced military professionalization and ideological deradicalization on the IRGC to curb its political role, but the Pasdaran became natural allies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when reformists threatened him.^[81] The IRGC grew stronger under President Ahmedinejad, and assumed formal command of the Basiji militia in early 2009.^[82]

Although never explicitly endorsing or affiliating themselves with any political parties, the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (or Abadgaran), is widely viewed as a political front for the Revolutionary Guards. Many former members (including Ahmadinejad) have joined this party in recent years and the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly given them financial support.

As an elite group, members of Pasdaran have influence in Iran’s political world. President Ahmadinejad joined the IRGC in 1985, serving first in military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan before leaving the front line to take charge of logistics. A majority of his first cabinet consisted of IRGC veterans.^[83] Nearly one third of the members elected to Iran’s Majlis in 2004 are also “Pásdárán“.^[84] Others have been appointed as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors and senior bureaucrats.^[34] However, IRGC veteran status does not imply a single viewpoint.^[81]

Economic activity

IRGC first expanded into commercial activity through informal social networking of veterans and former officials. IRGC officials confiscated assets of many refugees who had fled Iran after the fall of Abolhassan Banisadr’s government. It is now a vast conglomerate, controlling Iran’s missile batteries and nuclear program but also a multibillion-dollar business empire reaching almost all economic sectors.^[13] Estimates have it controlling between a tenth^[85] and around a third of Iran’s economy through a series of subsidiaries and trusts.^[86]

The Los Angeles Times estimates that IRGC has ties to over one hundred companies, with its annual revenue exceeding $12 billion in business and construction.^[87] IRGC has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects.^[88]

The following commercial entities have been named by the United States as owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders.^[89]

Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, the IRGC’s major engineering arm & one of Iran’s largest contractors employing about 25,000 engineers and staff on military (70%) and non-military (30%) projects^[81] worth over $7 billion in 2006.^[89]
Oriental Oil Kish (oil and gas industry)^[90]
Ghorb Nooh^[90]
Sahel Consultant Engineering^[90]
Ghorb Karbala^[90]
Sepasad Engineering Co. (excavation and tunnel construction)^[90]
Omran Sahel^[90]
Hara Company (excavation and tunnel construction)^[90]
Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem^[90]
Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)
Fater Engineering Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)

In September 2009, the Government of Iran sold 51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran to the Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e-Mobin), a group affiliated with the Guards, for the sum of $7.8 billion. This was the largest transaction on the Tehran Stock Exchange in history.^[91]^[92] IRGC also owns 45% participation in automotive Bahman Group and has a majority stake in Iran’s naval giant SADRA through Khatam al-Anbia.^[81]^[93]

The IRGC also exerts influence over bonyads, wealthy, non-governmental ostensibly charitable foundations controlled by key clerics. The pattern of revolutionary foundations mimics the style of informal and extralegal economic networks from the time of the Shah. Their development started in the early 1990s, gathered pace over the next decade, and accelerated even more with many lucrative no-bid contracts from the Ahmadinejad presidency.^[90] The IRGC exerts informal, but real, influence over many such organizations including:

Mostazafan Foundation (Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation)
Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs)^[81]

Analysis

Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that the IRGC is “the spine of the current political structure and a major player in the Iranian economy.”^[94] The once theocratic state has evolved into a garrison state, like Burma, whereby the military dominates social, cultural, political, and economic life, protecting the government from internal rather than external opponents.^[94]

Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations agree, stating that the IRGC has expanded well beyond its mandate and into a “socio-military-political-economic force” that deeply penetrates Iran’s power structure.^[95] “The Guards’ involvement in politics has grown to unprecedented levels since 2004, when IRCG won at least 16 percent of the 290 seats” in the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.^[95] During the elections of March 2008, IRGC veterans won 182 out of 290 seats, helping Mahmoud Ahmadinejadconsolidate power.^[96]

Half of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet was composed of former IRGC officers while several others were appointed to provincial governorships.^[96]

Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute contends that “While the presence of former IRGC officers in the cabinet is not a new phenomenon, their numbers under Ahmadinejad—they occupy nine of the twenty-one ministry portfolios—are unprecedented.”^[97]Additionally, Ahmadinejad successfully purged provincial governorships of Rafsanjani and Khatami supporters and replaced them not only with IRGC members, but also members of the Basij and the Islamic Republic prison administration.^[98]

The IRGC chief, General Mohammad Ali Ja’fari, announced that the Guards’ would go through internal restructuring in order to counter “internal threats to the Islamic Republic.”^[96] Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former CIA analyst, argues the Guards was created to protect the government against a possible coup.^[95]

Since the disputed 2009 presidential elections, debate over how powerful the IRGC is has reemerged. Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh see the irreversible militarization of Iran’s government.^[95] Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, believes the Guards’ power actually exceeds that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.^[95] Frederic Wehrey, adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation believes the Revolutionary Guards is not a cohesive unit of similar-minded conservatives but rather a factionalized institution that is hardly bent on overthrowing their masters.^[95]

Controversy

From its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its part in suppressing dissent has led many analysts to describe the events surrounding the 12 June 2009 presidential election as a military coup, and the IRGC as an authoritarian military security government for which its Shiite clerical system is no more than a facade.^[13]

Since its establishment, IRGC has been involved in many economic and military activities among which some raised controversies. The organization has been accused of smuggling (including importing illegal alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and satellite dishes, into Iran via jetties not supervised by the Government^[81]^[99]^[100]^[101]), training and supplying Hezbollah^[102]^[103] and Hamas^[104] fighters, and of being involved in the Iraq War.^[105]

In December 2009 evidence uncovered during an investigation by the Guardian newspaper and Guardian Films linked the IRGC to the kidnappings of 5 Britons from a government ministry building in Baghdad in 2007. Three of the hostages, Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst and Alec Maclachlan, were killed. Alan Mcmenemy’s body was never found but Peter Moore was released on 30 December 2009. The investigation uncovered evidence that Moore, 37, a computer expert from Lincoln was targeted because he was installing a system for the Iraqi Government that would show how a vast amount of international aid was diverted to Iran’s militia groups in Iraq.^[106]

According to Geneive Abdo IRGC members were appointed “as ambassadors, mayors, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials at state-run economic institutions” during the administration of president Ahmadinejad.^[16] Appointments in 2009 by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have given “hard-liners” in the guard “unprecedented power” and included “some of the most feared and brutal men in Iran.”^[16]

Designation as a terrorist organization

Country/Organization	Date
Bahrain	23 October 2018^[6]
Saudi Arabia	23 October 2018^[6]
United States	8 April 2019^[7]

References and notes …

External links

Official media news outlet used by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (in Persian)
Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari (13 December 2004) “Foxes in Iran’s Henhouse”, New York Times op-ed article about the growing IRGC role in Iran’s power structure
David Ignatius (17 April 2008) “A Blast Still Reverberating” Washington Post Discussion of 1983 Beirut US Embassy bombing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps

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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Date Designated	Name
10/8/1997	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
10/8/1997	Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)
10/8/1997	Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
10/8/1997	Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group – IG)
10/8/1997	HAMAS
10/8/1997	Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
10/8/1997	Hizballah
10/8/1997	Kahane Chai (Kach)
10/8/1997	Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, aka Kongra-Gel)
10/8/1997	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
10/8/1997	National Liberation Army (ELN)
10/8/1997	Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
10/8/1997	Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
10/8/1997	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
10/8/1997	PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
10/8/1997	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
10/8/1997	Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
10/8/1997	Shining Path (SL)
10/8/1999	al-Qa’ida (AQ)
9/25/2000	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
5/16/2001	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
12/26/2001	Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
12/26/2001	Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)
3/27/2002	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
3/27/2002	Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
3/27/2002	al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
8/9/2002	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
10/23/2002	Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
1/30/2003	Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
3/22/2004	Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
7/13/2004	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
12/17/2004	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly al-Qa’ida in Iraq)
6/17/2005	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
3/5/2008	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
3/18/2008	al-Shabaab
5/18/2009	Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
7/2/2009	Kata’ib Hizballah (KH)
1/19/2010	al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
8/6/2010	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
9/1/2010	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
11/4/2010	Jundallah
5/23/2011	Army of Islam (AOI)
9/19/2011	Indian Mujahedeen (IM)
3/13/2012	Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
5/30/2012	Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
9/19/2012	Haqqani Network (HQN)
3/22/2013	Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
11/14/2013	Boko Haram
11/14/2013	Ansaru
12/19/2013	al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB)
1/13/2014	Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi
1/13/2014	Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah
1/13/2014	Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia
4/10/2014	ISIL Sinai Province (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis)
5/15/2014	al-Nusrah Front
8/20/2014	Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)
9/30/2015	Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)
1/14/2016	ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)
5/20/2016	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)
7/1/2016	Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent
8/17/2017	Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
2/28/2018	ISIS-Bangladesh
2/28/2018	ISIS-Philippines
2/28/2018	ISIS-West Africa
5/23/2018	ISIS-Greater Sahara
7/11/2018	al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)
9/6/2018	Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Date Removed	Name	Date Orginally Designated
10/8/1999	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction	10/8/1997
10/8/1999	Khmer Rouge	10/8/1997
10/8/1999	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents	10/8/1997
10/8/2001	Japanese Red Army	10/8/1997
10/8/2001	Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement	10/8/1997
5/18/2009	Revolutionary Nuclei	10/8/1997
10/15/2010	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	10/8/1997
9/28/2012	Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)	10/8/1997
5/28/2013	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)	10/11/2005
7/15/2014	United Self Defense Forces of Colombia	9/10/2001
9/3/2015	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)	10/8/1997
12/9/2015	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	12/17/2004
6/1/2017	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	10/8/1997

Category	Mar. 2018	Jan. 2019	Feb. 2019	Mar. 2019	Change from: Feb. 2019- Mar. 2019
Employment status
Civilian noninstitutional population	257,097	258,239	258,392	258,537	145
Civilian labor force	161,646	163,229	163,184	162,960	-224
Participation rate	62.9	63.2	63.2	63.0	-0.2
Employed	155,160	156,694	156,949	156,748	-201
Employment-population ratio	60.4	60.7	60.7	60.6	-0.1
Unemployed	6,486	6,535	6,235	6,211	-24
Unemployment rate	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.8	0.0
Not in labor force	95,451	95,010	95,208	95,577	369

Unemployment rates
Total, 16 years and over	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.8	0.0
Adult men (20 years and over)	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.6	0.1
Adult women (20 years and over)	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.3	-0.1
Teenagers (16 to 19 years)	13.4	12.9	13.4	12.8	-0.6
White	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.4	0.1
Black or African American	6.8	6.8	7.0	6.7	-0.3
Asian	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	0.0
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity	5.1	4.9	4.3	4.7	0.4

Total, 25 years and over	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.1	0.0
Less than a high school diploma	5.6	5.7	5.3	5.9	0.6
High school graduates, no college	4.3	3.8	3.8	3.7	-0.1
Some college or associate degree	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.4	0.2
Bachelor’s degree and higher	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.0	-0.2

Reason for unemployment
Job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs	3,107	3,082	2,857	2,837	-20
Job leavers	860	805	840	779	-61
Reentrants	1,966	1,945	1,905	2,007	102
New entrants	615	606	623	614	-9

Duration of unemployment
Less than 5 weeks	2,266	2,325	2,194	2,126	-68
5 to 14 weeks	1,976	2,013	1,810	1,815	5
15 to 26 weeks	900	902	942	950	8
27 weeks and over	1,337	1,252	1,271	1,305	34

Employed persons at work part time
Part time for economic reasons	4,969	5,147	4,310	4,499	189
Slack work or business conditions	2,989	3,451	2,792	2,909	117
Could only find part-time work	1,620	1,419	1,347	1,329	-18
Part time for noneconomic reasons	21,439	20,949	21,153	21,297	144

Persons not in the labor force (not seasonally adjusted)
Marginally attached to the labor force	1,454	1,614	1,424	1,357	–
Discouraged workers	450	426	428	412	–
– Over-the-month changes are not displayed for not seasonally adjusted data. NOTE: Persons whose ethnicity is identified as Hispanic or Latino may be of any race. Detail for the seasonally adjusted data shown in this table will not necessarily add to totals because of the independent seasonal adjustment of the various series. Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data.

Category	Mar. 2018	Jan. 2019	Feb. 2019(P)	Mar. 2019(P)
EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED INDUSTRY (Over-the-month change, in thousands)
Total nonfarm	182	312	33	196
Total private	173	297	28	182
Goods-producing	30	80	-28	12
Mining and logging	8	7	-4	2
Construction	2	56	-25	16
Manufacturing	20	17	1	-6
Durable goods(1)	21	19	1	-7
Motor vehicles and parts	3.6	-1.1	1.3	-6.3
Nondurable goods	-1	-2	0	1
Private service-providing	143	217	56	170
Wholesale trade	7.5	7.8	10.2	-2.0
Retail trade	1.2	9.3	-20.2	-11.7
Transportation and warehousing	22.5	30.2	-3.7	7.3
Utilities	-0.2	0.3	-1.1	1.3
Information	12	-12	-4	10
Financial activities	9	6	6	11
Professional and business services(1)	42	5	54	37
Temporary help services	-0.8	-26.3	3.1	-5.4
Education and health services(1)	37	68	13	70
Health care and social assistance	41.6	41.7	31.2	61.2
Leisure and hospitality	11	93	-1	33
Other services	1	9	3	14
Government	9	15	5	14

(3-month average change, in thousands)
Total nonfarm	228	245	191	180
Total private	221	240	183	169

WOMEN AND PRODUCTION AND NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AS A PERCENT OF ALL EMPLOYEES(2)
Total nonfarm women employees	49.6	49.7	49.8	49.8
Total private women employees	48.2	48.3	48.4	48.4
Total private production and nonsupervisory employees	82.4	82.4	82.4	82.4

HOURS AND EARNINGS ALL EMPLOYEES
Total private
Average weekly hours	34.5	34.5	34.4	34.5
Average hourly earnings	$26.84	$27.56	$27.66	$27.70
Average weekly earnings	$925.98	$950.82	$951.50	$955.65
Index of aggregate weekly hours (2007=100)(3)	109.0	110.9	110.6	111.1
Over-the-month percent change	0.2	0.2	-0.3	0.5
Index of aggregate weekly payrolls (2007=100)(4)	139.8	146.1	146.3	147.1
Over-the-month percent change	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.5

DIFFUSION INDEX (Over 1-month span)(5)
Total private (258 industries)	65.3	59.1	59.3	60.5
Manufacturing (76 industries)	67.1	57.9	55.3	54.6
Footnotes (1) Includes other industries, not shown separately. (2) Data relate to production employees in mining and logging and manufacturing, construction employees in construction, and nonsupervisory employees in the service-providing industries. (3) The indexes of aggregate weekly hours are calculated by dividing the current month’s estimates of aggregate hours by the corresponding annual average aggregate hours. (4) The indexes of aggregate weekly payrolls are calculated by dividing the current month’s estimates of aggregate weekly payrolls by the corresponding annual average aggregate weekly payrolls. (5) Figures are the percent of industries with employment increasing plus one-half of the industries with unchanged employment, where 50 percent indicates an equal balance between industries with increasing and decreasing employment. (P) Preliminary
NOTE: Data have been revised to reflect March 2018 benchmark levels and updated seasonal adjustment factors.

Appendix Table A: Uninsured Rate Among the Nonelderly by State, 2013-2017
	2013 Uninsured Rate	2016 Uninsured Rate	2017 Uninsured Rate	Change in Uninsured Rate 2013-2017	Change in Number of Uninsured 2013-2017	Change in Uninsured Rate 2016-2017	Change in Number of Uninsured 2016-2017
US Total	16.8%	10.0%	10.2%	-6.6%	-17,037,000	0.2%	684,800
Expansion States	15.1%	7.7%	7.6%	-7.4%	-12,070,200	0.0%	4,400
Alaska	20.5%	16.0%	15.5%	-4.9%	-32,900	-0.5%	-4,900
Arizona	20.4%	11.9%	12.0%	-8.4%	-435,600	0.1%	11,600
Arkansas	19.0%	9.5%	9.6%	-9.5%	-230,300	0.1%	2,400
California	19.4%	8.4%	8.2%	-11.2%	-3,619,900	-0.2%	-48,700
Colorado	15.8%	8.7%	8.6%	-7.2%	-306,600	-0.1%	-3,400
Connecticut	10.9%	5.7%	6.6%	-4.3%	-129,900	0.9%	25,600
Delaware	11.8%	6.8%	6.6%	-5.2%	-38,600	-0.1%	-1,000
District of Columbia	7.2%	4.5%	4.1%	-3.1%	-15,000	-0.4%	-1,900
Hawaii	8.2%	4.1%	4.5%	-3.7%	-41,800	0.4%	3,200
Illinois	14.5%	7.5%	7.9%	-6.6%	-739,500	0.4%	37,400
Indiana	16.3%	9.4%	9.8%	-6.5%	-358,700	0.4%	23,300
Iowa	10.3%	4.8%	5.2%	-5.1%	-129,900	0.4%	9,400
Kentucky	16.8%	6.0%	6.4%	-10.4%	-380,900	0.4%	14,700
Louisiana	19.2%	11.9%	9.7%	-9.6%	-375,800	-2.2%	-85,600
Maryland	11.5%	7.0%	7.1%	-4.4%	-220,500	0.1%	6,100
Massachusetts	4.4%	2.9%	3.2%	-1.2%	-63,200	0.3%	18,900
Michigan	12.9%	6.3%	6.1%	-6.9%	-571,800	-0.2%	-19,400
Minnesota	9.6%	4.9%	5.2%	-4.3%	-194,900	0.3%	15,000
Montana	19.9%	10.1%	11.0%	-8.9%	-72,700	0.8%	7,200
Nevada	23.5%	12.8%	12.9%	-10.6%	-235,000	0.1%	6,100
New Hampshire	12.8%	7.6%	6.8%	-6.0%	-66,400	-0.8%	-9,000
New Jersey	15.4%	8.9%	8.9%	-6.5%	-488,200	0.0%	-1,000
New Mexico	22.3%	10.7%	10.7%	-11.6%	-205,600	0.1%	1,500
New York	12.5%	7.0%	6.7%	-5.8%	-961,800	-0.3%	-58,600
North Dakota	12.0%	9.1%	8.7%	-3.3%	-17,500	-0.4%	-2,700
Ohio	12.9%	6.6%	6.9%	-6.0%	-579,800	0.3%	29,100
Oregon	17.5%	7.3%	8.1%	-9.4%	-296,500	0.8%	28,900
Pennsylvania	11.5%	7.0%	6.6%	-4.8%	-508,400	-0.3%	-35,400
Rhode Island	14.1%	5.0%	5.3%	-8.7%	-74,700	0.3%	2,900
Vermont	8.3%	4.4%	5.1%	-3.2%	-17,100	0.7%	3,300
Washington	16.2%	6.9%	7.1%	-9.2%	-519,300	0.2%	15,800
West Virginia	16.3%	6.0%	7.1%	-9.2%	-141,400	1.1%	13,600
Non-Expansion States	19.6%	13.8%	14.3%	-5.3%	-4,966,700	0.6%	680,400
Alabama	16.0%	10.9%	11.3%	-4.7%	-191,700	0.4%	16,200
Florida	24.4%	15.3%	15.9%	-8.5%	-1,179,400	0.6%	133,400
Georgia	21.2%	14.8%	15.4%	-5.9%	-466,400	0.6%	62,800
Idaho	18.6%	12.1%	12.6%	-6.0%	-73,400	0.6%	10,900
Kansas	14.3%	9.8%	10.0%	-4.3%	-106,200	0.2%	4,500
Maine	13.4%	9.7%	9.8%	-3.7%	-41,500	0.0%	-200
Mississippi	19.7%	13.8%	14.3%	-5.5%	-144,000	0.5%	9,200
Missouri	15.3%	10.6%	10.8%	-4.5%	-228,800	0.2%	6,100
Nebraska	12.4%	10.3%	10.0%	-2.4%	-35,300	-0.3%	-4,500
North Carolina	18.2%	12.3%	12.7%	-5.5%	-422,500	0.4%	38,500
Oklahoma	20.6%	16.1%	16.4%	-4.2%	-130,200	0.3%	7,000
South Carolina	18.6%	11.8%	13.4%	-5.1%	-186,600	1.6%	66,100
South Dakota	14.6%	9.8%	11.0%	-3.5%	-23,900	1.2%	8,200
Tennessee	16.3%	10.8%	11.1%	-5.2%	-267,700	0.3%	23,600
Texas	24.6%	18.7%	19.6%	-5.0%	-879,100	0.9%	275,300
Utah	14.8%	9.4%	10.0%	-4.7%	-106,300	0.6%	19,800
Virginia	14.2%	10.3%	10.2%	-3.9%	-266,700	0.0%	-400
Wisconsin	10.5%	6.1%	6.1%	-4.4%	-213,900	-0.1%	-3,600
Wyoming	14.7%	12.7%	14.5%	-0.1%	-3,100	1.8%	7,400
NOTES: Includes nonelderly individuals ages 0-64. Expansion status reflects the implementation of Medicaid expansion as of 2017. SOURCE: Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of 2013, 2016, and 2017 American Community Survey (ACS), 1-Year Estimates.

Appendix Table B: Characteristics of the Nonelderly Uninsured, 2017
	Nonelderly (millions)	Percent of Nonelderly	Uninsured (millions)	Percent of Uninsured	Uninsured Rate
Total Nonelderly	267.5	100.0%	27.4	100.0%	10.2%
Age
Children – Total	76.1	28.5%	3.8	13.8%	5.0%
Nonelderly Adults – Total	191.4	71.5%	23.6	86.2%	12.3%
Adults 19 – 25	28.3	10.6%	4.2	15.4%	14.8%
Adults 26 – 34	39.1	14.6%	6.1	22.3%	15.6%
Adults 35 – 44	40.5	15.1%	5.5	20.2%	13.6%
Adults 45 – 54	41.8	15.6%	4.5	16.3%	10.7%
Adults 55 – 64	41.6	15.6%	3.3	12.0%	7.9%
Annual Family Income
<$20,000	31.8	11.9%	5.5	20.0%	17.2%
$20,000 – <$40,000	42.8	16.0%	7.4	27.0%	17.3%
$40,000+	192.9	72.1%	14.5	53.0%	7.5%
Family Poverty Level
<100%	30.4	11.4%	5.0	18.4%	16.6%
100% – <200%	45.3	16.9%	7.8	28.5%	17.2%
200% – <400%	81.9	30.6%	9.6	35.2%	11.7%
400%+	109.9	41.1%	4.9	18.0%	4.5%
Household Type
1 Parent with Children	19.0	7.1%	1.3	4.9%	7.1%
2 Parents with Children	84.2	31.5%	6.0	22.0%	7.2%
Multigenerational	18.7	7.0%	2.2	7.9%	11.6%
Adults Living Alone or with Other Adults	111.7	41.8%	13.2	48.3%	11.8%
Other	33.9	12.7%	4.6	16.9%	13.6%
Family Work Status
2+ Full-time	101.8	38.1%	8.6	31.5%	8.5%
1 Full-time	119.3	44.6%	12.4	45.3%	10.4%
Only Part-time	19.5	7.3%	2.8	10.4%	14.6%
Non-workers	26.9	10.1%	3.5	12.8%	13.0%
Race/Ethnicity
White	154.3	57.7%	11.3	41.3%	7.3%
Black	34.0	12.7%	3.8	13.8%	11.1%
Hispanic	53.5	20.0%	10.1	36.9%	18.9%
Asian/N. Hawaiian and Pacific Islander	15.9	5.9%	1.1	4.2%	7.2%
American Indian/Alaska Native	1.8	0.7%	0.4	1.5%	22.0%
Two or More Races	8.0	3.0%	0.6	2.3%	7.9%
Citizenship
U.S. Citizen – Native	230.6	86.2%	18.9	69.2%	8.2%
U.S. Citizen – Naturalized	16.7	6.2%	1.7	6.1%	10.0%
Non-U.S. Citizen, Residents for <5 Years	6.4	2.4%	1.7	6.4%	27.2%
Non-U.S. Citizen, Residents for 5+ Years	13.9	5.2%	5.0	18.3%	36.0%
NOTES: Includes nonelderly individuals ages 0-64. The U.S. Census Bureau’s poverty threshold for a family with two adults and one child was $19,730 in 2017. Parent includes any person with a dependent child. Multigenerational/other families with children include families with at least three generations in a household, plus families in which adults are caring for children other than their own. Part-time workers were defined as working <35 hours per week. Respondents who identify as mixed race who do not also identify as Hispanic fall intot he “Two or More Races” category. All individuals who identify as Hispanic ethnicity fall into the Hispanic category regardless of race. SOURCE: Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of 2017 American Community Survey (ACS), 1-Year Estimates.

Recent actual, projected and proposed refugee admissions
Year	Africa	%	East Asia	%	Europe	%	Latin America and Caribbean	%	Near East and South Asia	%	Unallocated reserve	Total
FY 2012 actual arrivals^[10]	10,608	18.21	14,366	24.67	1,129	1.94	2,078	3.57	30,057	51.61	–	58,238
FY 2013 ceiling^[10]	12,000		17,000		2,000		5,000		31,000		3,000	70,000
FY 2013 actual arrivals^[11]	15,980	22.85	16,537	23.65	580	0.83	4,439	6.35	32,389	46.32	–	69,925
FY 2014 ceiling^[11]	15,000		14,000		1,000		5,000		33,000		2,000	70,000
FY 2014 actual arrivals^[12]	17,476	24.97	14,784	21.12	959	1.37	4,318	6.17	32,450	46.36	–	69,987
FY 2015 ceiling^[12]	17,000		13,000		1,000		4,000		33,000		2,000	70,000
FY 2015 actual arrivals^[13]	22,472	32.13	18,469	26.41	2,363	3.38	2,050	2.93	24,579	35.14	–	69,933
FY 2016 ceiling^[13]	25,000		13,000		4,000		3,000		34,000		6,000	85,000
FY 2016 actual arrivals^[14]	31,625	37.21	12,518	14.73	3,957	4.65	1,340	1.57	35,555	41.83	–	84,995
FY 2017 ceiling^[15]	35,000		12,000		4,000		5,000		40,000		14,000	110,000
FY 2017 actual arrivals^[16]	20,232	37.66	5,173	9.63	5,205	9.69	1,688	3.14	21,418	39.87	–	53,716
FY 2018 ceiling^[17]	19,000		5,000		2,000		1,500		17,500		–	45,000
FY 2018 actual arrivals^[18]	10,459	46.50	3,668	16.31	3,612	16.06	955	4.25	3,797	16.88	–	22,491
FY 2019 ceiling^[19]	11,000		4,000		3,000		3,000		9,000		–	30,000
*FY 2019 actual arrivals^[20]	3,473	59.28	893	15.24	1,095	18.69	135	2.30	263	4.49	–	5,859

Archive for April, 2019

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Mark Levin on why Obama may have been spying on Trump

What happens if Obama was involved in illegal surveillance?

Byron York reacts to Clapper denying wiretap of Trump

WATCH: Barr says memo on Mueller investigation was ‘entirely proper’

Trump on border cages: ‘President Obama separated the children’

Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars • FULL DOCUMENTARY FILM • BRAVE NEW FILMS

How Many Civilians Have Been Killed By US Drones?

Amnesty: Obama should explain why drones killed civilians

Obama admits drone strikes kill innocent Pakistanis

Former Drone Pilots Denounce ‘Morally Outrageous’ Program | NBC News

America’s Ex-Drone Pilot

Bill Barr says he IS reviewing FBI conduct that kicked off Mueller probe as Democrats vow court battle to get un-redacted version of report he says will be out in a week

READ IN FULL: Attorney General Barr’s letter to Congress summarizing the Mueller investigation findings

MUELLER REPORT: Timeline of events in Mueller’s investigation

Barr ‘reviewing the conduct’ of FBI’s 2016 probe of Trump team Russia contacts

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