Steve Bannon and Kyle Bass discuss America’s current geopolitical landscape regarding China. Bannon and Bass take a deep dive into Chinese infiltration in U.S. institutions, China’s aggressiveness in the South China sea, and the potential for global conflict in the next few years. Filmed on October 5, 2018 at an undisclosed location.
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Founder & Chief Investment Officer,
Hayman Capital Management
J. Kyle Bass (born September 7, 1969) is an Americanhedge fund manager. He is the founder and principal of Hayman Capital Management, L.P., a Dallas-based hedge fund focused on global events.[1]
Despite his early success in predicting subprime mortgages, he has received criticism for subsequent poor performance of investments.[3] Bass has made prominent bets based on predictions of debt crisis in Japan and European sovereign debt, and shorted the Chinese yuan premised on a predicted collapse in the Chinese banking system. His fund has also challenged patents held by drug companies and shorted their stocks. His Japanese and European strategies have not been major successes and the Chinese yuan short led to severe losses for his fund in 2017.[4][5] The drug patent challenge campaign fizzled after several legal setbacks.[6]
Contents
Early life
Bass was born on September 7, 1969, in Miami, Florida, where his father managed the Fontainebleau Hotel. His father later moved the family to Dallas, Texas where he managed the Dallas Convention and Visitors Bureau.[7] Bass attended Texas Christian University on an academic and Division I diving scholarship. In 1992, Bass graduated with honors, earning a B.B.A. in finance with a concentration in real estate.[8]
Career
Before founding Hayman Capital Management in 2005, Bass briefly worked at Prudential Securities from 1992-1994 before joining Bear Stearns in 1994.[9] At Bear Stearns, he rose through the ranks rapidly, becoming a senior managing director at the age of 28 – among the youngest in the firm’s history to carry such a title.[2][8]
In 2001, he joined Legg Mason, signing a five-year deal to form the firm’s first institutional equity office in Texas. Bass told his hiring managers, “In five years and one day, I [will] be launching my own firm.”[9] While at Legg Mason, Bass advised hedge funds and other institutional clients on special situation investment strategies.[2]
In December 2005, when Legg Mason sold the portion of the business where he worked, Bass left Legg Mason and started Hayman Capital Management to serve as the investment manager to a “global special situations” hedge fund that he planned to launch. Bass launched Hayman Capital Management, L.P. with $33 million in assets under management – $5 million he had saved on his own and the balance he had raised from outside investors.[9] Shortly after launching the hedge fund in February 2006, Bass became convinced that there was a residential real-estate bubble in the United States one of the few investors to successfully predict and benefit from the subprime mortgage crisis, bringing him notoriety in the financial services industry.
In 2010, Bass testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. During his testimony, he addressed his analysis of the factors that caused the crisis.
After enjoying success in predicting the subprime mortgage crisis and moderate success with debt in Greece and Japan, Bass would make a string of poor bets, leading to a dramatic downsizing of his fund. In April 2014, Bass was among a very few defenders of GM for its failure to address a defect that had been tied to 13 deaths. Hayman at the time owned eight million shares of G.M., making it Hayman’s single biggest holding,[11] Coming to the defense of GM, Bass said on CNBC that of the 13 passengers who had died owing to the defect, 12 “either weren’t wearing their seatbelt or were under the influence of alcohol.” [12] Bass admitted in a late 2014 interview that it had been “a tough year” for Hayman due to owning a lot of GM stock, which was the fund’s biggest position in 2014.[13]
After the losing year in 2014, investor’s pulled out nearly a quarter of Hayman’s capital and the firm was forced to liquidate most of its stock holdings.[14] Bass called 2015 one of his fund’s worst years.[15] By early 2019, Hayman had $423.6 million in discretionary assets under management, down from $2.3 billion at the end of 2014.[16]
Fund performance
The long term performance of Hayman Capital’s flagship fund is described by the New York Post as “small caliber”.[14] In the period from 2008 to mid-2015, the flagship fund experienced a very modest annualized performance of 1.56%.[14] The flagship fund had a tremendously successful year in 2007, having gained 212%, based on the subprime mortgage meltdown bet that brought fame to Bass.[14] The fund also gained 16% in 2012 based on bets on Greek debt. The fund lost 1.4% in 2014 and suffered its worst year in 2017 with a 19% loss (in contrast to a 19% surge of the S&P 500) due to Hayman’s misplaced short on a collapse in the Chinese yuan.[14][5]
Investment positions
Subprime mortgages
Bass first began formulating his subprime strategy after he met with an investment banker from New York while attending a wedding in Spain where they discussed how and why the Subprime Mezzanine CDO business existed.[17][18] After returning to the US, Bass hired several private investigators to determine the ease of obtaining a mortgage. Bass spent a significant amount of time studying the residential mortgage market and performed research to identify which residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) composed of low-quality mortgages were most likely to default. This investment thesis was expressed by purchasing credit default swaps against the securitizations he deemed to be most unstable, which essentially was a manner of shorting the bonds using synthetic instruments. After purchasing the positions for his flagship fund in 2006, Bass raised additional capital for a special fund dedicated exclusively to capitalizing on the opportunity that existed in the market place. Bass managed or advised over $4 billion of positions in subprime RMBS.
In December 2007, after a wave of foreclosures had swept across the US, Bass was featured on Bloomberg TV as making a fortune betting against these subprime securities.
Europe and Japanese debt “doomsday”
After the subprime debt crisis occurred, Bass decided that it was the symptom of a more significant problem with debt and made predictions about debt “doomsday” in Europe and Japan. In 2009 he warned about the possibility of defaults by major countries over the next 3 years.[19] As of 2010, 10-15% of his portfolio was involved in bets against European and Japanese sovereign debts.[20] He went as far predicted that 2012 would be a “doomsday year” for Europe and spoke of a looming breakup of the Eurozone, which, he declared, would lead to defaults in Japan and the United States. He stated in June 2012, “Europe goes first, then Japan and finally the United States.”[21]
Bass has since 2012 also predicted a “full blown crisis” in Japan describing its approach to financing debt as a Ponzi scheme similar to Bernie Madoff‘s investment scam. Most experts have disagreed with his analysis.[22][23] Cullen Roche criticized Bass’s Japan analysis in August 2010, noting that Bass comparing Japan to the EU was an error, since their monetary systems are wildly different. Roche stated “people still fail to understand that a nation with monetary sovereignty that is the supplier of currency in a floating exchange rate system never has a problem funding itself.”[24] In May 2012, Business Insider agreed, faulting Bass’s analysis, since debt-to-GDP ratios do not reflect the interest rate or credit risk of a nation. The Business Insider noted that in a nation that borrows its own currency, public spending finances borrowing.[25]
He has been vocal in public appearances about future calamities stemming from financial meltdown. September 14, 2011, Bass maintained on CNBC that Greece’s only way out of its debt mess was a restructuring. Bass noted that despite the strife it would bring to Greece it was the only measure the nation could take. He added that within a year all of Europe would be in default as well.[26] In a speech reported on January 1, 2014, he assured the audience of his confidence that the next few years would be rife with turmoil, including the eruption of major wars. In his speech, he claimed that with the growing debt and inability to pay it off, eventually social unrest will lead to violent outbreaks. Bass finished his speech stating “War is coming – just as it has throughout history.” [27]
Chinese banking collapse
Starting in July 2015, Bass made a multiyear bet against the Chinese yuan based on a predicted banking collapse in China.[28] Bass would close out his position against the Chinese currency in early 2019 when the predicted devaluation of the currency didn’t occur.[28]
Bass argued in 2015 that the Chinese banking system was undercapitalized and its foreign reserves would be insufficient in a crisis. Bass predicted a hard landing for the Chinese economy following a bank crisis and a severe devaluation of the Chinese currency, variously given as “somewhere between 15%-20%” and “30 to 40 percent”.[29][30]
Hayman suffered its worst year in 2017 with a loss of 19% due to the strengthening of the Chinese yuan.[5]
Drug patent challenge campaign
Bass has attempted to profit from filing and publicizing patent challenges against pharmaceutical companies while also betting against their shares.[31][32] After 2 years of setbacks in his effort, Bass by 2017 ended his patent challenges.[6]
In 2015, Bass organized the Coalition For Affordable Drugs (CFAD) to use the inter partes review (IPR) process to challenge patent validity.[33][34] When he initiated this practice in January 2015, he claimed that his motive was to encourage competition in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and thus bring down prices.[35]
Bass filed a total of 35 patent challenges, in collaboration with Erich Spangenberg who has been called “the world’s most notorious patent troll”,[3] including 33 filed by CFAD and two filed by Bass personally on a not-for-profit basis.[36]
In June 2015, Celgene received permission from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to file a motion seeking sanctions against the CFAD for allegedly abusing the patent-review process. The Wall Street Journal noted that this development was “being closely watched because it raises the possibility that patent officials may put an end” to Bass’s patent-challenge scheme. Celgene also told the patent office, through counsel, that CFAD had threatened to challenge its patents unless Celgene met CFAD’s demands.[37]
In October 2016, Bass prevailed in the case, with USPTO invalidating the two Celgene Corp patents related to its cancer drugs Revlimid, Pomalyst, and Thalomid at issue.[38] However, one year later Celgene was able to convince the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to re-hear the case.[39]
Political relationships
Trump administration
Bass is described by a ProPublica story as a friend of Tommy Hicks Jr, a private investor, who was a hunting buddy to Donald Trump Jr. and had further ties to the Trump administration.[40] According to the investigative story on improper links between Hicks and the Trump administration, Hicks had obtained a hearing for Bass with high level officials at an interagency meeting at the Treasury Department to air views on China.[40] This meeting was at the time Bass held a large short position counting on the fall of the Chinese currency.[40]
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
The BBC has described Bass as having a “good relationship” with Argentina’s president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.[41] In February 2014, Bass said that Argentinian bonds represented a profitable opportunity and called Argentina most “interesting” nation for investments. He was virtually alone in this assessment, with one observer noting the poor state of the Argentine economy. The IB Times noted that the country had “cheated creditors seven times since it gained independence from Spain in 1816,” most recently defaulting on its debt in 1989.[42] When the Argentine government defaulted on its debt in July 2014, Bass supported the move and criticized the bondholders, notably Elliott Management and Aurelius Capital, that, with the support of U.S. federal judge Thomas Griesa, had held out for full payment. Echoing Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, he called these creditors “vultures,” said that they were “holding up 42 million people from progress,” and were holding Argentina for “ransom”.[43] On August 27, 2014, Bass accused Elliott’s Paul Singer of “holding poor countries as hostages,” prompting The New York Post to comment in an editorial the next day that Bass had “sounded more like Argentina’s leftist economy minister Axel Kicillof than a US hedge-fund manager.” [44]
Philanthropy
Bass serves on the board or in an advisory role for a number of charities and organizations.
He has advised the University of Texas System Investment Management Company (UTIMCO), a public university endowment since 2010.
n early 2017, Kevin Mallory was struggling financially. After years of drawing a government salary as a member of the military and as a CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency officer, he was behind on his mortgage and $230,000 in debt. Though he had, like many veteran intelligence officials, ventured into the private sector, where the pay can be considerably better, things still weren’t going well; his consulting business was floundering.
Then, prosecutors said, he received a message on LinkedIn, where he had more than 500 connections. It had come from a Chinese recruiter with whom Mallory had five mutual connections. The recruiter, according to the message, worked for a think tank in China, where Mallory, who spoke fluent Mandarin, had been based for part of his career. The think tank, the recruiter said, was interested in Mallory’s foreign-policy expertise. The LinkedIn message led to a phone call with a man who called himself Michael Yang. According to the FBI, the initial conversations that would lead Mallory down a path of betrayal were conducted in the bland language of professional courtesy. That February, according to a search warrant, Yang sent Mallory an email requesting “another short phone call with you to address several points.” Mallory replied, “So I can be prepared, will we be speaking via Skype or will you be calling my mobile device?”
Soon after, Mallory was on a plane to meet Yang in Shanghai. He would later tell the FBI he suspected that Yang was not a think-tank employee, but a Chinese intelligence officer, which apparently was okay by him. Mallory’s trip to China began an espionage relationship that saw him receive $25,000 over two months in exchange for handing over government secrets, the criminal complaint shows. The FBI eventually caught him with a digital memory card containing eight secret and top-secret documents that had details of a still-classified spying operation, according to NBC, which followed the case along with other major outlets. Mallory also had a special phone he’d received from Yang to send encrypted communications. Gone was the polite, careful language from their initial conversations. “Your object is to gain information,” Mallory told Yang in one of the texts on the device. “And my object is to be paid.” Mallory was charged under the Espionage Act with selling U.S. secrets to China and convicted by a jury last spring. Mallory’s attorneys alleged that he’d been trying to uncover Chinese spies, but a judge dismissed the idea that he was working as a double agent, a defense that otheraccusedspieshave tried to deploy. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison in May; his lawyers plan to appeal the conviction.If Mallory’s story was unique, he’d just be a tragic example of a former intelligence officer gone astray. But in the past year, two other former U.S. intelligence officers pleaded guilty to espionage-related charges involving China. They are an alarming sign for the U.S. intelligence community, which sees China in the same tier as Russia as America’s top espionage threat.
Ron Hansen, 59, is a former DIA officer fluent in both Mandarin and Russian, who had already received thousands of dollars from Chinese intelligence agents over several years by the time the FBI caught him last year, court documents show. Hansen gave the Chinese sensitive intelligence information and, the FBI alleged in its criminal complaint, export-controlled encryption software. He told the FBI that in early 2015, Chinese intelligence officers offered him $300,000 a year “in exchange for providing ‘consulting services,’” according to the complaint. He was caught when he began asking a DIA case officer to pass him information. Among his requests were classified documents about national defense and “United States military readiness in a particular region,” according to the Justice Department.The case of Jerry Chung Shing Lee, 54, a former CIA officer, is perhaps the most enigmatic. After leaving the CIA in 2007, Lee moved to Hong Kong and started a private business, but it never really took off, according to the indictment. In 2010, Chinese intelligence operatives approached him, offering money for information. According to the Justice Department, he conspired to pass his handlers sensitive intelligence, and had created a document including “certain locations to which the CIA would assign officers with certain identified experience, as well as the particular location and timeframe of a sensitive CIA operation.” Lee also possessed an address book that “contained handwritten notes … related to his work as a CIA case officer prior to 2004. These notes included … intelligence provided by CIA assets, true names of assets, operational meeting locations and phone numbers, and information about covert facilities.” The ramifications of Lee’s leaks are still unknown. While NBC reported last year that U.S. authorities suspect that the information Lee passed to his handlers helped lead to the death or imprisonment of some 20 U.S. agents, a subsequent Yahoo News report blamed the compromise on a massive communications breach initiated by Iran.
Espionage and counterespionage have been essential tools of statecraft for centuries, of course, and U.S. and Chinese intelligence agencies have been battling one another for decades. But what these recent cases suggest is that the intelligence war is escalating—that China has increased both the scope and the sophistication of its efforts to steal secrets from the U.S. “The fact that we have caught three at the same time is telling of how focused China is on the U.S.,” John Demers, the head of the National Security Division at the Justice Department, which brought the charges against Mallory, Hansen, and Lee, told me. “If you think about what it takes to co-opt three people, you start to appreciate the actual extent of their efforts. There may be people we haven’t caught, and then you have to acknowledge that probably a small percentage of the people who’ve been approached ever go as far as these three did.”
Many espionage cases don’t go public. “Some of the cases rarely see the light of a courtroom, because there’s classified material we’re not willing to risk,” one U.S. intelligence official told me, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. “Sometimes they’re not charged at all and are handled through other means. And there are others that remain ongoing that have not and will not become public.”
These recent cases provide just a small glimpse of the growing intelligence war that is playing out in the shadows of the U.S.-China struggle for global dominance, and of the aggressiveness and skillfulness with which China is waging it. As China advances economically and technologically, its spy services are keeping pace: Their intelligence officers are more sophisticated, the tools at their disposal are more powerful, and they are engaged in what appears to be an intensifying array of espionage operations that have their American counterparts on the defensive. China’s efforts aimed at former U.S. intelligence officers are just one part of a Chinese campaign that U.S. officials say also includes cyberattacks against U.S. government databases and companies, stealing trade secrets from the private sector, using venture-capital investment to acquire sensitive technology, and targeting universities and research institutions.
By their nature, espionage wars are conducted in the shadows and hard to see clearly. But in recent weeks I spoke with several current and former U.S. officials, including America’s counterintelligence chief, who have been on the front lines of the one being waged between the U.S. and China, to get a sense of how it is being fought, of China’s intelligence operations—the methods, the targets, the goals—and of what the U.S. needs to do to combat it.
China has been seeking to turn American spies for decades. But the rules of the game have changed. About 10 years ago, Charity Wright was a young U.S. military linguist training at the elite Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at a base called the Presidio in Monterey, California. Like many of her peers, Wright relied on taxis to visit the city. There were usually a few waiting outside the base’s gate. She’d been assigned to the institute’s Mandarin program, so she felt lucky to frequently find herself in the cab of an old man who told her he’d emigrated from China years ago. He was inquisitive in a way she found charming at first, letting her practice her new language skills as he asked about her background and family. After several months, though, she grew suspicious. The old man seemed to have an unusually good memory, and his questions were becoming more specific: Where is it that your father works? What will you be doing for the military once you graduate?Wright had been briefed on the possibility of foreign intelligence operatives collecting information on the institute’s trainees, building profiles for potential recruitment, given that many of them would move on to careers in intelligence. She reported the man to an officer at the base. Not long after, she heard that he’d been arrested and that there had been a crackdown in Monterey on a suspected Chinese spy ring.
Wright went on to spend five years as a cryptologic language analyst with the National Security Agency, assessing communications intercepts from China. Now she works in private-sector cybersecurity. As a reservist, she still holds a U.S. government clearance that allows her access to classified secrets. And she’s still the target of what she suspects are Chinese espionage efforts. Only these days, the agents don’t approach her in person. They get in touch the same way they reached Kevin Mallory: online. She gets messages through LinkedIn and other social-media sites proposing various opportunities in China: a contract with a consulting firm, a trip to speak at a conference for a generous stipend. The offers seem tempting, but this type of outreach comes straight from the Chinese-spy playbook. “I’ve heard that they can be very convincing, and by the time you fly over, they’ve got you in their lair,” Wright told me.
The tactics she saw from the old man in Monterey were “cut and dry HUMINT,” or human intelligence, she said. They were old school. But those tactics have been amplified by the tools of the social-media age, which allow intelligence officers to reach out to their targets en masse from China, where there’s no risk of getting caught. Meanwhile, intelligence experts tell me, Chinese intelligence officers have only been getting better at the traditional skills involved in persuading a target to turn on his or her country.
Donald Trump has made getting tough on China a central aspect of his foreign policy. He has focused on a trade war and tariffs aimed at rectifying what he portrays as an unfair economic playing field—earlier this month, the U.S. designated China as a currency manipulator—while holding onto the idea that China’s powerful leader, Xi Jinping, can be an ally and a friend. U.S. political and business leaders for decades pushed the idea that embracing trade with China would help to normalize its behavior, but Beijing’s aggressive espionage efforts have fueled an emerging bipartisan consensus in Washington that the hope was misplaced. Since 2017, the DOJ has brought at least a dozen cases against alleged agents and spies for conducting cyber- and economic espionage on behalf of China. “The hope was, as they develop, as they become more wealthy, as they start being a part of the club of developed nations, they’re going to change their behavior—once they get closer to the top, they’re going to operate by our rules,” John Demers told me. “What we’ve seen instead is [China] becoming better resourced and more methodical about the theft of information.”
For the past 20 years, America’s intelligence community’s top priority has been counterterrorism. A generation of operations officers and analysts has been geared more toward finding and killing America’s enemies and preventing extremist attacks than toward the more patient and strategic work that comes with peer competition and counterintelligence. If America is indeed entering an era of “great power” conflict with China, then the crux of the struggle will likely take place not on a battlefield, but in the race for information, at least for now. And here China is using an age-old human frailty to gain advantage in the competition with its more powerful adversary: greed. U.S. officials have been warning companies and research institutions not just of the strings that might be attached to Chinese money, but of the danger of corrupted employees turned spies. They are also worried about current and former U.S. officials who have been entrusted with protecting the nation’s secrets.
When I told William Evanina, America’s top counterintelligence official, Wright’s story about the cab driver in Monterey, he replied: “Of course.”
Spy rings operating out of taxis are relatively unoriginal, he told me, and have long been an issue around U.S. military and intelligence installations. An FBI and CIA veteran who is now the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Evanina has a suspicious mind—and perhaps one of the country’s worst Uber ratings. He sees the risk of intelligence collection and hidden cameras in any hired car, he told me, and if a driver ever tries to make small talk, he immediately shuts it down.
Knowing someone’s background can help an intelligence agency build a profile for potential recruitment. The person might have medical bills piling up, a parent in debt, a sibling in jail, or an infidelity that exposes him or her to blackmail. What really worries Evanina is that so much of this information can now be obtained online, legally and illegally. People can ignore Uber drivers all they want, but a good hacker or even someone savvy at mining social media might be able to track down targets’ financial records, their political views, profiles of their family members, and their upcoming travel plans. “It makes it so damn easy,” he said.
Security breaches happen with alarming regularity. Capital One announced in July that a data breach had exposed about 100 million people in America. During one of my conversations with Wright, she mused that whatever information the old man in the taxi might have wanted to glean from her, all that and much more may have been revealed in the 2015 breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. In that sophisticated attack, widely believed to have been carried out by state-sponsored Chinese hackers, an enormous batch of data was stolen, including detailed information the government collects as part of the process of approving security clearances. The stolen information contained “probing questions about an applicant’s personal finances, past substance abuse, and psychiatric care,” according to Wired, as well as “everything from lie detector results to notes about whether an applicant engages in risky sexual behavior.”
Russia, the U.S. adversary that is often included with China in discussions of “near peer” conflict, has a modus operandi when it comes to recruiting spies that is similar to America’s, Evanina said. While some of their intelligence efforts, such as election interference, are loud and aggressive and seemingly unconcerned with being discovered, Russians are careful and targeted when trying to turn a well-placed asset. Russia tends to have veteran intelligence operatives make contact in person and proceed with care and patience. “Their worst-case scenario is getting caught,” Evanina told me. “They take pride in their HUMINT operations. They’re very targeted. They take extra time to increase the percentage of success. Whereas the Chinese don’t care.” (This doesn’t mean that the Chinese can’t also be targeted and discreet when needed, he added.)
“What you have is an intelligence officer sitting in Beijing,” he said. “And he can send out 30,000 emails a day. And if he gets 300 replies, that’s a high-yield, low-risk intelligence operation.” Concerning those who have left government for the private sector—and who sometimes keep their clearance to continue doing sensitive government work—it can be hard to know where to draw the line. Evanina said China will sometimes wait years to target former officials: “Your Spidey sense goes down.” But “your memory is not erased”—that is, they’ve still got the information the Chinese want.
(Alicia Tatone)
Often, Chinese spies don’t even have to look too hard. Many of those who have left U.S. intelligence jobs reveal on their LinkedIn profiles which agencies they worked for and the countries and topics on which they focused. If they still have a government clearance, they might advertise that too. Buried in the questionnaire Evanina filled out for his Senate confirmation is a question asking whether he had any plans for a career after government. “I currently have no plans subsequent to completing government service,” he wrote. When I asked him about this, he admitted that this is becoming less common among intelligence officials his age. (He’s 52.) “All of my friends are leaving like crazy now because they have kids in college,” he said. “The money is [better]. It’s hard to say no.”
If a former intelligence officer lands a job at a prominent government contractor, such as Booz Allen Hamilton or DynCorp International, he or she can expect to be well compensated. But others find themselves in less lucrative posts, or try to strike out on their own. Evanina told me that Chinese intelligence operatives pose online as Chinese professors, think-tank experts, or executives. They usually propose a trip to China as a business opportunity. “Especially the ones who have retired from the CIA, DIA, and are now contractors—they have to make the bucks,” Evanina said. “And a lot of times that’s in China. And they get compromised.”
Once a target is in China, Chinese operatives might try to get the person to start passing over sensitive information in degrees. The first request could be for information that doesn’t seem like a big deal. But by then the trap is set. “When they get that [first] envelope, it’s being photographed. And then they can blackmail you. And then you’re being sucked in,” Evanina said. “One document becomes 10 documents becomes 15 documents. And then you have to rationalize that in your mind: I am not a spy, because they’re forcing me to do this.”
In the cases of Mallory, Hansen, and Lee, Evanina said, the lure wasn’t ideology. It was money. Money was also the lure in two similar cases, in which suspects were convicted of lesser charges than espionage. Both apparently began their relationship with Chinese intelligence officers while still employed in sensitive U.S. government jobs.
In 2016, Kun Shan Chun, a veteran FBI employee who had a top-secret security clearance, pleaded guilty to acting as an agent of China. Prosecutors said that while working for the agency in New York he sent his Chinese handler, “at minimum, information regarding the FBI’s personnel, structure, technological capabilities, general information regarding the FBI’s surveillance strategies, and certain categories of surveillance targets.” And in April, Candace Claiborne, a former State Department employee, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. According to the criminal complaint, Claiborne, who had served in a number of posts overseas including China, and held a top-secret security clearance, did not report her contacts with suspected Chinese agents, who provided her and a co-conspirator with “tens of thousands of dollars in gifts and benefits,” including New Year’s gifts, international travel and vacations, fashion-school tuition, rent, and cash payments. In exchange, Claiborne provided copies of State Department documents and analysis, prosecutors said.
Evanina’s office in Bethesda, Maryland, features a so-called Wall of Shame, on which hang the photographs of dozens of convicted American traitors—a testament to the struggles that have always plagued the U.S. intelligence community. The Cold War, for example, was marked by disastrous leaks from people such as the CIA officer Aldrich Ames and the FBI agent Robert Hanssen. Larry Chin, a CIA translator, was arrested in 1985 on charges of selling classified information to China over the course of three decades. That came during the so-called Year of the Spy, as the FBI made a series of high-profile arrests of U.S. government officials spying for the Soviet Union, Israel, and even Ghana. The Wall of Shame is currently being renovated, and when it’s unveiled in the fall, it will feature several new faces.Whenever a current or former U.S. intelligence officer has been turned, it takes years to assess the full repercussions. “We have to mitigate that damage for sometimes a decade,” Evanina said.
Two decades ago, Chinese intelligence officers were largely seen as relatively amateurish, even sloppy, a former U.S. intelligence official who spent years focusing on China told me. Usually, their English was poor. They were clumsy. They used predictable covers. Chinese military intelligence officers masquerading as civilians often failed to hide a military bearing and could come across as almost laughably uptight. Typically their main targets tended to be of Chinese descent. In recent years, however, Chinese intelligence officers have become more sophisticated—they can come across as suave, personable, even genteel. Their manners can be fluid. Their English is usually good. “Now this is the norm,” the former official said, speaking with me on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “They really have learned quite a bit and grown up.”
Rodney Faraon, a former senior analyst at the CIA, told me that the Mallory and Hansen cases show just how far China’s espionage services have come. “They’ve broadened their tactics to go beyond relatively easy targets, from recruiting among the ethnically Chinese community to a much more diverse set of human assets,” he said. “In a sense, they’ve become more traditional.”
In his recently published book, To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence, James Olson, a veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service and its former chief of counterintelligence, breaks down the basics of China’s espionage services and how they operate. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), its main service, focuses on overseas intelligence. The Ministry of Public Security focuses on domestic intelligence, but also has agents abroad. The People’s Liberation Army, which focuses on military intelligence, “has defined its role broadly and has competed with the MSS in a widerange of economic, political, and technological intelligence collection operations overseas, in addition to its more traditional military targeting.” Olson adds that “the PLA has been responsible for the bulk” of China’s cyberespionage, though the MSS may also be expanding in this realm. Both the MSS and PLA, meanwhile, “make regular use of diplomatic, commercial, journalistic, and student covers for their operations in the United States. They aggressively use Chinese travelers to the US, especially business representatives, academics, scientists, students, and tourists, to supplement their intelligence collection. US intelligence experts have been amazed at how voracious the Chinese have been in their collection activity.”
Olson notes that China has “always been adept at espionage,” but writes with a kind of awe at the extent of its efforts today. “If I were to start my CIA career all over again, I would try to get into our China program, learn Mandarin, and become a Chinese counterintelligence specialist … Our top priority in US counterintelligence today—and into the future—must be to stop or to drastically curtail China’s spying.”
If veteran American spies are vulnerable to Chinese espionage, U.S. companies may be faring even worse. In some cases, targeting the private sector and targeting U.S. national security can mix. A former U.S. security official, who now works for a prominent American aviation company that is involved in highly sensitive U.S. government projects, told me that the company had a suspected intelligence collector linked to China in its midst. “I would say that he’s had tradecraft training,” this person said, speaking anonymously due to an ongoing law-enforcement investigation.The former security official was hired by the company to monitor such threats, and initially found the lack of effective prevention measures and training at the company jarring. “When I walked in and got the briefing here, I thought it was a joke … Now we do take some measures to protect against [insider threats], but in a sense it’s fox in a henhouse,” this person said. “We as an industry are woefully inadequate at protecting ourselves from a foreign-intelligence threat.”
In a sense, going after American spies and government officials is fair game in the intelligence world. The U.S. does the same against the Chinese. “Intelligence operations are universal, with every country—other than a few isolated island-states who are concerned mainly with the danger of approaching cyclones—engaging in them, to one degree or another,” Loch K. Johnson, a professor emeritus at the University of Georgia, the author of Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, and one of America’s foremost intelligence scholars, told me in an email. He added that while almost every nation fields capabilities to both collect information about its adversaries and defend itself against espionage, a much smaller number have meaningful networks for covert action, which he described as “secret propaganda; political and economic manipulation; even paramilitary activities.” Both America and China count themselves among this group.
“The United States used propaganda, political, and economic ops during the Cold War and (somewhat less aggressively) since. China returns [the] favor,” Johnson said. “Both are major powers and have a full complement of intelligence capabilities, aimed at each other and other significant targets around the world. This means that the United States (like China in reverse) is constantly trying to learn what China is doing when it comes to military, economic, political, and cultural activities, since they may impinge upon U.S. interests in Asia and elsewhere.” To that end, the U.S. uses signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, and HUMINT, Johnson said, “all aided by a diligent searching through the available (and voluminous) [open-source intelligence] materials for background.”
But he noted a key difference between the two countries: China’s aggressive approach to economic espionage. These Chinese efforts are partly what have prompted U.S. officials and politicians to turn to a newly popular refrain that China’s not playing by the rules. U.S. officials insist that American intelligence agencies do not target foreign companies with the aim of helping domestic ones. (The line between American spying on foreign companies to advance the country’s economic and strategic interests and whether that spying helps U.S. companies can be blurry.) “What we do not do, as we have said many times, is use our foreign intelligence capabilities to steal the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of—or give intelligence we collect to—U.S. companies to enhance their international competitiveness or increase their bottom line,” James Clapper, then the director of national intelligence, said in 2013, amid revelations that the NSA had spied on foreign companies.Dennis Wilder, who retired as the CIA’s deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific in 2016, told me that the Chinese approach to espionage is defined by the fact that its leaders have long seen America as an existential threat. “This is a constant theme in Chinese intelligence—that we’re not just out to steal secrets, we’re not just out to protect ourselves, that the real American goal is the end of Chinese Communism, just as that was the goal with the Soviet Union,” he said.
Wilder, who still travels to the country as the director of an initiative for U.S.-China dialogue at Georgetown University, told me that Chinese officials regularly bring up past American covert action such as the CIA’s ill-fated support for the independence movement in Tibet beginning in the 1950s, and its infiltration of agents into China via Taiwan. And they still see an American hand in events such as the protests in Hong Kong today. “So we’re all sitting here scratching our heads and saying, ‘Do they really believe we’re behind Hong Kong? And the answer is, yes they do. They really believe that the fundamental American goal is the destruction and demise of Chinese Communism,” he said. “Now, if you believe that the other guy is bent on your destruction, then it’s kind of anything goes. So for the Chinese, stealing, espionage, cyberespionage against American corporations for the good of the Chinese state, are just part and parcel of the need for survival against this very formidable enemy.”China denies that it is spying against the U.S. on the scale alleged by American officials. When presented with the details of this story, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., Fang Hong, said via email that she had no knowledge of the cases involving Mallory, Hansen, Lee, and others. “China has always fully respected the sovereignty of all countries and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,” she said. Fang also disparaged U.S. attempts to root out Chinese spies, citing a quote commonly attributed to a great American writer. U.S. views on Chinese espionage, she remarked, “remind me of what Mark Twain said: ‘To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.’”
Fang continued, “U.S. officials’ accusations against Chinese students and researchers are groundless. Guided by the zero-sum-game mentality and ill intentions to contain China, people and institutions in the U.S. have been fabricating such absurd pretexts as ‘espionage’ as an excuse to harass them and make groundless allegations.”
She added that innocent people had been framed in some cases and that “such false accusations severely undermine China-U.S. people-to-people exchanges, and scientific and technological cooperation.”
The litany of cases the DOJ has brought over the past year or so underscores the comprehensive quality of China’s espionage efforts: a former General Electric engineer charged with theft of trade secrets related to gas and steam turbines (he has pleaded not guilty); an American and a Chinese citizen charged with attempting to steal trade secrets related to plastics (the American has pleaded not guilty and the Chinese defendant, as of March 2019, had yet to appear in a U.S. court); a state-owned Chinese chip-making company and a Taiwanese company that makes semiconductors charged with stealing from an American competitor(the chipmaker has pleaded not guilty); two Chinese hackers charged with targeting intellectual property (China denied the “slanderous” economic espionage charges). In Senate testimony in July, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that the agency has “probably about 1,000 plus investigations all across the country involving attempted theft of U.S. intellectual property … almost all leading back to China.”
Demers, the national-security official at the Justice Department, told me that China uses the same tactics and even some of the same intelligence officers in its espionage efforts against America’s private sector. “What it shows is how seriously the Chinese government takes their intellectual-property-theft efforts, because they’re really using the crown jewels of their intelligence community and their most sophisticated and well-honed tradecraft,” he said.Some of the trade secrets China is accused of stealing seem simply aimed to help a specific company or industry. Often, however, the distinction between a Chinese company and the Chinese state is not clear-cut. Chinese law mandates that all corporations cooperate with the government on national security. This was one concern U.S. officials cited after announcing indictments against the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei earlier this year; the Trump administration has banned U.S. companies from doing business with it. (Huawei has pleaded not guilty to attempted U.S. trade-theft allegations.)Demers told me that China uses economic espionage as a form of “R&D,” or research and development. “They also have very talented, smart people who are using their resources in legitimate ways, which is, I think, some of the frustration that folks have right now—that you could do this differently. You could fight fair, right? You’re not the 80-pound weakling who has to throw dirt in somebody’s eye to get ahead.”
The open business climate between America and China—the sort of climate that did not exist between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War—makes addressing Chinese espionage trickier: China is both a rival and a top trade partner. The economic and research relationship between the two countries benefits them both. At the same time, Chinese immigrants and visitors to America risk being unfairly targeted if U.S. officials fail to find the right balance, which would cast a chill on legitimate exchange between the two countries while raising the specter of American overreactions during past struggles, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. As U.S. officials warn about the Chinese espionage threat and the U.S. intelligence community reorients to face it, they must be careful not to undermine the American values—openness, civil liberty, enterprise—that remain perhaps the country’s greatest advantage over China.Rodney Faraon, who worked on the President’s Daily Briefing team at the CIA during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations and is now a partner at Crumpton Group, a business intelligence firm, told me that it will take a major push not just from America’s intelligence agencies but from the U.S. government overall to find the right strategy. And despite the Trump administration’s combative stance on trade negotiations and other issues, this has yet to happen. “The approach must be whole of government and must involve the private sector,” Faraon said. “The Chinese use and value intelligence better than we do, seeing its applicability in nearly every aspect of private and public life—military, social, commercial. We have been slow to recognize this for ourselves.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747/
Story 3: Big Brother Is Watching Every Move You Make With Social Credit System — Chinese Communist Control Digital Dictatorship Surveillance State — From Authoritarian to Totalitarian State — Socialist Serfs — Videos
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The Police – Every breath you take lyrics
Social surveillance in China – Credit or control? | DW Documentary
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Exposing China’s Digital Dystopian Dictatorship | Foreign Correspondent
A Look Inside China’s Social Credit System | NBC News Now
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China Expert Gordon Chang On Its Social Credit Rating System & Surveillance State
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China Social Credit System: Beijing plans to go full on Big Brother in 2020 – TomoNews
China’s “Social Credit System” Has Caused More Than Just Public Shaming (HBO)
Have you heard about China’s social credit system? It’s a technology-enabled, surveillance-based nationwide program designed to nudge citizens toward better behavior. The ultimate goal is to “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step,” according to the Chinese government.
In place since 2014, the social credit system is a work in progress that could evolve by next year into a single, nationwide point system for all Chinese citizens, akin to a financial credit score. It aims to punish for transgressions that can include membership in or support for the Falun Gong or Tibetan Buddhism, failure to pay debts, excessive video gaming, criticizing the government, late payments, failing to sweep the sidewalk in front of your store or house, smoking or playing loud music on trains, jaywalking, and other actions deemed illegal or unacceptable by the Chinese government.
It can also award points for charitable donations or even taking one’s own parents to the doctor.
Punishments can be harsh, including bans on leaving the country, using public transportation, checking into hotels, hiring for high-visibility jobs, or acceptance of children to private schools. It can also result in slower internet connections and social stigmatization in the form of registration on a public blacklist.
China’s social credit system has been characterized in one pithy tweet as “authoritarianism, gamified.”
In China, Your Credit Score Is Now Affected By Your Political Opinions – And Your Friends’ Politi…
China just introduced a universal credit score, where everybody is measured as a number between 350 and 950. But this credit score isn’t just affected by how well you manage credit – it also reflects…
At present, some parts of the social credit system are in force nationwide and others are local and limited (there are 40 or so pilot projects operated by local governments and at least six run by tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent).
Beijing maintains two nationwide lists, called the blacklist and the red list—the former consisting of people who have transgressed, and the latter people who have stayed out of trouble (a “red list” is the Communist version of a white list.) These lists are publicly searchable on a government website called China Credit.
The Chinese government also shares lists with technology platforms. So, for example, if someone criticizes the government on Weibo, their kids might be ineligible for acceptance to an elite school.
Public shaming is also part of China’s social credit system. Pictures of blacklisted people in one city were shown between videos on TikTok in a trial, and the addresses of blacklisted citizens were shown on a map on WeChat.
Many Westerners are disturbed by what they read about China’s social credit system. But such systems, it turns out, are not unique to China. A parallel system is developing in the United States, in part as the result of Silicon Valley and technology-industry user policies, and in part by surveillance of social media activity by private companies.
Here are some of the elements of America’s growing social credit system.
INSURANCE COMPANIES
The New York State Department of Financial Services announced earlier this year that life insurance companies can base premiums on what they find in your social media posts. That Instagram pic showing you teasing a grizzly bear at Yellowstone with a martini in one hand, a bucket of cheese fries in the other, and a cigarette in your mouth, could cost you. On the other hand, a Facebook post showing you doing yoga might save you money. (Insurance companies have to demonstrate that social media evidence points to risk, and not be based on discrimination of any kind—they can’t use social posts to alter premiums based on race or disability, for example.)
The use of social media is an extension of the lifestyle questions typically asked when applying for life insurance, such as questions about whether you engage in rock climbing or other adventure sports. Saying “no,” but then posting pictures of yourself free-soloing El Capitan, could count as a “yes.”
PATRONSCAN
A company called PatronScan sells three products—kiosk, desktop, and handheld systems—designed to help bar and restaurant owners manage customers. PatronScan is a subsidiary of the Canadian software company Servall Biometrics, and its products are now on sale in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
PatronScan helps spot fake IDs—and troublemakers. When customers arrive at a PatronScan-using bar, their ID is scanned. The company maintains a list of objectionable customers designed to protect venues from people previously removed for “fighting, sexual assault, drugs, theft, and other bad behavior,” according to its website. A “public” list is shared among all PatronScan customers. So someone who’s banned by one bar in the U.S. is potentially banned by all the bars in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada that use the PatronScan system for up to a year. (PatronScan Australia keeps a separate system.)
Judgment about what kind of behavior qualifies for inclusion on a PatronScan list is up to the bar owners and managers. Individual bar owners can ignore the ban, if they like. Data on non-offending customers is deleted in 90 days or less. Also: PatronScan enables bars to keep a “private” list that is not shared with other bars, but on which bad customers can be kept for up to five years.
PatronScan does have an “appeals” process, but it’s up to the company to grant or deny those appeals.
UBER AND AIRBNB
Thanks to the sharing economy, the options for travel have been extended far beyond taxis and hotels. Uber and Airbnb are leaders in providing transportation and accommodation for travelers. But there are many similar ride-sharing and peer-to-peer accommodations companies providing similar services.
Airbnb—a major provider of travel accommodation and tourist activities—bragged in March that it now has more than 6 million listings in its system. That’s why a ban from Airbnb can limit travel options.
Airbnb can disable your account for life for any reason it chooses, and it reserves the right to not tell you the reason. The company’s canned message includes the assertion that “This decision is irreversible and will affect any duplicated or future accounts. Please understand that we are not obligated to provide an explanation for the action taken against your account.” The ban can be based on something the host privately tells Airbnb about something they believe you did while staying at their property. Airbnb’s competitors have similar policies.
It’s now easy to get banned by Uber, too. Whenever you get out of the car after an Uber ride, the app invites you to rate the driver. What many passengers don’t know is that the driver now also gets an invitation to rate you. Under a new policy announced in May: If your average rating is “significantly below average,” Uber will ban you from the service.
WHATSAPP
You can be banned from communications apps, too. For example, you can be banned on WhatsApp if too many other users block you. You can also get banned for sending spam, threatening messages, trying to hack or reverse-engineer the WhatsApp app, or using the service with an unauthorized app.
WhatsApp is small potatoes in the United States. But in much of the world, it’s the main form of electronic communication. Not being allowed to use WhatsApp in some countries is as punishing as not being allowed to use the telephone system in America.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH SOCIAL CREDIT, ANYWAY?
Nobody likes antisocial, violent, rude, unhealthy, reckless, selfish, or deadbeat behavior. What’s wrong with using new technology to encourage everyone to behave?
The most disturbing attribute of a social credit system is not that it’s invasive, but that it’s extralegal. Crimes are punished outside the legal system, which means no presumption of innocence, no legal representation, no judge, no jury, and often no appeal. In other words, it’s an alternative legal system where the accused have fewer rights.
Social credit systems are an end-run around the pesky complications of the legal system. Unlike China’s government policy, the social credit system emerging in the U.S. is enforced by private companies. If the public objects to how these laws are enforced, it can’t elect new rule-makers.
An increasing number of societal “privileges” related to transportation, accommodations, communications, and the rates we pay for services (like insurance) are either controlled by technology companies or affected by how we use technology services. And Silicon Valley’s rules for being allowed to use their services are getting stricter.
If current trends hold, it’s possible that in the future a majority of misdemeanors and even some felonies will be punished not by Washington, D.C., but by Silicon Valley. It’s a slippery slope away from democracy and toward corporatocracy.
In other words, in the future, law enforcement may be determined less by the Constitution and legal code, and more by end-user license agreements.
The Social Credit System (Chinese: 社会信用体系; pinyin: shèhuì xìnyòng tǐxì) is a national reputation system being developed by the Chinese government.[1][2][3] By 2020, it is intended to standardise the assessment of citizens’ and businesses’ economic and social reputation, or ‘Social Credit’.[4][5][6][7][8]
The system will be one unified system and there will be a single system-wide social credit score for each citizen and business.[9] By 2018, some restrictions had been placed on citizens, whom state-owned media described as the first step toward creating a national social credit system.[10][11][12][7][13][14]
The system is considered a form of mass surveillance which uses big data analysistechnology.[15] The government of modern China has also maintained systems of paper records on individuals and households such as the dàng’àn (档案) and hùkǒu (户口) systems which officials might refer to, but did not provide the same degree and rapidity of feedback and consequences for Chinese citizens as the integrated electronic system because of the much greater difficulty of aggregating paper records for rapid, robust analysis.
The Social Credit System also originated from Grid-style social management, a policing strategy first implemented in select locations from 2001 and 2002 (during the rule of Paramount leaderJiang Zemin) in specific locations across mainland China. In its first phase, grid-style policing was a system for more effective communication between public security bureaus. Within a few years the grid system was adapted for use in distributing social services. Grid management provided the authorities not only with greater situational awareness on the group level, but also enhanced the tracking and monitoring of individuals.[16][17]
In 2018, sociologist Zhang Lifan explained that Chinese society today is still deficient in trust. People often expect to be cheated or to get in trouble even if they are innocent. He believes that it is due to the Cultural Revolution, where friends and family members were deliberately pitted against each other and millions of Chinese were killed. The stated purpose of the social credit system is to help Chinese people trust each other again.[17]
It is unclear whether the system will work as envisioned by 2020, but the Chinese government has fast-tracked the implementation of the system, resulting in the publication of numerous policy documents and plans since the main plan was issued in 2013. If the Social Credit System is implemented as envisioned, it will constitute a new way of controlling both the behavior of individuals and of businesses.[8]
Progress of implementation (2013–present)
In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of China started a blacklist of debtors with roughly thirty two thousand names. The list has since been described as a first step towards a national Social Credit System by state-owned media.[18][19]
In 2015, the People’s Bank of China licensed eight companies to begin a trial of social credit systems.[20][21] Among these eight firms is Sesame Credit, owned by Alibaba Group, Tencent, as well as China’s biggest ride-sharing and online-dating service, Didi Chuxing and Baihe.com, respectively.[22][20] In general, multiple firms are collaborating with the government to develop the system of software and algorithms used to calculate credit.[22][23] The SPC also began working with private companies – for example, Sesame Credit began deducting credit points from people who defaulted on court fines.[18]
The government originally considered that the Social Credit System be run by a private firm, but it has since acknowledged the need for third-party administration.[20][when?]
In 2017, no licenses to private companies were granted.[20] The reasons include conflict of interest, the remaining control of the government, as well as the lack of cooperation in data sharing among the firms that participate in the development.[20] However, the Social Credit System’s operation by a seemingly external association, such as a formal collaboration between private firms, has not been ruled out yet.[20] Private companies have also signed contracts with provincial governments to set up the basic infrastructure for the Social Credit System at a provincial level.[24]
As of March 2017, 137 commercial credit reporting companies are active on the Chinese market.[8] As part of the development of the Social Credit System, the Chinese government has been monitoring the progress of third-party Chinese credit rating systems.[4]
As of February 2018, no comprehensive, nation-wide social credit system exists, but there are multiple pilots testing the system on a local level as well as in specific sectors of industry.[25] One such program has been implemented in Shanghai through its Honest Shanghaiapp, which uses facial recognition software to browse government records, and rates users accordingly.[26]
In March 2018, Reuters reported that restrictions on citizens and businesses with low Social Credit ratings, and thus low trustworthiness, would come into effect on May 1.[27][28] By May 2018, several million flight and high-speed train trips had been denied to people who had been blacklisted.[11]
In April 2018, journalist Simina Mistreanu described a community where people’s social credit scores were posted near the village center.[17]
As of mid-2018, it was unclear whether the system will be an ‘ecosystem’ of various scores and blacklists run by both government agencies and private companies, or if it will be one unified system. It is also unclear whether there will be a single system-wide social credit score for each citizen and business.[10][11][12][7][13][14]
In November, a detailed plan was produced for further implementation of the program for 2018–2020. The plans included black listing people from public transport and publicly disclosing individuals’ and businesses’ untrustworthiness rating.[29][30]
In January 2019, Beijing government officially announced that it will start to test “Personal Credit Score”.[31]
In April 2019, the People’s Bank of China announces that a new version of Personal Credit Report will be put which allows to collect more personal information. State-run media has described it as “more detailed, more comprehensive and more precisely”[32]
In May 2019, Beijing announced that some inappropriate behavior in the subway could result in the person being blacklisted.[33]
National plans and local government Social Credit System pilots
As of 2018, over forty different Social Credit System experiments were implemented by local governments in different Chinese provinces.[34] The pilot programs began following the release of the 2014 “Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System” by Chinese authorities. The government oversees the creation and development of these governmental pilots by requesting they each publish a regular “interdepartmental agreement on joint enforcement of rewards and punishments for ‘trustworthy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ conduct.”[35]
In December 2017 the National Development and Reform Commission and People’s Bank of China selected “model cities” that demonstrated the steps needed to make a functional and efficient implementation of the Social Credit System. Among them are Hangzhou, Nanjing, Xiamen, Chengdu, Suzhou, Suqian, Huizhou, Wenzhou, Weihai, Weifang, Yiwu, and Rongcheng.[36][37] These pilots were deemed successful in their handling of “blacklists and ‘redlists’”, their creation of “credit sharing platforms”, and their “data sharing efforts with the other cities”. The local government Social Credit System experiments are focused more on the construction of transparent rule-based systems, in contrast with the more advanced rating systems used in the commercial pilots: Citizens often begin with an initial score, to which points are added or deducted depending on their actions. The specific number of points for each action are often listed in publicly available catalogs. Cities also experimented with a multi-level system, in which districts decide on scorekeepers who are responsible for reporting scores to higher-ups. Some experiments also allowed citizens to appeal the scores they were attributed.[38]
The government alleges these systems mean to penalize citizens generally agreed as ‘untrustworthy’. They claim they will be able to “change people’s behavior by ensuring they are closely associated with it.” Researchers[who?], however, argue the system will be part of the government’s plan to automate their authoritarian rule over the Chinese population.[16][39][40] According to Genia Kostka, a Professor of Chinese Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin, “if successful in [their] effort, the Communist Party will possess a powerful means of quelling dissent, one that is comparatively low-cost and which does not require the overt (and unpopular) use of coercion by the state.”[41]
Commercial Social Credit System pilots
There are also commercial pilots developed by private Chinese conglomerates that have an authorization from the state to test out social credit experiments. The pilots are more widespread than their local government counterparts, but function on an voluntary basis: Citizens can decide to opt-out of these systems at any time on request. Users with good scores are offered advantages such as easier access to credit loans, discounts for car and bike sharing services, fast-tracked visa application, or free health check-ups and preferential treatment at hospitals.[41] The algorithms used to assign scores in commercial pilots remain unknown, although sources say some pilots use a big-data analysis and artificial intelligence approach.[23]
In 2015, the People’s Bank of China issued temporary licenses to eight companies for the creation of commercial pilots, among them Zhima Credit owned by Ant Financial Services, a subsidiary of Alibaba Group Holding, and Tencent Credit owned by Tencent Holdings. However, in 2017 the People’s Bank of China refused to transform their licenses into official ones, citing concerns regarding conflict of interest in the companies development of systems that may in the future assign their own scores.[42] Instead it issued a jointly owned license to “Baihang Credit” valid for three years.[43] Baihang Credit is co-owned by the National Internet Finance Association (36%) and the eight other companies (8% each), allowing the state to maintain control and oversee the creation of a new commercial pilot.[44]
Implementation of technology platform
It is unclear what technology will be used in the fully implemented system. As of mid 2018, only pilot schemes have been tested.[10][11][12][7][13][14] Some of the technology is provided by the Alibaba Group’s Ant Financial which operates the Sesame Creditloyalty program.[22][20] Alibaba is China’s largest conglomerate of online services, including the largest online shopping and payment providers.[22] In November 2017, Sesame Credit’s general manager, Hu Tao, denied that Sesame Credit data is shared with the Chinese government.[45] There are also seven other technology partners.
Data collection
The Chinese government aims at assessing the trustworthiness and compliance of each person.[22][clarification needed] The data collected stems both from peoples’ own accounts, as well as their network’s activities. Website operators can mine the traces of data that users exchange with websites and derive a full social profile that includes location, friends, health records, insurance, private messages, financial position, gaming duration, smart home statistics, preferred newspapers, shopping history, and dating behaviour.[22][clarification needed]
Data structuring
Automated algorithms are used to structure the collected data, based on government rules.[22][clarification needed]
Implications for citizens
From the Chinese government’s Plan for Implementation, the SCS is due to be fully implemented by 2020. Once implemented the system will manage the rewards, or punishments, of citizens on the basis of their economic and personal behavior. Some types of punishments include: flight ban, exclusion from private schools, slow internet connection, exclusion from high prestige work, exclusion from hotels, and registration on a public blacklist.
Travel ban
By the end of 2018, 5.5 million high-speed rail trips and 17.5 million flights had been denied to prospective travellers who were on a blacklist.[46][47] The exact reasons for being placed on the list are unknown. Business Insider speculated that the reason could be the debtors list created by the SPC.[11]
Exclusion from school admissions
If the parents of a child were to score below a certain threshold, their children would be excluded from the top schools in the region.[48]
Social status
One’s personal score could be used as a social symbol on social and couples platforms. For example, China’s biggest matchmaking service, Baihe, allows its users to publish their own score.[49]
Repression of religious minorities
City-level pilot projects for the social credit score system have included rewarding individuals for aiding authorities in enforcing restrictions of religious practices, including coercing practitioners of Falun Gong to renounce their beliefs[dubious– discuss] and reporting on Uighurs who publicly pray, fast during Ramadan, or perform other Islamic practices.[50]
Debt Collection
A Hebei court released an app showing a “map of deadbeat debtors” within 500 meters and encouraged users to report individuals who they believed could repay their debts.[50] A spokesman of the court stated that “It’s a part of our measures to enforce our rulings and create a socially credible environment.”[51]
Public display
Mugshots of blacklisted individuals are sometimes displayed on large LED screens on buildings, or shown before the movie in movie theaters.[52]
Other
The rewards of having a high score include easier access to loans and jobs and priority during bureaucratic paperwork. Likewise, the immediate negative consequences for a low score, or being associated to someone with a low score, ranges from lower internet speeds to being denied access to certain jobs, loans and visas.[53][54][55]
Implications for businesses
Among other things, the Social Credit System is meant to provide an answer to the problem of lack of trust on the Chinese market. Proponents argue that it will help eliminate problems such as food safety issues, cheating, and counterfeit goods.[56] China claims its aim is to enhance trust and social stability by creating a “culture of sincerity”.[22]
For businesses, the Social Credit System is meant to serve as a market regulation mechanism. The goal is to establish a self-enforcing regulatory regime fueled by big data in which businesses exercise “self-restraint” (企业自我约束). The basic idea is that with a functional credit system in place, companies will comply with government policies and regulations to avoid having their scores lowered by disgruntled employees, customers or clients.[8] As currently envisioned, companies with good credit scores will enjoy benefits such as good credit conditions, lower tax rates, and more investment opportunities. Companies with bad credit scores will potentially face unfavorable conditions for new loans, higher tax rates, investment restrictions, and lower chances to participate in publicly funded projects.[8]Government plans also envision real-time monitoring of a business’ activities. In that case, infractions on the part of a business could result in a lowered score almost instantly. However, whether this will actually happen depends on the future implementation of the system as well as on the availability of technology needed for this kind of monitoring.[8]
Geographic scope
The Social Credit System will be limited to Mainland China and thus does not apply to Hong Kong and Macau. However, at present, plans do not distinguish between Chinese companies and foreign companies operating on the Chinese market, raising the possibility that foreign businesses operating in China will be subjected to the system as well.[8]
The Hong Kong Government stated in July 2019 that claims that the social credit system will be rolled out in Hong Kong are “totally unfounded”, and stated that the system will not be implemented there.[57]
Criticism
The system has been implicated in a number of controversies. Of particular note is how it is applied to individuals as well as companies. People have already faced various punishments for violating social protocols. The system has been used to already block nine million people with “low scores” from purchasing domestic flights.[58] While still in the preliminary stages, the system has been used to ban people and their children from certain schools, prevent low scorers from renting hotels, using credit cards, and blacklist individuals from being able to procure employment.[58] The system has also been used to rate individuals on their internet habits (excessive online gaming reduces one’s score), personal shopping habits, and a variety of other personal and wholly innocuous acts that have no impact on the wider community.[59][60] Criticism of this program has been widespread outside China with the proposed system being described by Human Rights Watch as “chilling” and filled with arbitrary abuses.[59]
Vision Times labeled the system as a mass surveillance tool and mass disciplinary machine.[61]
Comparison to other countries
Chile
Since the early days of the Pinochet dictatorship, a Directory of Commercial Information (DICOM) has featured prominently in the economic life of the country. People who have poor DICOM scores find it harder to find housing, start new businesses, get loans and, though not the intended usage of the system, find jobs, since employers tend to check scores as a part of the selection process.[62][63][64] There have been legal measures taken recently to reduce the negative impact of the system on people with poor scores, such as banning the usage of DICOM scores in determining access to medical attention.[65]
Germany
In February 2018, Handelsblatt Global reported that Germany may be “sleep walking” towards a system comparable to China’s. Using data from the universal credit rating system, Schufa, geolocation and health records to determine access to credit and health insurance.[66]
Russia
Around 80% of Russians will reportedly get a digital profile that will document personal successes and failures in less than a decade under the government’s comprehensive plans to digitize the economy. Observers have compared this to China’s social credit system,[67]although Deputy Prime MinisterMaxim Akimov has denied that, saying a Chinese-style social credit system is a “threat”.[68][69]
United Kingdom
In 2018, the New Economics Foundation compared the Chinese citizen score to other rating systems in the United Kingdom. These included using data from a citizen’s credit score, phone usage, rent payment, etc. to filter job applications, determine access to social services, determine advertisements served, etc.[70][71]
Venezuela
In 2018, Venezuela started developing a smart-card ID known as the “carnet de la patria,” or “fatherland card,” with the help of Chinese telecom company ZTE.[72] The system also includes a database which stores details like birthdays, family information, employment and income, property owned, medical history, state benefits received, presence on social media, membership of a political party, and whether a person voted.[72] Many in Venezuela have expressed concern that the card is an attempt to tighten social control through monitoring all aspects of daily life, similar to that of China’s social credit system.[73][74]
Falun Gong (UK: /ˌfɑːlʊnˈɡɒŋ, ˌfæl-, – ˈɡʊŋ/, US: /- ˈɡɔːŋ/)[1] or Falun Dafa (/ˈdɑːfə/; Standard Mandarin Chinese: [fàlwə̌n tâfà]; literally, “Dharma Wheel Practice” or “Law Wheel Practice”) is a Chinese religious spiritual practice that combines meditation and qigong exercises with a moral philosophy centered on the tenets of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance (Chinese: 真、善、忍). The practice emphasizes morality and the cultivation of virtue, and identifies as a qigong practice of the Buddhist school, though its teachings also incorporate elements drawn from Taoist traditions. Through moral rectitude and the practice of meditation, practitioners of Falun Gong aspire to eliminate attachments, and ultimately to achieve spiritual enlightenment.
Falun Gong originated and was first taught publicly in northeastern China in 1992 by Li Hongzhi. It emerged toward the end of China’s “qigong boom”—a period that saw a proliferation of similar practices of meditation, slow-moving energy exercises and regulated breathing. It differs from other qigong schools in its absence of fees or formal membership, lack of daily rituals of worship, its greater emphasis on morality, and the theological nature of its teachings. Western academics have described Falun Gong as a qigong discipline, a “spiritual movement”, a “cultivation system” in the tradition of Chinese antiquity, or as a form of Chinese religion.
The practice initially enjoyed support from Chinese officialdom, but by the mid to late 1990s, the Communist Party and public security organizations increasingly viewed Falun Gong as a potential threat due to its size, independence from the state, and spiritual teachings. By 1999, government estimates placed the number of Falun Gong practitioners at 70 million.[2] During that time, negative coverage of Falun Gong began to appear in the state-run press, and practitioners usually responded by picketing the source involved. Most of the time, the practitioners succeeded, but controversy and tension continued to build. The scale of protests grew until April 1999, when over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered near the central government compound in Beijing to request legal recognition and freedom from state interference. This demonstration is widely seen as catalyzing the persecution that followed.
On 20 July 1999, the Communist Party leadership initiated a nationwide crackdown and multifaceted propaganda campaign intended to eradicate the practice. It blocked Internet access to websites that mention Falun Gong, and in October 1999 it declared Falun Gong a “heretical organization” that threatened social stability. Falun Gong practitioners in China are reportedly subject to a wide range of human rights abuses: hundreds of thousands are estimated to have been imprisoned extrajudicially,[3] and practitioners in detention are subject to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive methods of thought reform at the hands of Chinese authorities.[4] As of 2009, human rights groups estimated that at least 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners had died as a result of abuse in custody.[5] One observer reported that tens of thousands may have been killed to supply China’s organ transplant industry (see Organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China).[6][7] In the years since the persecution began, Falun Gong practitioners have become active in advocating for greater human rights in China.
Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi has lived in New York City since 1996, and Falun Gong has a sizable global constituency. Inside China, estimates suggest that tens of millions continued to practice Falun Gong in spite of the persecution.[8][9][10] Hundreds of thousands are estimated to practice Falun Gong outside China in over 70 countries worldwide.[11][12]
Contents
Origins
Falun Gong is most frequently identified with the qigong movement in China. Qigong is a modern term that refers to a variety of practices involving slow movement, meditation, and regulated breathing. Qigong-like exercises have historically been practiced by Buddhist monks, Daoist martial artists, and Confucian scholars as a means of spiritual, moral, and physical refinement. [13]
The modern qigong movement emerged in the early 1950s, when Communist cadres embraced the techniques as a way to improve health.[13] The new term was constructed to avoid association with religious practices, which were prone to being labeled as “feudal superstition” and persecuted during the Maoist era.[13][14] Early adopters of qigong eschewed its religious overtones and regarded qigong principally as a branch of Chinese medicine. In the late 1970s, Chinese scientists purported to have discovered the material existence of the qi energy that qigong seeks to harness.[15] In the spiritual vacuum of the post-Mao era, tens of millions of mostly urban and elderly Chinese citizens took up the practice of qigong,[16][17][18] and a variety of charismatic qigong masters established practices. At one time, over 2,000 disciplines of qigong were being taught.[19] The state-run China Qigong Science Research Society (CQRS) was established in 1985 to oversee and administer the movement.[20]
On 13 May 1992, Li Hongzhi gave his first public seminar on Falun Gong (alternatively called Falun Dafa) in the northeastern Chinese city of Changchun. In his hagiographic spiritual biography, Li Hongzhi is said to have been taught ways of “cultivation practice” by several masters of the Buddhist and Daoist traditions, including Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, and a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist from the Changbai Mountains. Falun Dafa is said to be the result of his reorganizing and writing down the teachings that were passed to him.[21]
Li presented Falun Gong as part of a “centuries-old tradition of cultivation”,[22] and in effect sought to revive the religious and spiritual elements of qigong practice that had been discarded in the earlier Communist era. David Palmer writes that Li “redefined his method as having entirely different objectives from qigong: the purpose of practice should neither be physical health nor the development of extraordinary powers, but to purify one’s heart and attain spiritual salvation.”[13]
Falun Gong is distinct from other qigong schools in that its teachings cover a wide range of spiritual and metaphysical topics, placing emphasis on morality and virtue and elaborating a complete cosmology.[23] The practice identifies with the Buddhist School (Fojia) but also draws on concepts and language found in Taoism and Confucianism.[20] This has led some scholars to label the practice as a syncretic faith.[24]
Falun Gong adherents practice the fifth exercise, a meditation, in Manhattan
Falun Gong aspires to enable the practitioner to ascend spiritually through moral rectitude and the practice of a set of exercises and meditation. The three central tenets of the belief are Truthfulness (真, Zhēn), Compassion (善, Shàn), and Forbearance (忍, Rěn).[25][26] Together these principles are regarded as the fundamental nature of the cosmos, the criteria for differentiating right from wrong, and are held to be the highest manifestations of the Tao, or Buddhist Dharma.[27][28][29][30] Adherence to and cultivation of these virtues is regarded as a fundamental part of Falun Gong practice.[31] In Zhuan Falun (转法轮), the foundational text published in 1995, Li Hongzhi writes “It doesn’t matter how mankind’s moral standard changes … The nature of the cosmos doesn’t change, and it is the only standard for determining who’s good and who’s bad. So to be a cultivator you have to take the nature of the cosmos as your guide for improving yourself.”[27][32]
Practice of Falun Gong consists of two features: performance of the exercises, and the refinement of one’s xinxing (moral character, temperament). In Falun Gong’s central text, Li states that xinxing “includes virtue (which is a type of matter), it includes forbearance, it includes awakening to things, it includes giving up things—giving up all the desires and all the attachments that are found in an ordinary person—and you also have to endure hardship, to name just a few things.”[27][33] The elevation of one’s moral character is achieved, on the one hand, by aligning one’s life with truth, compassion, and tolerance; and on the other, by abandoning desires and “negative thoughts and behaviors, such as greed, profit, lust, desire, killing, fighting, theft, robbery, deception, jealousy, etc.”[34]
Among the central concepts found in the teachings of Falun Gong is the existence of ‘Virtue’ (‘德, Dé) and ‘Karma’ (‘業, Yè).[35][36] The former is generated through doing good deeds and suffering, while the latter is accumulated through doing wrong deeds. A person’s ratio of karma to virtue is said to determine his or her fortunes in this life or the next. While virtue engenders good fortune and enables spiritual transformation, an accumulation of karma results in suffering, illness, and alienation from the nature of the universe.[20][36][37] Spiritual elevation is achieved through the elimination of negative karma and the accumulation of virtue.[20][38] Practitioners believe that through a process of moral cultivation, one can achieve Tao and obtain special powers and a level of divinity.[39][40]
Falun Gong’s teachings posit that human beings are originally and innately good—even divine—but that they descended into a realm of delusion and suffering after developing selfishness and accruing karma.[27][41][42] The practice holds that reincarnation exists and that different people’s reincarnation processes are overseen by different gods.[43] To re-ascend and return to the “original, true self”, Falun Gong practitioners are supposed to assimilate themselves to the qualities of truthfulness, compassion and tolerance, let go of “attachments and desires” and suffer to repay karma.[20][27][44] The ultimate goal of the practice is enlightenment or spiritual perfection (yuanman), and release from the cycle of reincarnation, known in Buddhist tradition as samsara.[27][45]
Traditional Chinese cultural thought and modernity are two focuses of Li Hongzhi’s teachings. Falun Gong echoes traditional Chinese beliefs that humans are connected to the universe through mind and body, and Li seeks to challenge “conventional mentalities”, concerning the nature and genesis of the universe, time-space, and the human body.[46][47] The practice draws on East Asian mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes the purportedly self-imposed limits of modern science, especially evolution, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid ontological system.[48]
Exercises
The five exercises of Falun Gong
In addition to its moral philosophy, Falun Gong consists of four standing exercises and one sitting meditation. The exercises are regarded as secondary to moral elevation, though is still an essential component of Falun Gong cultivation practice.[20][49]
The first exercises, called “Buddha Stretching a Thousand Arms”, are intended to facilitate the free flow of energy through the body and open up the meridians. The second exercise, “Falun Standing Stance”, involves holding four static poses—each of which resembles holding a wheel—for an extended period. The objective of this exercise is to “enhances wisdom, increases strength, raises a person’s level, and strengthens divine powers”. The third, “Penetrating the Cosmic Extremes”, involves three sets of movements, which aim to enable the expulsion of bad energy (e.g., pathogenic or black qi) and the absorption of good energy into the body. Through practice of this exercise, the practitioner aspires to cleanse and purify the body. The fourth exercise, “Falun Cosmic Orbit”, seeks to circulate energy freely throughout the body. Unlike the first through fourth exercises, the fifth exercise is performed in the seated lotus position. Called “Reinforcing Supernatural Powers”, it is a meditation intended to be maintained as long as possible.[50][51]
Falun Gong exercises can be practiced individually or in group settings, and can be performed for varying lengths of time in accordance with the needs and abilities of the individual practitioner.[27][52] Porter writes that practitioners of Falun Gong are encouraged to read Falun Gong books and practice its exercises on a regular basis, preferably daily.[53] Falun Gong exercises are practiced in group settings in parks, university campuses, and other public spaces in over 70 countries worldwide, and are taught for free by volunteers.[53][54] In addition to five exercises, in 2001 another meditation activity was introduced called “sending righteous thoughts,” which is intended to reduce persecution on the spiritual plane.[53]
A pilot study involving genomic profiling of six Falun Dafa practitioners indicated that, “changes in gene expression of [Falun Gong] practitioners in contrast to normal healthy controls were characterized by enhanced immunity, downregulation of cellular metabolism, and alteration of apoptotic genes in favor of a rapid resolution of inflammation.”[55]
In addition to the attainment of physical health, many Buddhist and Daoist meditation systems aspire to transform the physical body and cultivate a variety of supernatural capabilities (shentong), such as telepathy and divine sight.[56] Discussions of supernatural skills also feature prominently within the qigong movement, and the existence of these skills gained a level mainstream acceptance in China’s scientific community in the 1980s.[15] Falun Gong’s teachings hold that practitioners can acquire supernatural skills through a combination of moral cultivation, meditation and exercises. These include—but are not limited to—precognition, clairaudience, telepathy, and divine sight (via the opening of the third eye or celestial eye). However, Falun Gong stresses that these powers can be developed only as a result of moral practice, and should not be pursued or casually displayed.[39] According to David Ownby, Falun Gong teaches that “Pride in one’s abilities, or the desire to show off, are marks of dangerous attachments,” and Li warns his followers not to be distracted by the pursuit of such powers.[15]
Social practices
Falun Gong adherents practice the third exercise in Toronto.
Falun Gong differentiates itself from Buddhist monastic traditions in that it places great importance on participation in the secular world. Falun Gong practitioners are required to maintain regular jobs and family lives, to observe the laws of their respective governments, and are instructed not to distance themselves from society. An exception is made for Buddhist monks and nuns, who are permitted to continue a monastic lifestyle while practicing Falun Gong.[27][57]
As part of its emphasis on ethical behavior, Falun Gong’s teachings prescribe a strict personal morality for practitioners. They are expected to act truthfully, do good deeds, and conduct themselves with patience and forbearance when encountering difficulties. For instance, Li stipulates that a practitioner of Falun Gong must “not hit back when attacked, not talk back when insulted.”[58] In addition, they must “abandon negative thoughts and behaviors,” such as greed, deception, jealousy, etc.[27][58] The teachings contain injunctions against smoking and the consumption of alcohol, as these are considered addictions that are detrimental to health and mental clarity.[27][59][60] Practitioners of Falun Gong are forbidden to kill living things—including animals for the purpose of obtaining food—though they are not required to adopt a vegetarian diet.[58]
In addition to these things, practitioners of Falun Gong must abandon a variety of worldly attachments and desires.[34] In the course of cultivation practice, the student of Falun Gong aims to relinquish the pursuit of fame, monetary gain, sentimentality, and other entanglements. Li’s teachings repeatedly emphasize the emptiness of material pursuits; although practitioners of Falun Gong are not encouraged to leave their jobs or eschew money, they are expected to give up the psychological attachments to these things.[59] Similarly, sexual desire and lust are treated as attachments to be discarded, but Falun Gong students are still generally expected to marry and have families.[59] All sexual relations outside the confines of monogamous, heterosexual marriage are regarded as immoral.[61] Although gays and lesbians may practice Falun Gong, homosexual conduct is said to generate karma, and is therefore viewed as incompatible with the goals of the practice.[62]
Falun Gong’s cosmology includes the belief that different ethnicities each have a correspondence to their own heavens, and that individuals of mixed race lose some aspect of this connection.[20] Nonetheless, Li maintains that being of mixed race does not affect a person’s soul, nor hinder their ability to practice cultivation.[20] The practice does not have any formal stance against interracial marriage, and many Falun Gong practitioners have interracial children.[63]
Falun Gong doctrine counsels against participation in political or social issues.[64] Excessive interest in politics is viewed as an attachment to worldly power and influence, and Falun Gong aims for transcendence of such pursuits. According to Hu Ping, “Falun Gong deals only with purifying the individual through exercise, and does not touch on social or national concerns. It has not suggested or even intimated a model for social change. Many religions … pursue social reform to some extent … but there is no such tendency evident in Falun Gong.”[65]
Texts
The first book of Falun Gong teachings was published in April 1993. Called China Falun Gong, or simply Falun Gong, it is an introductory text that discusses qigong, Falun Gong’s relationship to Buddhism, the principles of cultivation practice and the improvement of moral character (xinxing). The book also provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises and meditation.[49][66]
The main body of teachings is articulated in the book Zhuan Falun, published in Chinese in January 1995. The book is divided into nine “lectures”, and was based on edited transcriptions of the talks Li gave throughout China in the preceding three years.[67] Falun Gong texts have since been translated into an additional 40 languages.[68] In addition to these central texts, Li has published several books, lectures, articles, books of poetry, which are made available on Falun Gong websites.[69][70]
The Falun Gong teachings use numerous untranslated Chinese religious and philosophical terms, and make frequent allusion to characters and incidents in Chinese folk literature and concepts drawn from Chinese popular religion. This, coupled with the literal translation style of the texts, which imitate the colloquial style of Li’s speeches, can make Falun Gong scriptures difficult to approach for Westerners.[23]
Symbols
The main symbol of the practice is the Falun (Dharma wheel, or Dharmacakra in Sanskrit). In Buddhism, the Dharmacakra represents the completeness of the doctrine. To “turn the wheel of dharma” (Zhuan Falun) means to preach the Buddhist doctrine, and is the title of Falun Gong’s main text.[71] Despite the invocation of Buddhist language and symbols, the law wheel as understood in Falun Gong has distinct connotations, and is held to represent the universe.[72] It is conceptualized by an emblem consisting of one large and four small (counter-clockwise) Swastika symbols, representing the Buddha, and four small Taiji (yin-yang) symbols of the Daoist tradition.[27][72]
Dharma-ending period
Li situates his teaching of Falun Gong amidst the “Dharma-ending period” (Mo Fa, 末法), described in Buddhist scriptures as an age of moral decline when the teachings of Buddhism would need to be rectified.[15][20] The current era is described in Falun Gong’s teachings as the “Fa rectification” period (zhengfa, which might also be translated as “to correct the dharma”), a time of cosmic transition and renewal.[20] The process of Fa rectification is necessitated by the moral decline and degeneration of life in the universe, and in the post-1999 context, the persecution of Falun Gong by the Chinese government has come to be viewed as a tangible symptom of this moral decay.[73] Through the process of the Fa rectification, life will be reordered according to the moral and spiritual quality of each, with good people being saved and ascending to higher spiritual planes, and bad ones being eliminated or cast down.[73] In this paradigm, Li assumes the role of rectifying the Dharma by disseminating through his moral teachings.[13][20]
Some scholars, such as Maria Hsia Chang and Susan Palmer, have described Li’s rhetoric about the “Fa rectification” and providing salvation “in the final period of the Last Havoc”, as apocalyptic.[74][75] However, Benjamin Penny, a professor of Chinese history at the Australian National University, argues that Li’s teachings are better understood in the context of a “Buddhist notion of the cycle of the Dharma or the Buddhist law”.[76] Richard Gunde notes that unlike apocalyptic groups in the West, Falun Gong does not fixate on death or the end of the world, and instead “has a simple, innocuous ethical message”.[17] Li Hongzhi does not discuss a “time of reckoning”,[76] and has rejected predictions of an impending apocalypse in his teachings.[77]
Categorization
Falun Gong is a multifaceted discipline that means different things to different people, ranging from a set of physical exercises for the attainment of better health and a praxis of self-transformation, to a moral philosophy and a new knowledge system.[48] Scholars and journalists have adopted a variety of terms and classifications in describing Falun Gong, some of them more precise than others.
In the cultural context of China, Falun Gong is generally described either as a system of qigong, or a type of “cultivation practice” (xiulian). Cultivation is a Chinese term that describes the process by which an individual seeks spiritual perfection, often through both physical and moral conditioning. Varieties of cultivation practice are found throughout Chinese history, spanning Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian traditions.[20] Benjamin Penny, writes “the best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system. Cultivation systems have been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2,500 years.”[78] Qigong practices can also be understood as a part of a broader tradition of “cultivation practice”.[20]
In the West, Falun Gong is frequently classified as a religion on the basis of its theological and moral teachings,[79] its concerns with spiritual cultivation and transformation, and its extensive body of scripture.[20] Human rights groups report on the persecution of Falun Gong as a violation of religious freedom, and in 2001, Falun Gong was given an International Religious Freedom Award from Freedom House.[20] Falun Gong practitioners themselves have sometimes disavowed this classification, however. This rejection reflects the relatively narrow definition of “religion” (zongjiao) in contemporary China. According to David Ownby, religion in China has been defined since 1912 to refer to “world-historical faiths” that have “well-developed institutions, clergy, and textual traditions”—namely, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism.[80] Falun Gong lacks these features, having no temples, rituals of worship, clergy or formal hierarchy. Moreover, if Falun Gong had described itself as a religion in China, it likely would have invited immediate suppression.[20] These historical and cultural circumstances notwithstanding, the practice has often been described as a form of Chinese religion.[81]
Although it is often referred to as such in journalistic literature, Falun Gong does not satisfy the definition of a “sect” or “cult.”[46] A sect is generally defined as a branch or denomination of an established belief system or mainstream church. Although Falun Gong draws on both Buddhist and Daoist ideas and terminology, it claims no direct relationship or lineage connection to these religions.[22][82] Sociologists regard sects as exclusive groups that exist within clearly defined boundaries, with rigorous standards for admission and strict allegiances.[83] However, as noted by Noah Porter, Falun Gong does not share these qualities: it does not have clearly defined boundaries, and anyone may practice it.[53] Cheris Shun-ching Chan likewise writes that Falun Gong is “categorically not a sect”: its practitioners do not sever ties with secular society, it is “loosely structured with a fluctuating membership and tolerant of other organizations and faiths,” and it is more concerned with personal, rather than collective worship.[83]
Organization
As a matter of doctrinal significance, Falun Gong is intended to be “formless”, having little to no material or formal organization. Practitioners of Falun Gong cannot collect money or charge fees, conduct healings, or teach or interpret doctrine for others.[84] There are no administrators or officials within the practice, no system of membership, and no churches or physical places of worship.[15][74][85][86] In the absence of membership or initiation rituals, Falun Gong practitioners can be anyone who chooses to identify themselves as such.[87] Students are free to participate in the practice and follow its teachings as much or as little as they like, and practitioners do not instruct others on what to believe or how to behave.[53][65][88]
Spiritual authority is vested exclusively in the teachings of founder Li Hongzhi.[84] But organizationally Falun Gong is decentralized, and local branches and assistants are afforded no special privileges, authority, or titles. Volunteer “assistants” or “contact persons” do not hold authority over other practitioners, regardless of how long they have practiced Falun Gong.[47][73] Li’s spiritual authority within the practice is absolute, yet the organization of Falun Gong works against totalistic control, and Li does not intervene in the personal lives of practitioners. Falun Gong practitioners have little to no contact with Li, except through the study of his teachings.[53][73] There is no hierarchy in Falun Gong to enforce orthodoxy, and little or no emphasis is given on dogmatic discipline; the only thing emphasized is the need for strict moral behavior, according to Craig Burgdoff, a professor of religious studies.[73]
To the extent that organization is achieved in Falun Gong, it is accomplished through a global, networked, and largely virtual online community. In particular, electronic communications, email lists and a collection of websites are the primary means of coordinating activities and disseminating Li Hongzhi’s teachings.[89]
Outside Mainland China, a network of volunteer ‘contact persons’, regional Falun Dafa Associations and university clubs exist in approximately 80 countries.[90] Li Hongzhi’s teachings are principally spread through the Internet.[74][91] In most mid- to large-sized cities, Falun Gong practitioners organize regular group meditation or study sessions in which they practice Falun Gong exercises and read Li Hongzhi’s writings. The exercise and meditation sessions are described as informal groups of practitioners who gather in public parks—usually in the morning—for one to two hours.[53][74][92] Group study sessions typically take place in the evenings in private residences or university or high school classrooms, and are described by David Ownby as “the closest thing to a regular ‘congregational experience'” that Falun Gong offers.[52] Individuals who are too busy, isolated, or who simply prefer solitude may elect to practice privately.[52] When there are expenses to be covered (such as for the rental of facilities for large-scale conferences), costs are borne by self-nominated and relatively affluent individual members of the community.[52][93]
In 1993, the Beijing-based Falun Dafa Research Society was accepted as a branch of the state-run China Qigong Research Society (CQRS), which oversaw the administration of the country’s various qigong schools, and sponsored activities and seminars. As per the requirements of the CQRS, Falun Gong was organized into a nationwide network of assistance centers, “main stations”, “branches”, “guidance stations”, and local practice sites, mirroring the structure of the qigong society or even of the Communist Party itself.[86][94] Falun Gong assistants were self-selecting volunteers who taught the exercises, organized events, and disseminated new writings from Li Hongzhi. The Falun Dafa Research Society provided advice to students on meditation techniques, translation services, and coordination for the practice nationwide.[86]
Following its departure from the CQRS in 1996, Falun Gong came under increased scrutiny from authorities and responded by adopting a more decentralized and loose organizational structure.[53] In 1997, the Falun Dafa Research Society was formally dissolved, along with the regional “main stations.”[95] Yet practitioners continued to organize themselves at local levels, being connected through electronic communications, interpersonal networks and group exercise sites.[53][96] Both Falun Gong sources and Chinese government sources claimed that there were some 1,900 “guidance stations” and 28,263 local Falun Gong exercise sites nationwide by 1999, though they disagree over the extent of vertical coordination among these organizational units.[97] In response to the persecution that began in 1999, Falun Gong was driven underground, the organizational structure grew yet more informal within China, and the internet took precedence as a means of connecting practitioners.[98]
Following the persecution of Falun Gong in 1999, Chinese authorities sought to portray Falun Gong as a hierarchical and well-funded organization. James Tong writes that it was in the government’s interest to portray Falun Gong as highly organized in order to justify its repression of the group: “The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime’s repression in the name of social order was.”[99] He concluded that Party’s claims lacked “both internal and external substantiating evidence”, and that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities never “credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals”.[100]
Prior to July 1999, official estimates placed the number of Falun Gong practitioners at 70 million nationwide, rivaling membership in the Communist Party.[2][101][102][103][104] By the time of the persecution on 22 July 1999, most Chinese government numbers said the population of Falun Gong was between 2 and 3 million,[96][105] though some publications maintained an estimate of 40 million.[86][106] Most Falun Gong estimates in the same period placed the total number of practitioners in China at 70 to 80 million.[23][86][107] Other sources have estimated the Falun Gong population in China to have peaked between 10 and 70 million practitioners.[108][109] The number of Falun Gong practitioners still practicing in China today is difficult to confirm, though some sources estimate that tens of millions continue to practice privately.[8][110]
Demographic surveys conducted in China in 1998 found a population that was mostly female and elderly. Of 34,351 Falun Gong practitioners surveyed, 27% were male and 73% female. Only 38% were under 50 years old.[111] Falun Gong attracted a range of other individuals, from young college students to bureaucrats, intellectuals and Party officials.[112][113] Surveys in China from the 1990s found that between 23–40% of practitioners held university degrees at the college or graduate level—several times higher than the general population.[53]
Falun Gong is practiced by tens, and possibly hundreds of thousands outside China,[12] with the largest communities found in Taiwan and North American cities with large Chinese populations, such as New York and Toronto. Demographic surveys by Palmer and Ownby in these communities found that 90% of practitioners are ethnic Chinese. The average age was approximately 40.[114] Among survey respondents, 56% were female and 44% male; 80% were married. The surveys found the respondents to be highly educated: 9% held PhDs, 34% had master’s degrees, and 24% had a bachelor’s degree.[114]
The most commonly reported reasons for being attracted to Falun Gong were intellectual content, cultivation exercises, and health benefits.[115] Non-Chinese Falun Gong practitioners tend to fit the profile of “spiritual seekers”—people who had tried a variety of qigong, yoga, or religious practices before finding Falun Gong. According to Richard Madsen[who?], Chinese scientists with doctorates from prestigious American universities who practice Falun Gong claim that modern physics (for example, superstring theory) and biology (specifically the pineal gland‘s function) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. From their point of view, “Falun Dafa is knowledge rather than religion, a new form of science rather than faith”.[79]
Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public on 13 May 1992, in Changchun, Jilin Province.[15] Several months later, in September 1992, Falun Gong was admitted as a branch of qigong under the administration of the state-run China Qigong Scientific Research Society (CQRS). Li was recognized as a qigong master, and was authorized to teach his practice nationwide.[116] Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. He was granted a number of awards by PRC governmental organizations.[15][78][117][118]
According to David Ownby, Professor of History and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Université de Montréal, Li became an “instant star of the qigong movement”,[119] and Falun Gong was embraced by the government as an effective means of lowering health care costs, promoting Chinese culture, and improving public morality. In December 1992, for instance, Li and several Falun Gong students participated in the Asian Health Expo in Beijing, where he reportedly “received the most praise [of any qigong school] at the fair, and achieved very good therapeutic results”, according to the fair’s organizer.[15] The event helped cement Li’s popularity, and journalistic reports of Falun Gong’s healing powers spread.[15][20] In 1993, a publication of the Ministry of Public Security praised Li for “promoting the traditional crime-fighting virtues of the Chinese people, in safeguarding social order and security, and in promoting rectitude in society.”[120]
Falun Gong had differentiated itself from other qigong groups in its emphasis on morality, low cost, and health benefits. It rapidly spread via word-of-mouth, attracting a wide range of practitioners from all walks of life, including numerous members of the Chinese Communist Party.[23][121]
From 1992 to 1994, Li did charge fees for the seminars he was giving across China, though the fees were considerably lower than those of competing qigong practices, and the local qigong associations received a substantial share.[46] Li justified the fees as being necessary to cover travel costs and other expenses, and on some occasions, he donated the money earned to charitable causes. In 1994, Li ceased charging fees altogether, thereafter stipulating that Falun Gong must always be taught for free, and its teachings made available without charge (including online).[122] Although some observers believe Li continued to earn substantial income through the sale of Falun Gong books,[123] others dispute this, noting that most Falun Gong books in circulation were bootleg copies.[61]
At the Asian Health Expo in Beijing, 1994, Li Hongzhi is proclaimed the “Most Acclaimed Qigong Master.” Falun Gong also received the “Special Gold Award” and award for “Advancing Frontier Science.”
With the publication of the books Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun, Li made his teachings more widely accessible. Zhuan Falun, published in January 1995 at an unveiling ceremony held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Public Security, became a best-seller in China.[124][125]
In 1995, Chinese authorities began looking to Falun Gong to solidify its organizational structure and ties to the party-state.[53] Li was approached by the Chinese National Sports Committee, Ministry of Public Health, and China Qigong Science Research Association (CQRS) to jointly establish a Falun Gong association. Li declined the offer. The same year, the CQRS issued a new regulation mandating that all qigong denominations establish a Communist Party branch. Li again refused.[13]
Tensions continued to mount between Li and the CQRS in 1996. In the face of Falun Gong’s rise in popularity—a large part of which was attributed to its low cost—competing qigong masters accused Li of undercutting them. According to Schechter, the qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but Li emphasized the need for the teachings to be free of charge.[46]
In March 1996, in response to mounting disagreements, Falun Gong withdrew from the CQRS, after which time it operated outside the official sanction of the state. Falun Gong representatives attempted to register with other government entities, but were rebuffed.[126] Li and Falun Gong were then outside the circuit of personal relations and financial exchanges through which masters and their qigong organizations could find a place within the state system, and also the protections this afforded.[127]
1996–1999
Falun Gong’s departure from the state-run CQRS corresponded to a wider shift in the government’s attitudes towards qigong practices. As qigong’s detractors in government grew more influential, authorities began attempting to rein in the growth and influence of these groups, some of which had amassed tens of millions of followers.[15] In the mid-1990s the state-run media began publishing articles critical of qigong.[13][15]
Falun Gong was initially shielded from the mounting criticism, but following its withdrawal from the CQRS in March 1996, it lost this protection. On 17 June 1996, the Guangming Daily, an influential state-run newspaper, published a polemic against Falun Gong in which its central text, Zhuan Falun, was described as an example of “feudal superstition.”[15][128] The author wrote that the history of humanity is a “struggle between science and superstition,” and called on Chinese publishers not to print “pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers.” The article was followed by at least twenty more in newspapers nationwide. Soon after, on 24 July, the Central Propaganda Department banned all publication of Falun Gong books (though the ban was not consistently enforced).[128] The state-administered Buddhist Association of China also began issuing criticisms of Falun Gong, urging lay Buddhists not to take up the practice.[129]
The events were an important challenge to Falun Gong, and one that practitioners did not take lightly.[130] Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to Guangming Daily and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated Hu Yaobang‘s 1982 ‘Triple No’ directive, which prohibited the media from either encouraging or criticizing qigong practices.[128][131] In other instances, Falun Gong practitioners staged peaceful demonstrations outside media or local government offices to request retractions of perceived unfair coverage.[20]
The polemics against Falun Gong were part of a larger movement opposing qigong organizations in the state-run media.[132] Although Falun Gong was not the only target of the media criticism, nor the only group to protest, theirs was the most mobilized and steadfast response.[48] Many of Falun Gong’s protests against negative media portrayals were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of the practice. This contributed to practitioners’ belief that the media claims against them were false or exaggerated, and that their stance was justified.[133]
In June 1998, He Zuoxiu, an outspoken critic of qigong and a fierce defender of Marxism, appeared on a talk show on Beijing Television and openly disparaged qigong groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.[134] Falun Gong practitioners responded with peaceful protests and by lobbying the station for a retraction. The reporter responsible for the program was reportedly fired, and a program favorable to Falun Gong was aired several days later.[135][136] Falun Gong practitioners also mounted demonstrations at 14 other media outlets.[135]
In 1997, The Ministry of Public Security launched an investigation into whether Falun Gong should be deemed xie jiao (邪教, “heretical teaching”). The report concluded that “no evidence has appeared thus far”.[137] The following year, however, on 21 July 1998, the Ministry of Public Security issued Document No. 555, “Notice of the Investigation of Falun Gong”. The document asserted that Falun Gong is a “heretical teaching”, and mandated that another investigation be launched to seek evidence in support of the conclusion.[138] Falun Gong practitioners reported having phone lines tapped, homes ransacked and raided, and Falun Gong exercise sites disrupted by public security agents.[20]
Li Hongzhi (right) receiving a proclamation from Illinois Governor George Ryan in 1999
In this time period, even as criticism of qigong and Falun Gong mounted in some circles, the practice maintained a number of high-profile supporters in the government. In 1998, Qiao Shi, the recently retired Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, initiated his own investigation into Falun Gong. After months of investigations, his group concluded that “Falun Gong has hundreds of benefits for the Chinese people and China, and does not have one single bad effect.”[139] In May of the same year, China’s National Sports Commission launched its own survey of Falun Gong. Based on interviews with over 12,000 Falun Gong practitioners in Guangdong province,[13] they stated that they were “convinced the exercises and effects of Falun Gong are excellent. It has done an extraordinary amount to improve society’s stability and ethics.”
The practice’s founder, Li Hongzhi, was largely absent from the country during the period of rising tensions with the government. In March 1995, Li had left China to first teach his practice in France and then other countries, and in 1998 obtained permanent residency in the United States.[13][20][140]
By 1999, estimates provided by the State Sports Commission suggested there were 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in China.[2][141] An anonymous employee of China’s National Sports Commission, was at this time quoted in an interview with U.S. News & World Report as speculating that if 100 million had taken up Falun Gong and other forms of qigong there would be a dramatic reduction of health care costs and that “Premier Zhu Rongji is very happy about that.”[101]
Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests
By the late 1990s, the Communist Party’s relationship to the growing Falun Gong movement had become increasingly tense. Reports of discrimination and surveillance by the Public Security Bureau were escalating, and Falun Gong practitioners were routinely organizing sit-in demonstrations responding to media articles they deemed to be unfair. The conflicting investigations launched by the Ministry of the Public Security on one side and the State Sports Commission and Qiao Shi on the other spoke of the disagreements among China’s elites on how to regard the growing practice.
In April 1999, an article critical of Falun Gong was published in Tianjin Normal University‘s Youth Reader magazine. The article was authored by physicist He Zuoxiu who, as Porter and Gutmann note, is a relative of Politburo member and public security secretaryLuo Gan.[53][142] The article cast qigong, and Falun Gong in particular, as superstitious and harmful for youth.[143] Falun Gong practitioners responded by picketing the offices of the newspaper requesting a retraction of the article.[138] Unlike past instances in which Falun Gong protests were successful, on 22 April the Tianjin demonstration was broken up by the arrival of three hundred riot police. Some of the practitioners were beaten, and forty-five arrested.[46][138][144] Other Falun Gong practitioners were told that if they wished to appeal further, they needed to take the issue up with the Ministry of Public Security and go to Beijing to appeal.[142][144][145]
Falun Gong adherents demonstrate in front of Zhongnanhai, 25 April 1999.
The Falun Gong community quickly mobilized a response, and on the morning of 25 April, upwards of 10,000 practitioners gathered near the central appeals office to demand an end to the escalating harassment against the movement, and request the release of the Tianjin practitioners. According to Benjamin Penny, practitioners sought redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, “albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily.”[78] Journalist Ethan Gutmann wrote that security officers had been expecting them, and corralled the practitioners onto Fuyou Street in front of Zhongnanhai government compound.[142] They sat or read quietly on the sidewalks surrounding the Zhongnanhai.[146]
Five Falun Gong representatives met with Premier Zhu Rongji and other senior officials to negotiate a resolution. The Falun Gong representatives were assured that the regime supported physical exercises for health improvements and did not consider the Falun Gong to be anti-government.[146] Upon reaching this resolution, the crowd of Falun Gong protesters dispersed.[142]
Party General SecretaryJiang Zemin was alerted to the demonstration by CPC Politburo member Luo Gan,[105] and was reportedly angered by the audacity of the demonstration—the largest since the Tiananmen Square protests ten years earlier. Jiang called for resolute action to suppress the group,[96] and reportedly criticized Premier Zhu for being “too soft” in his handling of the situation.[46] That evening, Jiang composed a letter indicating his desire to see Falun Gong “defeated”. In the letter, Jiang expressed concerns over the size and popularity of Falun Gong, and in particular about the large number of senior Communist Party members found among Falun Gong practitioners. He noted the possibility of foreign forces behind Falun Gong’s protests (the practice’s founder, Li Hongzhi, had emigrated to the United States), and expressed concern about their use of the internet to coordinate a large-scale demonstration. Jiang also intimated that Falun Gong’s moral philosophy was at odds with the atheist values of Marxist–Leninism, and therefore constituted a form of ideological competition.[147]
Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for this decision to persecute Falun Gong.[148][149] Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi; Saich points to Jiang’s anger at Falun Gong’s widespread appeal, and ideological struggle as causes for the crackdown that followed. Willy Wo-Lap Lam suggests Jiang’s decision to suppress Falun Gong was related to a desire to consolidate his power within the Politburo.[150] According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown.[136]
A Falun Gong practitioner arrested by Chinese police in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.
On 20 July 1999, security forces abducted and detained thousands of Falun Gong practitioners that they identified as leaders.[96] Two days later, on 22 July, the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs outlawed the Falun Dafa Research Society as an illegal organization “engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability”.[151][152] The same day, the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular forbidding citizens from practicing Falun Gong in groups, possessing Falun Gong’s teachings, displaying Falun Gong banners or symbols, or protesting the ban.[136]
The ensuing campaign aimed to “eradicate” the group through a combination of propaganda, imprisonment, and coercive thought reform of practitioners, sometimes resulting in deaths. In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw “heterodox religions” and sentence Falun Gong devotees to prison terms.[153][154]
Hundreds of thousands are estimated to have been imprisoned extrajudicially, and practitioners in detention are reportedly subjected to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive methods of thought reform at the hands of Chinese authorities.[4][155][156] The U.S. Department of State and Congressional-Executive Commission on China cite estimates that as much as half of China’s reeducation-through-labor camp population is made up of Falun Gong practitioners.[157][158] Researcher Ethan Gutmann estimates that Falun Gong represents an average of 15 to 20 percent of the total “laogai” population, which includes reeducation through labor camps as well as prisons and other forms of administrative detention.[159] Former detainees of the labor camp system have reported that Falun Gong practitioners are one of the largest groups of prisoners; in some labor camp and prison facilities, they comprise the majority of detainees, and are often said to receive the longest sentences and the worst treatment.[160][161] A 2013 report by Amnesty International on labor reeducation camps found that Falun Gong practitioners “constituted on average from one third to in some cases 100 per cent of the total population” of certain camps.[162]
According to Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong extends to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces.[61] An extra-constitutional body, the “610 Office” was created to “oversee” the effort.[4][153][163] Human Rights Watch (2002) commented that families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government.[136]
Speculation on rationale
Foreign observers have attempted to explain the Party’s rationale for banning Falun Gong as stemming from a variety of factors. These include Falun Gong’s popularity, China’s history of quasi-religious movements that turned into violent insurrections, its independence from the state and refusal to toe the party line, internal power politics within the Communist Party—and Falun Gong’s moral and spiritual content, which put it at odds with aspects of the official Marxist ideology.
610 Office’s organization in China.
Xinhua News Agency, the official news organization of the Communist Party, declared that Falun Gong is “opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition.”[164] Xinhua also asserted that “the so-called ‘truth, kindness and forbearance’ principle preached by [Falun Gong] has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve”, and argued that it was necessary to crush Falun Gong to preserve the “vanguard role and purity” of the Communist Party.[165] Other articles appearing in the state-run media in the first days and weeks of the ban posited that Falun Gong must be defeated because its “theistic” philosophy was at odds with the Marxist–Leninism paradigm and with the secular values of materialism.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam writes that Jiang Zemin’s campaign against Falun Gong may have been used to promote allegiance to himself; Lam quotes one party veteran as saying “by unleashing a Mao-style movement [against Falun Gong], Jiang is forcing senior cadres to pledge allegiance to his line.”[166]The Washington Post reported that sources indicated not all of the standing committee of the Politburo shared Jiang’s view that Falun Gong should be eradicated,[167] but James Tong suggests there was not substantial resistance from the Politburo.
Human Rights Watch commented that the crackdown on Falun Gong reflects historical efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion, which the government believes is inherently subversive.[136] The Chinese government protects five “patriotic”, Communist Party-sanctioned religious groups. Unregistered religions that fall outside the state-sanctioned organizations are thus vulnerable to suppression.[168]The Globe and Mail wrote : “… any group that does not come under the control of the Party is a threat”.[169]Craig S. Smith of The Wall Street Journal wrote that the party feels increasingly threatened by any belief system that challenges its ideology and has an ability to organize itself.[170] That Falun Gong, whose belief system represented a revival of traditional Chinese religion, was being practiced by a large number of Communist Party members and members of the military was seen as particularly disturbing to Jiang Zemin; according to Julia Ching, “Jiang accepts the threat of Falun Gong as an ideological one: spiritual beliefs against militant atheism and historical materialism. He [wished] to purge the government and the military of such beliefs.”[171]
A Falun Gong adherent sitting in Tiananmen Square
Yuezhi Zhao points to several other factors that may have led to a deterioration of the relationship between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and media.[48] These included infighting within China’s qigong establishment, the influence of qigong opponents among Communist Party leaders, and the struggles from mid-1996 to mid-1999 between Falun Gong and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.[48] According to Zhao, Falun Gong practitioners have established a “resistance identity”—one that stands against prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality, and “the entire value system associated with China’s project of modernization.”[48] In China the practice represented an indigenous spiritual and moral tradition, a cultural revitalization movement, and drew a sharp contrast to “Marxism with Chinese characteristics”.[172]
Vivienne Shue similarly writes that Falun Gong presented a comprehensive challenge to the Communist Party’s legitimacy. Shue argues that Chinese rulers historically have derived their legitimacy from a claim to possess an exclusive connection to the “Truth”. In imperial China, truth was based on a Confucian and Daoist cosmology, where in the case of the Communist Party, the truth is represented by Marxist–Leninism and historical materialism. Falun Gong challenged the Marxist–Leninism paradigm, reviving an understanding based on more traditionally Buddhist or Daoist conceptions.[173] David Ownby contends that Falun Gong also challenged the Communist Party’s hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse: “[Falun Gong’s] evocation of a different vision of Chinese tradition and its contemporary value is now so threatening to the state and party because it denies them the sole right to define the meaning of Chinese nationalism, and perhaps of Chineseness.”[174]
Maria Chang noted that since the overthrow of the Qin Dynasty, “Millenarian movements had exerted a profound impact on the course of Chinese history,” cumulating in the Chinese Revolutions of 1949, which brought the Chinese Communists to power.[75] Patsy Rahn (2002) describes a paradigm of conflict between Chinese sectarian groups and the rulers they often challenge. According to Rahn, the history of this paradigm goes back to the collapse of the Han dynasty: “The pattern of ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at times threatened by them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early as the second century and continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era and into the present.”[175]
Conversion program
Falun Gong practitioner Tang Yongjie was tortured by prison guards, who applied hot rods to his legs in an attempt to force him to recant his beliefs.
According to James Tong, the regime aimed at both coercive dissolution of the Falun Gong denomination and “transformation” of the practitioners.[176] By 2000, the Party upped its campaign by sentencing “recidivist” practitioners to “re-education through labor“, in an effort to have them renounce their beliefs and “transform” their thoughts.[136] Terms were also arbitrarily extended by police, while some practitioners had ambiguous charges levied against them, such as “disrupting social order”, “endangering national security”, or “subverting the socialist system”.[177] According to Bejesky, the majority of long-term Falun Gong detainees are processed administratively through this system instead of the criminal justice system. Upon completion of their re-education sentences, those practitioners who refused to recant were then incarcerated in “legal education centers” set up by provincial authorities to “transform minds”.[177][178]
Much of the conversion program relied on Mao-style techniques of indoctrination and thought reform, where Falun Gong practitioners were organized to view anti-Falun Gong television programs and enroll in Marxism and materialism study sessions.[179] Traditional Marxism and materialism were the core content of the sessions.[180]
The government-sponsored image of the conversion process emphasizes psychological persuasion and a variety of “soft-sell” techniques; this is the “ideal norm” in regime reports, according to Tong. Falun Gong reports, on the other hand, depict “disturbing and sinister” forms of coercion against practitioners who fail to renounce their beliefs.[182] 14,474 cases are classified by different methods of torture, according to Tong (Falun Gong agencies document over 63,000 individual cases of torture).[183] Among them are cases of severe beatings; psychological torment, corporal punishment and forced intense, heavy-burden hard labor and stress positions; solitary confinement in squalid conditions;[182] “heat treatment” including burning and freezing; electric shocks delivered to sensitive parts of the body that may result in nausea, convulsions, or fainting;[182] “devastative” forced feeding; sticking bamboo strips into fingernails; deprivation of food, sleep, and use of toilet;[182] rape and gang rape; asphyxiation; and threat, extortion, and termination of employment and student status.[182]
The cases appear verifiable, and the great majority identify (1) the individual practitioner, often with age, occupation, and residence; (2) the time and location that the alleged abuse took place, down to the level of the district, township, village, and often the specific jail institution; and (3) the names and ranks of the alleged perpetrators. Many such reports include lists of the names of witnesses and descriptions of injuries, Tong says.[182] The publication of “persistent abusive, often brutal behavior by named individuals with their official title, place, and time of torture” suggests that there is no official will to cease and desist such activities.[182]
Deaths
Due to the difficulty in corroborating reports of torture deaths in China, estimates on the number of Falun Gong practitioners killed under persecution vary widely. In 2009, The New York Times reported that, according to human rights groups, the repressions had claimed “at least 2,000” lives.[5] Amnesty International said at least 100 Falun Gong practitioners had reportedly died in the 2008 calendar year, either in custody or shortly after their release.[184] Falun Gong sources have documented over 3,700 deaths.[185] Investigative journalist Ethan Gutmann estimated 65,000 Falun Gong were killed for their organs from 2000 to 2008 based on extensive interviews,[159][186] while researchers David Kilgour and David Matas reported, “the source of 41,500 transplants for the six-year period 2000 to 2005 is unexplained”.[187][188]
Chinese authorities do not publish statistics on Falun Gong practitioners killed amidst the crackdown. In individual cases, however, authorities have denied that deaths in custody were due to torture.[189]
In 2006, allegations emerged that a large number of Falun Gong practitioners had been killed to supply China’s organ transplant industry. These allegations prompted an investigation by former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas.
The Kilgour-Matas report[187][190][191] was published in July 2006, and concluded that “the government of China and its agencies in numerous parts of the country, in particular hospitals but also detention centers and ‘people’s courts’, since 1999 have put to death a large but unknown number of Falun Gong prisoners of conscience.” The report, which was based mainly on circumstantial evidence, called attention to the extremely short wait times for organs in China—one to two weeks for a liver compared with 32.5 months in Canada—noting that this was indicative of organs being procured on demand. It also tracked a significant increase in the number of annual organ transplants in China beginning in 1999, corresponding with the onset of the persecution of Falun Gong. Despite very low levels of voluntary organ donation, China performs the second-highest number of transplants per year. Kilgour and Matas also presented self-accusatory material from Chinese transplant center web sites[192][193][194] advertising the immediate availability of organs from living donors, and transcripts of interviews in which hospitals told prospective transplant recipients that they could obtain Falun Gong organs.[187]
In May 2008 two United Nations Special Rapporteurs reiterated requests for the Chinese authorities to respond to the allegations,[195] and to explain a source for the organs that would account for the sudden increase in organ transplants in China since 2000. Chinese officials have responded by denying the organ harvesting allegations, and insisting that China abides by World Health Organization principles that prohibit the sale of human organs without written consent from donors. Responding to a U.S. House of Representatives Resolution calling for an end to abusing transplant practices against religious and ethnic minorities, a Chinese embassy spokesperson said “the so-called organ harvesting from death-row prisoners is totally a lie fabricated by Falun Gong.”[196] In August 2009, Manfred Nowak, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, said, “The Chinese government has yet to come clean and be transparent … It remains to be seen how it could be possible that organ transplant surgeries in Chinese hospitals have risen massively since 1999, while there are never that many voluntary donors available.”[197]
In 2014, investigative journalist Ethan Gutmann published the result of his own investigation.[198] Gutmann conducted extensive interviews with former detainees in Chinese labor camps and prisons, as well as former security officers and medical professionals with knowledge of China’s transplant practices.[7][199] He reported that organ harvesting from political prisoners likely began in Xinjiang province in the 1990s, and then spread nationwide. Gutmann estimates that some 64,000 Falun Gong prisoners may have been killed for their organs between the years 2000 and 2008.[198][200]
In a 2016 report, David Kilgour found that he had underestimated. In the new report he found that the government’s official estimates for the volume of organs harvested since the persecution of Falun Gong began to be 150,000 to 200,000.[201] Media outlets have extrapolated from this study a death toll of 1,500,000.[202][203]Ethan Gutmann estimated from this update that 60,000 to 110,000 organs are harvested in China annually noting it is (paraphrasing): “difficult but plausible to harvest 3 organs from a single body” and also calls the harvest “a new form of genocide using the most respected members of society.”[204]
In June 2019, the China Tribunal – an independent tribunal set up by the International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China – concluded that detainees including imprisoned followers of the Falun Gong movement are still being killed for organ harvesting. The Tribunal, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, said it was “certain that Falun Gong as a source – probably the principal source – of organs for forced organ harvesting”.[205][206]
Media campaign
The Chinese government’s campaign against Falun Gong was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet.[96][153] Within the first month of the crackdown, 300–400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media.[207] The propaganda campaign focused on allegations that Falun Gong jeopardized social stability, was deceiving and dangerous, was “anti-science” and threatened progress, and argued that Falun Gong’s moral philosophy was incompatible with a Marxist social ethic.[15]
China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith asserted that for several months after Falun Gong was outlawed, China Central Television’s evening news contained little but anti-Falun Gong rhetoric; the government operation was “a study in all-out demonization”, they wrote.[208] Falun Gong was compared to “a rat crossing the street that everyone shouts out to squash” by Beijing Daily;[209] other officials said it would be a “long-term, complex and serious” struggle to “eradicate” Falun Gong.[210]
State propaganda initially used the appeal of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong’s worldview was in “complete opposition to science” and communism.[211] For example, the People’s Daily asserted on 27 July 1999, that the fight against Falun Gong “was a struggle between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism.” Other editorials declared that Falun Gong’s “idealism and theism” are “absolutely contradictory to the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism,” and that the “‘truth, kindness and forbearance’ principle preached by [Falun Gong] has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve.” Suppressing Falun Gong was presented as a necessary step to maintaining the “vanguard role” of the Communist Party in Chinese society.[212]
Despite Party efforts, initial charges leveled against Falun Gong failed to elicit widespread popular support for the persecution of the group. In the months following July 1999, the rhetoric in the state-run press escalated to include charges that Falun Gong was colluding with foreign, “anti-China” forces. In October 1999, three months after the persecution began, the People’s Daily newspaper claimed Falun Gong as a xiejiao.[24][83] A direct translation of that term is “heretical teaching”, but during the anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign was rendered as “evil cult” in English.[154] In the context of imperial China, the term “xiejiao” was used to refer to non-Confucian religions, though in the context of Communist China, it has been used to target religious organizations that do not submit to Communist Party authority.[213][214]
Ian Johnson argued that applying the ‘cult’ label to Falun Gong effectively “cloaked the government’s crackdown with the legitimacy of the West’s anticult movement.” He wrote that Falun Gong does not satisfy common definitions of a cult: “its members marry outside the group, have outside friends, hold normal jobs, do not live isolated from society, do not believe that the world’s end is imminent and do not give significant amounts of money to the organisation … it does not advocate violence and is at heart an apolitical, inward-oriented discipline, one aimed at cleansing oneself spiritually and improving one’s health.”[61] David Ownby similarly wrote that “the entire issue of the supposed cultic nature of Falun Gong was a red herring from the beginning, cleverly exploited by the Chinese state to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong.”.[15] According to John Powers and Meg Y. M. Lee, because the Falun Gong was categorized in the popular perception as an “apolitical, qigong exercise club,” it was not seen as a threat to the government. The most critical strategy in the Falun Gong suppression campaign, therefore, was to convince people to reclassify the Falun Gong into a number of “negatively charged religious labels”,[215] like “evil cult”, “sect”, or “superstition”. The group’s silent protests were reclassified as creating “social disturbances”. In this process of relabelling, the government was attempting to tap into a “deep reservoir of negative feelings related to the historical role of quasi-religious cults as a destabilising force in Chinese political history.”[215]
A turning point in the propaganda campaign came on the eve of Chinese New Year on 23 January 2001, when five people attempted to set themselves ablaze on Tiananmen Square. The official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that the self-immolators were practitioners, though the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed this,[216] on the grounds that the movement’s teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing,[217] further alleging that the event was “a cruel (but clever) piece of stunt-work.”[218] The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). The broadcasts showed images of a 12-year-old girl, Liu Siying, burning, and interviews with the other participants in which they stated a belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise.[216][219] But one of the CNN producers on the scene did not even see a child there. Falun Gong sources and other commentators pointed out that the main participants’ account of the incident and other aspects of the participants’ behavior were inconsistent with the teachings of Falun Dafa.[220] Media Channel and the International Education Development (IED) agree that the supposed self-immolation incident was staged by CCP to “prove” that Falun Gong brainwashes its followers to commit suicide and has therefore to be banned as a threat to the nation. IED’s statement at the 53rd UN session describes China’s violent assault on Falun Gong practitioners as state terrorism and that the self-immolation “was staged by the government.” Washington Post journalist Phillip Pan wrote that the two self-immolators who died were not actually Falun Gong practitioners.[221] On March 21, 2001, Liu Siying suddenly died after appearing very lively and being deemed ready to leave the hospital to go home. Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state’s crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, the mainland Chinese media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.[222] As public sympathy for Falun Gong declined, the government began sanctioning “systematic use of violence” against the group.[223]
In February, 2001, the month following the Tiananmen Square incident, Jiang Zemin convened a rare Central Work Conference to stress the importance of continuity in the anti-Falun Gong campaign and unite senior party officials behind the effort.[136] Under Jiang’s leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of “upholding stability” – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. Jiang’s message was echoed at the 2001 National People’s Congress, where the Falun Gong’s eradication was tied to China’s economic progress.[136] Though less prominent on the national agenda, the persecution of Falun Gong has carried on after Jiang was retired; successive, high-level “strike hard” campaigns against Falun Gong were initiated in both 2008 and 2009. In 2010, a three-year campaign was launched to renew attempts at the coercive “transformation” of Falun Gong practitioners.[224]
In education system
Anti-Falun Gong propaganda efforts have also permeated the Chinese education system. Following Jiang Zemin’s 1999 ban of Falun Gong, then-Minister of Education Chen Zhili launched an active campaign to promote the Party’s line on Falun Gong within all levels of academic institutions, including graduate schools, universities and colleges, middle schools, primary schools, and kindergartens. Her efforts included a “Cultural Revolution-like pledge” in Chinese schools that required faculty members, staff, and students to publicly denounce Falun Gong. Teachers who did not comply with Chen’s program were dismissed or detained; uncooperative students were refused academic advancement, expelled from school, or sent to “transformation” camps to alter their thinking.[225] Chen also worked to spread the anti-Falun Gong academic propaganda movement overseas, using domestic educational funding to donate aid to foreign institutions, encouraging them to oppose Falun Gong.[225]
Falun Gong’s response to the persecution
Practitioners meditate to protest the persecution of Falun Gong at a demonstration in Washington, D.C.
Falun Gong’s response to the persecution in China began in July 1999 with appeals to local, provincial, and central petitioning offices in Beijing.[226] It soon progressed to larger demonstrations, with hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners traveling daily to Tiananmen Square to perform Falun Gong exercises or raise banners in defense of the practice. These demonstrations were invariably broken up by security forces, and the practitioners involved were arrested—sometimes violently—and detained. By 25 April 2000, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners had been arrested on the square;[227] seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the square on 1 January 2001.[228] Public protests continued well into 2001. Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Ian Johnson wrote that “Falun Gong faithful have mustered what is arguably the most sustained challenge to authority in 50 years of Communist rule.”[229]
By late 2001, demonstrations in Tiananmen Square had become less frequent, and the practice was driven deeper underground. As public protest fell out of favor, practitioners established underground “material sites,” which would produce literature and DVDs to counter the portrayal of Falun Gong in the official media. Practitioners then distribute these materials, often door-to-door.[230] Falun Gong sources estimated in 2009 that over 200,000 such sites exist across China today.[231] The production, possession, or distribution of these materials is frequently grounds for security agents to incarcerate or sentence Falun Gong practitioners.[232]
In 2002, Falun Gong activists in China tapped into television broadcasts, replacing regular state-run programming with their own content. One of the more notable instances occurred in March 2002, when Falun Gong practitioners in Changchun intercepted eight cable television networks in Jilin Province, and for nearly an hour, televised a program titled “Self-Immolation or a Staged Act?”. All six of the Falun Gong practitioners involved were captured over the next few months. Two were killed immediately, while the other four were all dead by 2010 as a result of injuries sustained while imprisoned.[233][234]
Outside China, Falun Gong practitioners established international media organizations to gain wider exposure for their cause and challenge narratives of the Chinese state-run media. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, New Tang Dynasty Television, and Sound of Hope radio station.[15] According to Zhao, through The Epoch Times it can be discerned how Falun Gong is building a “de facto media alliance” with China’s democracy movements in exile, as demonstrated by its frequent printing of articles by prominent overseas Chinese critics of the PRC government.[48] In 2004, The Epoch Times published a collection of nine editorials that presented a critical history of Communist Party rule.[65][235] This catalyzed the Tuidang movement, which encourages Chinese citizens to renounce their affiliations to the Chinese Communist Party, including ex post facto renunciations of the Communist Youth League and Young Pioneers. The Epoch Times claims that tens of millions have renounced the Communist Party as part of the movement, though these numbers have not been independently verified.[236]
In 2006, Falun Gong practitioners in the United States formed Shen Yun Performing Arts, a dance and music company that tours internationally.[237]
Falun Gong software developers in the United States are also responsible for the creation of several popular censorship-circumvention tools employed by internet users in China.[238]
Falun Gong Practitioners outside China have filed dozens of lawsuits against Jiang Zemin, Luo Gan, Bo Xilai, and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity.[239] According to International Advocates for Justice, Falun Gong has filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century and the charges are among the most severe international crimes defined by international criminal laws.[240] As of 2006, 54 civil and criminal lawsuits were under way in 33 countries.[15] In many instances, courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity. In late 2009, however, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang Zemin and Luo Gan on charges of “crimes of humanity” and genocide, and asked for their arrest—the ruling is acknowledged to be largely symbolic and unlikely to be carried out.[241][242][243][244] The court in Spain also indicted Bo Xilai, Jia Qinglin and Wu Guanzheng.[241][242]
Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters also filed a lawsuit in May 2011 against the technology company Cisco Systems, alleging that the company helped design and implement a surveillance system for the Chinese government to suppress Falun Gong. Cisco denied customizing their technology for this purpose.[245]
Li Hongzhi began teaching Falun Gong internationally in March 1995. His first stop was in Paris where, at the invitation of the Chinese ambassador, he held a lecture seminar at the PRC embassy. This was followed by lectures in Sweden in May 1995. Between 1995 and 1999, Li gave lectures in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, and Singapore.[15]
Falun Gong’s growth outside China largely corresponded to the migration of students from Mainland China to the West in the early- to mid-1990s. Falun Gong associations and clubs began appearing in Europe, North America and Australia, with activities centered mainly on university campuses.[246] Falun Gong volunteer instructors and Falun Dafa Associations are currently found in 80 countries outside China.[11]
Translations of Falun Gong teachings began appearing in the late 1990s. As the practice began proliferating outside China, Li Hongzhi was beginning to receive recognition in the United States and elsewhere in the western world. In May 1999, Li was welcomed to Toronto with greetings from the city’s mayor and the provincial lieutenant governor, and in the two months that followed also received recognition from the cities of Chicago and San Jose.[247]
Although the practice was beginning to attract an overseas constituency in the 1990s, it remained relatively unknown outside China until the Spring of 1999, when tensions between Falun Gong and Communist Party authorities became a subject of international media coverage. With the increased attention, the practice gained a greater following outside China. Following the launch of the Communist Party’s suppression campaign against Falun Gong, the overseas presence became vital to the practice’s resistance in China and its continued survival.[15] Falun Gong practitioners overseas have responded to the persecution in China through regular demonstrations, parades, and through the creation of media outlets, performing arts companies, and censorship-circumvention software mainly intended to reach Mainland Chinese audiences.[238]
International reception
Since 1999, numerous Western governments and human rights organizations have expressed condemnation of the Chinese government’s suppression of Falun Gong.[248] Since 1999, members of the United States Congress have made public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong.[249] In 2010, U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 605 called for “an immediate end to the campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners,” condemned the Chinese authorities’ efforts to distribute “false propaganda” about the practice worldwide, and expressed sympathy to persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and their families.[250][251]
Rally of Falun Gong’s adherents in Washington, D.C., 2003.
From 1999 to 2001, Western media reports on Falun Gong—and in particular, the mistreatment of practitioners—were frequent, if mixed.[207] By the latter half of 2001, however, the volume of media reports declined precipitously, and by 2002, major news organizations like The New York Times and Washington Post had almost completely ceased their coverage of Falun Gong from China.[207] In a study of media discourse on Falun Gong, researcher Leeshai Lemish found that Western news organizations also became less balanced, and more likely to uncritically present the narratives of the Communist Party, rather than those of Falun Gong or human rights groups.[207] Adam Frank writes that in reporting on the Falun Gong, the Western tradition of casting the Chinese as “exotic” took dominance, and that while the facts were generally correct in Western media coverage, “the normalcy that millions of Chinese practitioners associated with the practice had all but disappeared.”[252] David Ownby noted that alongside these tactics, the “cult” label applied to Falun Gong by the Chinese authorities never entirely went away in the minds of some Westerners, and the stigma still plays a role in wary public perceptions of Falun Gong.[253]
To counter the support of Falun Gong in the West, the Chinese government expanded their efforts against the group internationally. This included visits to newspaper officers by diplomats to “extol the virtues of Communist China and the evils of Falun Gong”,[254] linking support for Falun Gong with “jeopardizing trade relations,” and sending letters to local politicians telling them to withdraw support for the practice.[254] According to Perry Link, pressure on Western institutions also takes more subtle forms, including academic self-censorship, whereby research on Falun Gong could result in a denial of visa for fieldwork in China; or exclusion and discrimination from business and community groups who have connections with China and fear angering the Communist Party.[254][255]
Although the persecution of Falun Gong has drawn considerable condemnation outside China, some observers note that Falun Gong has failed to attract the level of sympathy and sustained attention afforded to other Chinese dissident groups.[256]Katrina Lantos Swett, vice chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, notes that most Americans are aware of the suppression of “Tibetan Buddhists and unregistered Christian groups or pro-democracy and free speech advocates such as Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei,” and yet “know little to nothing about China’s assault on the Falun Gong.”[257]
Ethan Gutmann, a journalist reporting on China since the early 1990s, has attempted to explain this apparent dearth of public sympathy for Falun Gong as stemming, in part, from the group’s shortcomings in public relations. Unlike the democracy activists or Tibetans, who have found a comfortable place in Western perceptions, “Falun Gong marched to a distinctly Chinese drum”, Gutmann writes. Moreover, practitioners’ attempts at getting their message across carried some of the uncouthness of Communist party culture, including a perception that practitioners tended to exaggerate, create “torture tableaux straight out of a Cultural Revolution opera”, or “spout slogans rather than facts”. This is coupled with a general doubtfulness in the West of persecuted refugees.[258] Gutmann also notes that media organizations and human rights groups also self-censor on the topic, given the PRC governments vehement attitude toward the practice, and the potential repercussions that may follow for making overt representations on Falun Gong’s behalf.[256]
Richard Madsen writes that Falun Gong lacks robust backing from the American constituencies that usually support religious freedom. For instance, Falun Gong’s conservative moral beliefs have alienated some liberal constituencies in the West (e.g. its teachings against promiscuity and homosexual behavior).[61] Christian conservatives, by contrast, don’t accord the practice the same space[clarification needed] as persecuted Chinese Christians.[259] Madsen charges that the American political center does not want to push the human rights issue so hard that it would disrupt commercial and political relations with China. Thus, Falun Gong practitioners have largely had to rely on their own resources in responding to suppression.[259]
In August 2007 at the request of the Falun Gong, the newly reestablished Rabbinic Sanhedrin deliberated persecution of the movement by Chinese government.[260][261][262]
Tong, James. (2009) “Revenge of the Forbidden City: The suppression of the Falungong in China, 1999–2005”. Oxford University Press. ISBN0-19-537728-1.
Shue, Vivienne. (2004) “Legitimacy Crisis in China?” In Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and Society in 21st-century China. Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Story 4: Live Fire Used in Hong Kong Protest — Videos —
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Steve Bannon: If There Is Another Tiananmen in Hong Kong, the CCP Will Collapse | Zooming I
The messages behind Hong Kong’s foreign flags
Hong Kong protesters fight back with TENNIS RACQUETS to volley back tear gas after police opened fire with live bullets for the first time during weeks of demonstrations
Pro-democracy protesters were seen armed with metal poles and sports equipment to protect themselves
An afternoon rally in the district of Tsuen Wan spiralled into violent clashes between police and proteters
Police fired live bullets for the first time in the weeks-long demonstrations which have rocked Hong Kong
PUBLISHED: 21:13 EDT, 25 August 2019 | UPDATED: 02:13 EDT, 26 August 2019
Protesters in Hong Kong are using tennis racquets to fend off tear gas while police fired live bullets for the first time in the weeks-long demonstrations.
Pro-democracy protesters were seen armed with metal poles and sports equipment to protect themselves from a police crackdown amid escalating tensions in the city.
An afternoon rally in the district of Tsuen Wan spiralled into violent clashes on Sunday with officers caught isolated by masked youths wielding sticks and throwing rocks.
Tensions escalated when police began hoisting warning flags before firing tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowd, who reacted angrily by throwing bricks and molotov cocktails.
In one instance, several police officers drew their sidearms. ‘According to my understanding, just now a gunshot was fired by a colleague,’ Superintendent Leung Kwok Win told the press.
‘My initial understanding was that it was a uniformed policeman who fired his gun.’
Scroll down for video
Protesters in Hong Kong are using tennis racquets to fend off tear gas after police fired live bullets for the first time in the weeks-long demonstration
Pro-democracy protesters were seen armed with sports equipment to protect themselves from a police crackdown amid escalating tensions in the city
A Hong Kong police officer fired at least one gunshot Sunday, the first time a live round has been used during three months of protests. Above: Officers point their guns at protesters on the streets of Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong
There has been a worrying change in the methods being used by city police to break up the crowds, with one instance where several police officers drew their sidearms, an AFP reporter at the scene said
A protester clad in a gas mask and other protective gear throws a brick at police during a clash at an anti-government rally in Tsuen Wan district to the north of the Hong Kong’s Victoria Harbour on Sunday
Another protestor, wearing the symbolic yellow helmet, is held down by two officers in riot gear as the police force clears out a street previously held by protestors
Tens of thousands of protesters skirmished with police in Hong Kong for a second straight day on Sunday following a pro-democracy march in an outlying district. After hoisting warning flags, police used tear gas to try to disperse the crowd. Above: A protester throws a Molotov cocktail at police
Flames from molotov cocktails and petrol bombs linger on the road and pavement after anti-extradition bill protesters clashed with riot police during a protest to demand democracy and political reforms, at Tsuen Wan, in Hong Kong this evening
A makeshift barricade of bollards and railings separates protestors from police officers as night falls across Hong Kong
It was unclear where the shot was aimed, but it was the first live round fired since the protests started three months ago.
The Hong Kong Free Press reported that three officers drew pistols in Tsuen Wan, a built up north of the main city, as two ‘got on their knees’ to beg the officers not to fire any shots.
There was a sense of chaos across swathes of the Kowloon peninsula, over the harbour from the main island of Hong Kong, with police sirens blaring, tear gas wafting throughout densely populated areas and running clashes on the streets.
The skirmishes between police and tens of thousands of protesters occurred for a second straight day yesterday following a pro-democracy march from a sports stadium in Kwai Fong to Tsuen Wan.
While a large crowd rallied in a nearby park, another group of protesters took over a main street, strewing bamboo poles on the pavement and lining up orange and white traffic barriers and cones to try to obstruct the police.
One woman looked undeterred by a police officer clutching a baton as she faced him while holding a purple umbrella above her head
While a large crowd rallied in a nearby park, another group of protesters took over a main street, strewing bamboo poles on the pavement and lining up orange and white traffic barriers and cones to try to obstruct the police. Above: Police fire tear gas at protesters
After hoisting warning flags, police used tear gas to try to disperse the crowd. Protesters responded by throwing bricks and gasoline bombs toward the police
The result was a surreal scene of small fires and scattered paving bricks on the street between the two, rising clouds of tear gas and green and blue laser lights pointed by the protesters at the police. Above: Riot police aim their guns at protesters
Police also carried riot shields and wore body armour, helmets and gas masks to defend against projectiles which were hurled at them in response to their tear gas
Some protesters wore protective gear including helmets and gas masks to guard against tear gas volleys by police. One mn (right) appeared to be holding his own weapon
The demonstrators were not deterred by police as they charged towards them. Their defiance was despite multiple warnings by the Chinese government that the protests must stop
Some police drew their weapons as the clashes with protesters escalated. Sunday’s reported gunshots were the first in the three months of pro-democracy protests
Multiple photographers surrounded one officer with clutching his gun as they looked to record what was going on
After hoisting warning flags, police used tear gas to try to disperse the crowd. Protesters responded by throwing bricks and gasoline bombs toward the police.
The result was a surreal scene of small fires and scattered paving bricks on the street between the two, rising clouds of tear gas and green and blue laser lights pointed by the protesters at the police.
Prior to the skirmishes, tens of thousands of umbrella-carrying protesters marched in the rain in Hong Kong’s latest pro-democracy demonstration.
Many filled Tsuen Wan Park, the endpoint of the rally, chanting, ‘Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,’ the South China Morning Post newspaper said.
What do Hong Kong protesters want?
Apart from the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Hong Kong demonstrators have listed five demands and have continued to urge the government to respond to them.
These five demands are:
1. A complete withdrawal of the extradition bill
2. A retraction from the government to its characterisation that the protesters were ‘rioters’
3. Unconditional and immediate release of protesters who were arrested and charges against them dropped
4. Establishment of an independent enquiry to investigate police violence during clashes
5. Genuine universal suffrage
The protests began with people gathering at a sports stadium in Kwai Fong, western Hong Kong, where they then marched to nearby Tsuen Wan and clashed with police.
The Chinese-ruled city’s rail operator, MTR Corp, had suspended some services to try to prevent people gathering.
M. Sung, a 53-year-old software engineer in a black mask emblematic of the many older, middle-class citizens at the march, said he had been at almost every protest and would keep coming.
‘We know this is the last chance to fight for ‘one country, two systems’, otherwise the Chinese Communist Party will penetrate our home city and control everything,’ he said.
‘If we keep a strong mind, we can sustain this movement for justice and democracy. It won’t die,’ Sung said.
Hong Kong has been gripped by three months of street demonstrations that started against a proposed extradition bill to China, but have spun out into a wider pro-democracy movement.
Protesters say they are fighting the erosion of the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement under which the former British colony returned to China in 1997 with the promise of continued freedoms not enjoyed on the mainland.
The protests pose a direct challenge for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, who are eager to quell the unrest ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1.
Beijing has sent a clear warning that forceful intervention is possible, with paramilitary forces holding drills just over the border.
The Chinese Government has used a mix of intimidation, propaganda and economic muscle to constrict the protests in a strategy dubbed ‘white terror’ by the movement.
The MTR – the city’s metro – is the latest Hong Kong business to be rebuked by the public, after appearing to bend to Chinese state-media attacks accusing the transport system of being an ‘exclusive’ service to ferry protesters to rallies.
Yesterday, the MTR shut stations near the main demonstration area in Tsuen Wan, the second day of station closures in a row
As photographers took pictures, a Hong Kong officers were seen with their guns out as they clashed with protesters again
Demonstrators also carried lasers which they shined into the eyes of police in an effort to hit back against their volleys of tear gas
One protester who was caught by police looked up fearfully at an officer as they tended to injuries he had suffered in clashes
The officer appeared to shine a light into the man’s eyes while others stood guard around him as others continued to protest
Riot police successfully detain one protester who is seen lying on their stomach with their hands on the wet road as officers talk to each other
Hong Kong was filled with clouds of tear gas as the sun began to go down in the region and protesters stayed on the streets
Some were armed with metal bars and wore helmets, goggles and gas masks for protection. Others wore body armour, including one man whose arms and chest were covered in protective gear
Lines of police were matched by masses of protesters who stood behind makeshift barriers. Many of those protesting wore yellow helmets and held umbrellas aloft
Bamboo poles were left strewn over the street as protesters tried to build barricades to push back the police in Tsuen Wan
Many protesters filled Tsuen Wan Park, the endpoint of the rally, chanting, ‘Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,’ the South China Morning Post newspaper said
Some protesters, undeterred by the robust police response, threw projectiles including Molotov cocktails at police
Other protesters were seen cowering in the streets of Tsuen Wan while wearing gas masks and helmets and holding umbrellas
Some rioters were detained by police, including one woman who cowered on the floor with her head bowed as two officers with shields and batons stood over her
The protesters filled Hong Kong’s streets, with thousands holding umbrellas over their heads both as protection against the rain and as a reference to the original ‘Umbrella Movement’ in 2014
The protests began with people gathering at a sports stadium in Kwai Fong, western Hong Kong, where they then marched to nearby Tsuen Wan and clashed with police. The Chinese-ruled city’s rail operator, MTR Corp, had suspended some services to try to prevent people gathering
Protesters were not afraid to have physical clashes with police as they were seen fighting with officers. Above: One policeman crouches on the floor as a protester stands over him with a metal bar
Despite the defiance of protesters, a seemingly-endless stream of police filled the streets to deal with demonstrations
Many of those clashes with officers were dressed in helmets and face coverings and some had makeshift weapons
As well as clashing with police, a hoard of protesters were seen breaking into and trashing a restaurant in Tsuen Wan
After smashing windows, protesters were seen standing amid upturned tables and chairs and shards of broken glass
Some protesters used metal poles to smash the window of a shop run by mainland Chinese people where Mahjong – a traditional Chinese domino-like tile game – can be played. The tactics are likely to further anger the Chinese government
After the windows were smashed, people inside huddled in a doorway while one man sitting at a table appeared to be crying
Worried-looking Hong Kong residents stood and watched the protesters break into the shop. The residents have witnessed three months of ongoing protests
In another Mahjong venue, broken glass was pictured scattered over the floor while a man peered through a doorway at the back of the room
Police facing protesters were backed up by trucks firing water cannon which helped to knock down makeshift barricades
Officers were seen walking through the streets behind and head of police vans as protesters massed up ahead of them
A petrol bomb thrown on the road by a protester lands next to police officers who keep a safe distance from leaping flames
Bricks thrown by protesters are seen near tear gas fired by the police during violent clashes between officers and those on the streets
One protester holds an umbrella as they react to the haze of tear gas which hung over the streets of Hong Kong for much of the day
Despite this, protesters continued to gather at Kwai Chung sports stadium in the pouring rain before beginning the march to Tsuen Wan.
A second rally of a few hundred, some of them family members of police, was also held on Sunday afternoon.
One relative, who said she was the wife of an officer, said they had received enough criticism. ‘I believe within these two months, police have got enough opprobrium.’
‘I really want you to know even if the whole world spits on you, we as family members will not,’ she said, giving her surname only as Si.
Police said they would launch a ‘dispersal operation’ soon.
‘Some radical protesters have removed railings … and set up barricades with water-filled barriers, bamboo sticks, traffic cones and other objects,’ they said in a statement. ‘Such acts neglect the safety of citizens and road users, paralysing traffic in the vicinity.
‘Remember, your job is to serve Hong Kong residents, not be the enemies of Hong Kong.’
The city’s officers are often the focus of protesters’ anger because of their perceived heavy-handling of the rallies.
The neighbouring gambling territory of Macau, a former Portuguese colony that returned to Chinese rule in 1999, elected former legislature head Ho Iat Seng as its leader on Sunday – the sole approved candidate.
One defiant-looking man is detained by officers as they continue to try to deal with the ongoing protests which have rocked Hong Kong
One protester held an egg above his head as he prepares to launch it at police while others cower behind him
One protester held a tennis racket as he and others fled from a tear gas canister. Yesterday, the MTR shut stations near the main demonstration area in Tsuen Wan, the second day of station closures in a row
A demonstrator uses a slingshot as they clash with riot police during Sunday’s protest in Tsuen Wan in Hong Kong
Protesters who were not cowed by tear gas from police used slingshots to fire bricks back at them. Many wore gas masks to guard against tear gas
This man wearing a gas mask had a closed umbrella in one hand and some kind of inflatable in the other as he faced the police
Protesters constructed barricades from road barriers and wooden pallets as they faced police amid a cloud of tear gas which had been fired by officers
An anti-riot police vehicle equipped with a water cannon clears the road from a barricade set up by protesters during an anti-government rally in Kwai Fung and Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong
Some protesters wore gas masks to protect against a barrage of tear gas from police in Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong
Many crouched behind makeshift barriers while others watched the clashes from inside a glass-panelled walkway above
Riot police wearing gas masks and armed with batons walked in front of a water cannon truck as they continued to respond to the ongoing protests
Some protesters threw slightly less dangerous projectiles at police, in the form of eggs. One man (above) was pictured throwing an egg and he had a plentiful supply behind him
Even though most protesters engaging in clashes with police were wearing as masks, officers continued to fire volleys of tear gas at them
Battle lines drawn: protesters and police faced each other in the street in Tsuen Wan in Hong Kong. Demonstrators stood behind makeshift barricades while officers held up riot shields
One protester used spray paint to scrawl on the wall ‘Absolute power corrupts absolutely’ – a chilling hint that the Chinese government may impose a further crackdown on protesters
The city had earlier appeared to have pulled back from a sharp nosedive into violence, with the last serious confrontation taking place more than a week ago, shortly after protests paralysed the financial hub’s airport. But Sunday’s clashes again brought more violence. Above: A man helps a fellow protester as he falls to the floor amid the heavy use of tear gas by police
One man defiantly waved his middle finger at police as he stood behind makeshift barricades and others cowered in the face of tear gas
Some officers appeared to be in plain clothes as they clashed with protesters for the second straight day in what has been three months of ongoing protests
Amid the use of tear gas by police, protesters were pictured running away while wearing gas masks and holding umbrellas
Children were pictured with their parents during some of yesterday’s protests as thousands of people took to the streets
Protesters were armed with metal poles and even tennis rackets as dozens of people watched the clashes with police from a walkway above the street
Protesters broke into restaurants during clashes. Above: A group of six men use metal poles to smash the glass of one venue
One protester reaches out at what appears to be a tear gas canister as it sprays out gas intended to subdue protesters
Ho, who has deep ties to China, is expected to cement Beijing’s control over the ‘special administrative region’, the same status given to Hong Kong, and distance it from the unrest there.
Ten people were left in hospital after Saturday’s clashes in Hong Kong – two in a serious condition – staff said, without detailing if they were police or protesters.
Saturday’s clashes saw police baton-charge protesters and fire tear gas, while demonstrators threw rocks and bottles later into the night in a working-class neighbourhood.
The city had earlier appeared to have pulled back from a sharp nosedive into violence, with the last serious confrontation taking place more than a week ago, shortly after protests paralysed the financial hub’s airport.
Demonstrations started against a bill that would have allowed extradition to China, but have bled into wider calls for democracy and police accountability in the semi-autonomous city.
Protesters say Hong Kong’s unique freedoms are in jeopardy as Beijing tightens its political choke hold on the city.
Police fired volleys of tear gas throughout clashes with demonstrators as they attempted to quell the ongoing protests
Protesters wearing helmets, gas masks and gloves wield makeshift weapons. Others hold lasers and shine them at police
Violent clashes between police and protesters saw officers wielding their batons and riot shields as their opponents held makeshift weapons
A protester holds his arm out as a policeman prepares to hit him with his baton. The protests have seen further violence descend onto the streets of Hong Kong
Some police were dressed in plain clothes as they clashed with demonstrators. Above: An officer cries out as a protester smashes a metal bar against his shield
Some protesters directed laser pens towards police as the streets were filled with thousands of people in Hong Kong
M. Sung, a 53-year-old software engineer in a black mask emblematic of the many older, middle-class citizens at the march, said he had been at almost every protest and would keep coming. ‘We know this is the last chance to fight for ‘one country, two systems’, otherwise the Chinese Communist Party will penetrate our home city and control everything,’ he said. Above: A protester holds up a sign reading ‘corrupt police return eyes to victims’ as demonstrators march in the rain
Hong Kong has been gripped by three months of street demonstrations that started against a proposed extradition bill to China , but have spun out into a wider pro-democracy movement. Above: Protesters also carried bamboo sticks to block a road during the protests. Yesterday, riot police fired tear gas and baton-charged protesters who retaliated with a barrage of the bamboo poles, stones and bottles
Demonstrators used the poles to block a road. The MTR – the city’s metro – is the latest Hong Kong business to be rebuked by the public, after appearing to bend to Chinese state-media attacks accusing the transport system of being an ‘exclusive’ service to ferry protesters to rallies
The protests pose a direct challenge for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, who are eager to quell the unrest ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1. Above: Protesters march from Kwai Fung to Tsuen Wan in Hong Kong
Some protesters were seen holding U.S. flags as they join marchers heading from Kwai Fung to Tsuen Wan, further north
One woman, who said she was the wife of an officer, said the police had received enough criticism. ‘I believe within these two months, police have got enough opprobrium’. Above: Riot police officers stand guard as protesters march in Tsuen Wan
In Tsuen Wan, demonstrators marched through the area, including one man who was seen in a yellow helmet and military vest
Yesterday, the MTR shut stations near the main demonstration area in Tsuen Wan in western Hong Kong, it was the second day of station closures in a row. Above: Protesters march past rows of police
Beijing has used a mix of intimidation, propaganda and economic muscle to constrict the protests in a strategy dubbed ‘white terror’ by the movement, but that has not stopped hundreds of thousands of protesters from gathering on their streets. Above: Protesters clutching umbrellas gather yesterday in Hong Kong
Demonstrators also removed road barriers during their march during through Kwai Fong, in Hong Kong yesterday
Ten people were left in hospital after Saturday’s clashes – two in a serious condition – staff said, without detailing if they were police or protesters
Saturday’s clashes saw police baton-charge protesters and fire tear gas, while demonstrators threw rocks and bottles later into the night in a working-class neighbourhood
On Friday, tens of thousands of people had held hands across Hong Kong in a dazzling, neon-framed recreation of a pro-democracy ‘Baltic Way’ protest against Soviet rule three decades ago.
The city’s skyscraper-studded harbour-front as well as several busy shopping districts were lined with peaceful protesters, many wearing surgical masks to hide their identity and holding Hong Kong flags or mobile phones with lights shining.
The human chain was another creative demonstration in the rolling protests which have tipped Hong Kong into an unprecedented political crisis.
Chinese state media says Hong Kong’s ‘toxic’ textbooks lead to protests
Chinese state newspaper has suggested that the cause of the anti-government protests in Hong Kong is the city’s education system, particularly its textbooks.
Tung Chee-hwa, the city’s first Chief Executive, has confessed that the General Education system in Hong Kong was a failure and the young generations became ‘problematic’ as a result, claimed People’s Daily in a column today.
The op-ed, penned by Professor Gu Minggang, said Hong Kong needed to reflect on its entire education system.
Protesters hold hands to form a human chain during a rally to call for political reforms in Hong Kong on August 23. Chinese media accused that the city’s ‘biased’ and ‘erroneous’ textbooks had brought up a generation of ‘useless youngsters’
The author said: ‘After Hong Kong returned to the arms of the motherland, the first and foremost issue to resolve should be to establish the concept of the country. The problem is, how many educators in Hong Kong have this notion?’
On Wednesday, China’s Guancha.cn called the General Education textbook in Hong Kong ‘toxic’, ‘biased’ and ‘erroneous’.
Citing Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing newspaper Wenweipo, Guancha.cn accused the textbook of encouraging pupils to hate police, promoting Occupy Central campaign and twisting facts.
The article said that the textbook had become a political propaganda and brought up a generation of ‘useless youngsters’.
Story 5: Three Way Tie In Race For 2020 Democratic Presidential Canidate — Biden, Sander and Warren — Videos
Biden plunges, tied with Warren and Sanders in new national poll
Joe Biden Doesn’t Know What State He Is In
Published on Aug 24, 2019
In Keene, N.H., former Vice President Joe Biden told a press gaggle that he loves being in Vermont when asked about his time in Keene on 8/24/19. Be sure to like, subscribe, and comment below to share your thoughts on the video.
3-Way Lead as Dem 2020 Picture Shifts
Today
Sanders and Warren rise; Biden drops
West Long Branch, NJ – Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and former Vice President Joe Biden are currently bunched together in the national Democratic presidential preference contest. Movement in the latest Monmouth University Poll – positive for Warren and Sanders, negative for Biden – suggests the 2020 presidential nomination process may be entering a volatile stage. The poll results also suggest that liberal voters are starting to take a closer look at a wider range of candidates, while moderates are focusing on those with the highest name recognition. Another key finding that could contribute to growing volatility in the race is confusion over “Medicare for All.” Most say support for this policy is an important factor in choosing a Democratic nominee, but voters actually prefer a public option over a single payer plan.
The poll finds a virtual three-way tie among Sanders (20%), Warren (20%), and Biden (19%) in the presidential nomination preferences of registered Democrats and Democratic-leaning voters across the country. Compared to Monmouth’s June poll, these results represent an increase in support for both Sanders (up from 14%) and Warren (up from 15%), and a significant drop for Biden (down from 32%).
Results for the rest of the field are fairly stable compared to two months ago. These candidates include California Sen. Kamala Harris at 8% support (identical to 8% in June), New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker at 4% (2% in June), South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg at 4% (5% in June), entrepreneur Andrew Yang at 3% (2% in June), former cabinet secretary Julián Castro at 2% (<1% in June), former Texas Rep. Beto O’Rourke at 2% (3% in June), and author Marianne Williamson at 2% (1% in June). Support for the remaining 13 candidates included in the preference poll registered only 1% or less.
Biden has suffered an across the board decline in his support since June. He lost ground with white Democrats (from 32% to 18%) and voters of color (from 33% to 19%), among voters without a college degree (from 35% to 18%) and college graduates (from 28% to 20%), with both men (from 38% to 24%) and women (from 29% to 16%), and among voters under 50 years old (from 21% to 6%) as well as voters aged 50 and over (from 42% to 33%). Most of Biden’s lost support in these groups shifted almost equally toward Sanders and Warren.
“The main takeaway from this poll is that the Democratic race has become volatile. Liberal voters are starting to cast about for a candidate they can identify with. Moderate voters, who have been paying less attention, seem to be expressing doubts about Biden. But they are swinging more toward one of the left-leaning contenders with high name recognition rather than toward a lesser known candidate who might be more in line with them politically,” said Patrick Murray, director of the independent Monmouth University Polling Institute. He added, “It’s important to keep in mind this is just one snapshot from one poll. But it does raise warning signs of increased churning in the Democratic nomination contest now that voters are starting to pay closer attention.”
Biden lost support over the past two months among Democrats who call themselves moderate or conservative (from 40% to 22%) with the shift among these voters accruing to both Sanders (from 10% to 20%) and Warren (from 6% to 16%). Biden also lost support among liberals (from 24% to 15%), but this group’s backing has scattered to a variety of other candidates. Sanders has picked up a few points among liberal voters (from 17% to 21%) while Warren has held fairly steady (from 25% to 24%). Also, Harris has not budged with this group (from 10% to 11%) and Buttigieg has slipped slightly (from 8% to 5%). However, the aggregate support for four other candidates – namely Booker, Castro, Williamson and Yang – has gone up a total of 8 points among liberal Democrats (from 8% to 16% for the four combined).
The Monmouth poll also finds that Biden has lost his small edge in the early states where Democrats will cast ballots from February through Super Tuesday. His even larger lead in the later states has vanished as well. Biden (20%), Warren (20%), Sanders (16%), and Harris (12%) are all in the top tier among voters in the early states. Biden has slipped by 6 points since June and Warren has gained 5 points over the same time span. Early state support for Sanders and Harris has not changed much. In the later states, Biden’s support has plummeted from 38% in June to 17% now, while both Warren (from 16% to 20%) and Sanders (from 13% to 23%) have made gains.
“Biden’s drop in support is coming disproportionately from later states that have less impact on the process. But if this trend continues it could spell trouble for him in the early states if it undermines his claim to being the most electable candidate. This could benefit someone like Harris, who remains competitive in the early states and could use a strong showing there to propel her into the top tier. Based on the current data, though, Warren looks like the candidate with the greatest momentum right now,” said Murray.
2020 DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT by state primary schedule *
EARLY STATES
OTHER STATES
Aug‘19
Jun‘19
May‘19
Aug‘19
Jun‘19
May‘19
Elizabeth Warren
20%
15%
9%
20%
16%
11%
Joe Biden
20%
26%
26%
17%
38%
38%
Bernie Sanders
16%
15%
14%
23%
13%
16%
Kamala Harris
12%
11%
14%
5%
5%
8%
Cory Booker
2%
3%
<1%
5%
1%
1%
Pete Buttigieg
4%
4%
6%
4%
6%
6%
Andrew Yang
5%
3%
2%
2%
1%
0%
Julián Castro
2%
1%
1%
2%
<1%
0%
Beto O’Rourke
3%
6%
3%
1%
1%
4%
Marianne Williamson
1%
1%
1%
3%
1%
1%
* Early states include those scheduled to or likely to hold a primary/caucus event in February 2020 or on Super Tuesday (March 3rd).
Warren has seen her personal ratings improve steadily over the past few months. She currently earns a 65% favorable and 13% unfavorable rating, up from 60%-14% in May, the last time Monmouth tracked the 2020 candidate ratings. At the same, time Biden has seen his ratings drop to 66% favorable and 25% unfavorable, from 74%-17% three months ago. The ratings for Sanders have been comparatively more stable at 64% favorable and 24% unfavorable compared with 65%-21% in Monmouth’s May poll.
At least 2-in-3 Democratic voters can now recognize the names of 11 candidates Monmouth has been tracking in terms of voter favorability since January. Most have seen a small uptick in basic name recognition over the past three months of between 5 and 13 percentage points. The exceptions are Biden and Sanders on one hand, both of whom have been universally familiar to Democratic voters since the beginning of the campaign, and Williamson on the other hand, whose name recognition shot up 19 points from 48% in May to 67% in the current poll. In Williamson’s case, though, the increased notoriety has led to a rise in negative views, currently earning her a 14% favorable and 25% unfavorable rating, which is down from an evenly divided 10%-10% rating in May.
Other candidates who have seen a downturn in their ratings are Harris at 56% favorable and 17% unfavorable (from 58%-9% in May) and Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar at 27% favorable and 18% unfavorable (from 32%-10% in May). Those who have seen a slight improvement in their ratings are Booker at 49% favorable and 14% unfavorable (from 41%-13% in May), Buttigieg at 43% favorable and 14% unfavorable (from 35%-11% in May), and Yang at 24% favorable and 12% unfavorable (from 12%-13% in May). Candidates who are holding relatively steady are Castro at 35% favorable and 13% unfavorable (from 28%-10% in May) and O’Rourke at 39% favorable and 20% unfavorable (from 40%-19% in May).
2020 CANDIDATE OPINION AMONG DEMOCRATIC VOTERS
Net favorability rating:
Aug ‘19
May ‘19
Apr ‘19
Mar ‘19
Jan ‘19
Elizabeth Warren
+52
+46
+32
+30
+40
Joe Biden
+41
+57
+56
+63
+71
Bernie Sanders
+40
+44
+44
+53
+49
Kamala Harris
+39
+49
+40
+42
+33
Cory Booker
+35
+28
+24
+31
+33
Pete Buttigieg
+29
+24
+29
n/a
+2
Julián Castro
+22
+18
n/a
n/a
+15
Beto O’Rourke
+19
+21
+31
+26
+32
Andrew Yang
+12
–1
n/a
n/a
0
Amy Klobuchar
+9
+22
+14
+13
+15
Marianne Williamson
–11
0
n/a
+4
n/a
The two most recent entrants in the crowded field earn net negative ratings. Former naval officer and Pennsylvania Rep. Joe Sestak has a negative 5% favorable and 11% unfavorable rating with 53% name recognition. Former hedge fund manager Tom Steyer, who has spent heavily on advertising since getting into the race, earns a 9% favorable and 25% unfavorable rating with 70% name recognition.
On the issue of health care, 58% of party voters say it is very important to them that the Democrats nominate someone who supports “Medicare for All.” Another 23% say it is somewhat important, 10% say it is not important, and 9% are unsure. However, it is not clear that Medicare for All means the same thing to all voters. When asked specifically about what type of health insurance system they prefer, 53% of Democratic voters say they want a system that offers an opt in to Medicare while retaining the private insurance market. Just 22% say they want to move to a system where Medicare for All replaces private insurance. Another 7% prefer to keep insurance private for people under 65 but regulate the costs and 11% want to leave the system basically as it is now.
Those who prefer a public option are divided into two camps that include 18% who would like to move to a universal public insurance system eventually and 33% who say that there should always be the choice of private coverage. In other words, only 4-in-10 Democrats want to get rid of the private insurance market when the 22% who want Medicare for All now are combined with the 18% who would like to move to a universal public system at some point in the future.
“We asked the public option question in our Iowa poll earlier this month and got a lot of flak from Medicare for All advocates who claim that polls show widespread support for their idea. It seems from these results, though, the term has a wide range of meanings among Democratic voters. Many conflate the public-only program name with a public option. There is a lot more nuance in public opinion on this issue that could become problematic for proponents as voters become more familiar with what Medicare for All actually entails,” said Murray.
The Monmouth University Poll was conducted by telephone from August 16 to 20, 2019 with 800 adults in the United States. Results in this release are based on 298 registered voters who identify as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party, which has a +/- 5.7 percentage point sampling margin of error. The poll was conducted by the Monmouth University Polling Institute in West Long Branch, NJ.
QUESTIONS AND RESULTS
(* Some columns may not add to 100% due to rounding.)
[Q1-13 previously released.]
14.I know the 2020 election is far away, but who would you support for the Democratic nomination for president if the candidates were the following? [INCLUDES LEANERS] [NAMES WERE ROTATED]
TREND: (with leaners)
Aug.
2019
June
2019
May
2019
April
2019
March
2019
Jan.
2019
Bernie Sanders
20%
14%
15%
20%
25%
16%
Elizabeth Warren
20%
15%
10%
6%
8%
8%
Joe Biden
19%
32%
33%
27%
28%
29%
Kamala Harris
8%
8%
11%
8%
10%
11%
Cory Booker
4%
2%
1%
2%
5%
4%
Pete Buttigieg
4%
5%
6%
8%
<1%
0%
Andrew Yang
3%
2%
1%
<1%
1%
1%
Julián Castro
2%
<1%
1%
<1%
1%
1%
Beto O’Rourke
2%
3%
4%
4%
6%
7%
Marianne Williamson
2%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
n/a
Bill de Blasio
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
n/a
Tulsi Gabbard
1%
1%
1%
0%
<1%
1%
Amy Klobuchar
1%
1%
3%
1%
3%
2%
Michael Bennet
<1%
0%
<1%
0%
<1%
n/a
Steve Bullock
<1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
n/a
Kirsten Gillibrand
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
1%
Joe Sestak
<1%
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Tom Steyer
<1%
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
John Delaney
0%
0%
<1%
0%
0%
<1%
Jay Inslee *
0%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
Wayne Messam
0%
0%
0%
<1%
n/a
n/a
Seth Moulton *
0%
0%
0%
<1%
n/a
n/a
Tim Ryan
0%
<1%
<1%
0%
n/a
n/a
(VOL) Other
1%
0%
<1%
3%
5%
8%
(VOL) No one
<1%
1%
2%
3%
<1%
3%
(VOL) Undecided
10%
11%
9%
14%
8%
9%
(n)
(298)
(306)
(334)
(330)
(310)
(313)
* The poll was conducted before Inslee and Moulton dropped out of the race.
15.I’m going to read you the names of some people who are running for president in 2020. Please tell me if your general impression of each is favorable or unfavorable, or if you don’t really have an opinion. If you have not heard of the person, just let me know. [NAMES WERE ROTATED]
TREND:
Favorable
Unfavorable
No
opinion
Not
heard of
(n)
Former Vice President Joe Biden
66%
25%
8%
1%
(298)
— May 2019
74%
17%
7%
1%
(334)
— April 2019
72%
16%
12%
1%
(330)
— March 2019
76%
13%
9%
2%
(310)
— January 2019
80%
9%
8%
3%
(313)
Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders
64%
24%
10%
2%
(298)
— May 2019
65%
21%
12%
2%
(334)
— April 2019
65%
21%
13%
1%
(330)
— March 2019
70%
17%
10%
3%
(310)
— January 2019
68%
19%
9%
4%
(313)
Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren
65%
13%
16%
7%
(298)
— May 2019
60%
14%
14%
12%
(334)
— April 2019
51%
19%
18%
12%
(330)
— March 2019
49%
19%
15%
17%
(310)
— January 2019
57%
17%
16%
11%
(313)
Former Texas Congressman Beto O’Rourke
39%
20%
26%
15%
(298)
— May 2019
40%
19%
20%
22%
(334)
— April 2019
43%
12%
22%
23%
(330)
— March 2019
38%
12%
21%
29%
(310)
— January 2019
41%
9%
23%
27%
(313)
California Senator Kamala Harris
56%
17%
16%
11%
(298)
— May 2019
58%
9%
15%
18%
(334)
— April 2019
50%
10%
19%
21%
(330)
— March 2019
53%
11%
16%
20%
(310)
— January 2019
46%
13%
21%
20%
(313)
Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar
27%
18%
34%
20%
(298)
— May 2019
32%
10%
28%
30%
(334)
— April 2019
27%
13%
28%
32%
(330)
— March 2019
26%
13%
29%
33%
(310)
— January 2019
23%
8%
30%
39%
(313)
South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg
43%
14%
20%
23%
(298)
— May 2019
35%
11%
24%
30%
(334)
— April 2019
35%
6%
25%
34%
(330)
— March 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— January 2019
8%
6%
27%
58%
(313)
New Jersey Senator Cory Booker
49%
14%
25%
13%
(298)
— May 2019
41%
13%
26%
19%
(334)
— April 2019
40%
16%
24%
20%
(330)
— March 2019
43%
12%
20%
25%
(310)
— January 2019
44%
11%
20%
25%
(313)
Former cabinet secretary Julián Castro
35%
13%
32%
20%
(298)
— May 2019
28%
10%
31%
31%
(334)
— April 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— March 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— January 2019
24%
9%
32%
35%
(313)
Entrepreneur Andrew Yang
24%
12%
36%
29%
(298)
— May 2019
12%
13%
33%
42%
(334)
— April 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— March 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— January 2019
10%
10%
26%
53%
(313)
Author Marianne Williamson
14%
25%
28%
33%
(298)
— May 2019
10%
10%
28%
52%
(334)
— April 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— March 2019
8%
4%
21%
67%
(310)
— January 2019
—
—
—
—
—
Former Pennsylvania Congressman Joe Sestak
5%
11%
37%
47%
(298)
— May 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— April 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— March 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— January 2019
—
—
—
—
—
Former hedge fund manager Tom Steyer
9%
25%
37%
30%
(298)
— May 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— April 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— March 2019
—
—
—
—
—
— January 2019
—
—
—
—
—
16.How important is it to you that the Democrats nominate someone who supports Medicare for All – very important, somewhat important, not important, or are you not sure?
Aug.
2019
Very important
58%
Somewhat important
23%
Not important
10%
Not sure
9%
(n)
(298)
17.Which of the following comes closest to how you would like to see health care handled: A. get rid of all private insurance coverage in favor of having everyone on a single public plan like Medicare for All, B. allow people to either opt into Medicare or keep their private coverage, C. keep health insurance private for people under age 65 but regulate the costs, or D. keep the health insurance system basically as it is?
Aug.
2019
A. Get rid of all private insurance coverage in favor of … Medicare for All
22%
B. Allow people to either opt into Medicare or keep their private coverage
53%
C. Keep health insurance private for people under age 65 but regulate the costs
7%
D. Keep the health insurance system basically as it is
11%
(VOL) Other
2%
(VOL) Don’t know
4%
(n)
(298)
17A.[If “B. ALLOW PEOPLE TO OPT INTO MEDICARE OR KEEP THEIR PRIVATE COVERAGE” in Q17, ASK:] Would you eventually like to see the nation’s health care coverage move to a universal public system like Medicare for All or do you think there should always be a choice to keep your private coverage? [Percentages are based on the total sample of Democrats.]
Aug.
2019
Medicare for All now (from Q17)
22%
Public option: Eventually move to a universal public system like Medicare for All
18%
Public option: Should always be a choice to keep your private coverage
33%
Public option: Don’t know what should eventually happen
2%
Minor, none, other changes to health insurance (from Q17)
21%
(VOL) Don’t know (from Q17)
4%
(n)
(298)
[Q18-26 held for future release.]
METHODOLOGY
The Monmouth University Poll was sponsored and conducted by the Monmouth University Polling Institute from August 16 to 20, 2019 with a national random sample of 800 adults age 18 and older, in English. This includes 314 contacted by a live interviewer on a landline telephone and 486 contacted by a live interviewer on a cell phone. The results in this poll release are based on a subsample of 298 registered voters who identify themselves as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party. Telephone numbers were selected through random digit dialing and landline respondents were selected with a modified Troldahl-Carter youngest adult household screen. Monmouth is responsible for all aspects of the survey design, data weighting and analysis. Final sample is weighted for region, age, education, gender and race based on US Census information. Data collection support provided by Braun Research (field) and Dynata (RDD sample). For results based on the Democratic voter sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling has a maximum margin of plus or minus 5.7 percentage points (unadjusted for sample design). Sampling error can be larger for sub-groups (see table below). In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.
DEMOGRAPHICS (weighted)
DEMOCRATIC VOTERS
38% Male
62% Female
31% 18-34
31% 35-54
38% 55+
53% White
18% Black
20% Hispanic
9% Asian/Other
59% No degree
41% 4 year degree
Click on pdf file link below for full methodology and crosstabs by key demographic groups.
Joe Biden: ‘I want to be clear, I’m not going nuts’
9:24 a.m.
Joshua Lott/Getty Images
Former Vice President Joe Biden is hopping on the defensive.
After months of gaffes on the 2020 campaign trail prompting even his brain surgeon to chime in and defend his mind, Biden made a pointed comment about the state of his brain over the weekend. “I want to be clear, I’m not going nuts,” Biden said during a campaign rally in New Hampshire — a comment that surely extended beyond the confusion he was trying to clear up at the time, theLos Angeles Times reports.
Biden made the declaration while speaking to supporters at New Hampshire’s Loon Lake, defending his inability to remember just where he’d spoken at Dartmouth College a few hours earlier. “I’m not sure whether it was the medical school or where the hell I spoke. But it was on the campus,” he said, looking at the gathered reporters as he did it, per the Times.
The obviously defensive comment comes after months of Biden stumbling over some pretty important details at campaign rallies, namely the locations of two mass shootings earlier this month. There’s also the time Biden said “poor kids are just as bright and just as talented as white kids” in front of the the Asian & Latino Coalition in Iowa. Yet the man who performed surgery on Biden three decades ago following two brain aneurysms agrees with the 76-year-old’s weekend comment, saying that he’s clearly “as sharp as he was 31 years ago.” Kathryn Krawczyk
GOP primary challenger Joe Walsh says the racist things he’s said on Twitter don’t necessarily make him a racist
5:26 p.m.
The presidential campaign freshly launched by former Rep. Joe Walsh (R-Ill.) also appears to be doubling as some kind of an apology — or at least personal accountability — tour.
Walsh, who on Sunday officially announced that he was challenging President Trump in the Republican primary, has routinely come under fire for his own controversial remarks, including a plethora of racist and insensitive tweets over the years. Walsh acknowledged his Twitter feed on Monday in an appearance on MSNBC, and concurred that some of what he said is, indeed, racist. But, as Walsh sees it, that doesn’t influence whether he’s actually a racist offline, or, as the youth say, “IRL.”
Aaron Blake
✔@AaronBlake
Joe Walsh on MSNBC: “I wouldn’t call myself a racist, but I’ve said racist things on Twitter.”
When he made his announcement on Sunday, Walsh said he regretted helping “create” Trump by playing into divisive, personal politics, so it seems he’s trying to rip off the Band-Aid at the beginning of his campaign and address criticism that was sure to arise otherwise. Read more about Walsh’s presidential campaign here at The Week. Tim O’Donnell
Your favorite vintage of French wine likely won’t get much more expensive in the near future.
Officials from France and the United States reportedly reached a compromise on Monday following the Group of Seven summit in Biarritz, France, on a new French tax passed last month on digital services provided by large internet companies, like Google and Amazon.
The new agreement stipulates that France would repay companies the difference between its digital tax and whatever taxes come from the agreed-upon Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s planned mechanism. The threshold for the French tax to be applicable for a company is annual revenues of more than $830 million — including $27 million generated in France — from “digital activities,” like collection of user data and selling targeted advertising.
French President Emmanuel Macron praised the compromise, while maintaining that France will nix its national tax if and when his preferred method of an international system for digital taxation is implemented. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said OECD nations want a solution on that by next year.
President Trump had previously threatened to tax French wine if Paris moved forward with its approved three percent tax on digital services. Tim O’Donnell
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Story 1: President Trump Closing Press Conference At G-7 Summit Meeting in Biarritz, France — Unity — Videos —
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Steve Bannon’s Warning On China Trade War (w/ Kyle Bass) | Real Vision Classics
Published on Aug 21, 2019
Steve Bannon and Kyle Bass discuss America’s current geopolitical landscape regarding China. Bannon and Bass take a deep dive into Chinese infiltration in U.S. institutions, China’s aggressiveness in the South China sea, and the potential for global conflict in the next few years. Filmed on October 5, 2018 at an undisclosed location.
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Kyle Bass
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Hayman Capital Management
J. Kyle Bass (born September 7, 1969) is an American hedge fund manager. He is the founder and principal of Hayman Capital Management, L.P., a Dallas-based hedge fund focused on global events.[1]
In 2008, Bass successfully predicted and effectively bet against the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis by purchasing credit default swaps on subprime securities which, in turn, increased in value when the real estate bubble burst.[2]
Despite his early success in predicting subprime mortgages, he has received criticism for subsequent poor performance of investments.[3] Bass has made prominent bets based on predictions of debt crisis in Japan and European sovereign debt, and shorted the Chinese yuan premised on a predicted collapse in the Chinese banking system. His fund has also challenged patents held by drug companies and shorted their stocks. His Japanese and European strategies have not been major successes and the Chinese yuan short led to severe losses for his fund in 2017.[4][5] The drug patent challenge campaign fizzled after several legal setbacks.[6]
Contents
Early life
Bass was born on September 7, 1969, in Miami, Florida, where his father managed the Fontainebleau Hotel. His father later moved the family to Dallas, Texas where he managed the Dallas Convention and Visitors Bureau.[7] Bass attended Texas Christian University on an academic and Division I diving scholarship. In 1992, Bass graduated with honors, earning a B.B.A. in finance with a concentration in real estate.[8]
Career
Before founding Hayman Capital Management in 2005, Bass briefly worked at Prudential Securities from 1992-1994 before joining Bear Stearns in 1994.[9] At Bear Stearns, he rose through the ranks rapidly, becoming a senior managing director at the age of 28 – among the youngest in the firm’s history to carry such a title.[2][8]
In 2001, he joined Legg Mason, signing a five-year deal to form the firm’s first institutional equity office in Texas. Bass told his hiring managers, “In five years and one day, I [will] be launching my own firm.”[9] While at Legg Mason, Bass advised hedge funds and other institutional clients on special situation investment strategies.[2]
In December 2005, when Legg Mason sold the portion of the business where he worked, Bass left Legg Mason and started Hayman Capital Management to serve as the investment manager to a “global special situations” hedge fund that he planned to launch. Bass launched Hayman Capital Management, L.P. with $33 million in assets under management – $5 million he had saved on his own and the balance he had raised from outside investors.[9] Shortly after launching the hedge fund in February 2006, Bass became convinced that there was a residential real-estate bubble in the United States one of the few investors to successfully predict and benefit from the subprime mortgage crisis, bringing him notoriety in the financial services industry.
In 2007, Bass testified as an expert witness before the U.S. House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored Enterprises. During his testimony, he addressed: i) the role of credit rating agencies in the structured finance market and ii) policy measures that could be taken to minimize inherent conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers.[10]
In 2010, Bass testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. During his testimony, he addressed his analysis of the factors that caused the crisis.
After enjoying success in predicting the subprime mortgage crisis and moderate success with debt in Greece and Japan, Bass would make a string of poor bets, leading to a dramatic downsizing of his fund. In April 2014, Bass was among a very few defenders of GM for its failure to address a defect that had been tied to 13 deaths. Hayman at the time owned eight million shares of G.M., making it Hayman’s single biggest holding,[11] Coming to the defense of GM, Bass said on CNBC that of the 13 passengers who had died owing to the defect, 12 “either weren’t wearing their seatbelt or were under the influence of alcohol.” [12] Bass admitted in a late 2014 interview that it had been “a tough year” for Hayman due to owning a lot of GM stock, which was the fund’s biggest position in 2014.[13]
After the losing year in 2014, investor’s pulled out nearly a quarter of Hayman’s capital and the firm was forced to liquidate most of its stock holdings.[14] Bass called 2015 one of his fund’s worst years.[15] By early 2019, Hayman had $423.6 million in discretionary assets under management, down from $2.3 billion at the end of 2014.[16]
Fund performance
The long term performance of Hayman Capital’s flagship fund is described by the New York Post as “small caliber”.[14] In the period from 2008 to mid-2015, the flagship fund experienced a very modest annualized performance of 1.56%.[14] The flagship fund had a tremendously successful year in 2007, having gained 212%, based on the subprime mortgage meltdown bet that brought fame to Bass.[14] The fund also gained 16% in 2012 based on bets on Greek debt. The fund lost 1.4% in 2014 and suffered its worst year in 2017 with a 19% loss (in contrast to a 19% surge of the S&P 500) due to Hayman’s misplaced short on a collapse in the Chinese yuan.[14][5]
Investment positions
Subprime mortgages
Bass first began formulating his subprime strategy after he met with an investment banker from New York while attending a wedding in Spain where they discussed how and why the Subprime Mezzanine CDO business existed.[17][18] After returning to the US, Bass hired several private investigators to determine the ease of obtaining a mortgage. Bass spent a significant amount of time studying the residential mortgage market and performed research to identify which residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) composed of low-quality mortgages were most likely to default. This investment thesis was expressed by purchasing credit default swaps against the securitizations he deemed to be most unstable, which essentially was a manner of shorting the bonds using synthetic instruments. After purchasing the positions for his flagship fund in 2006, Bass raised additional capital for a special fund dedicated exclusively to capitalizing on the opportunity that existed in the market place. Bass managed or advised over $4 billion of positions in subprime RMBS.
In December 2007, after a wave of foreclosures had swept across the US, Bass was featured on Bloomberg TV as making a fortune betting against these subprime securities.
Europe and Japanese debt “doomsday”
After the subprime debt crisis occurred, Bass decided that it was the symptom of a more significant problem with debt and made predictions about debt “doomsday” in Europe and Japan. In 2009 he warned about the possibility of defaults by major countries over the next 3 years.[19] As of 2010, 10-15% of his portfolio was involved in bets against European and Japanese sovereign debts.[20] He went as far predicted that 2012 would be a “doomsday year” for Europe and spoke of a looming breakup of the Eurozone, which, he declared, would lead to defaults in Japan and the United States. He stated in June 2012, “Europe goes first, then Japan and finally the United States.”[21]
Bass has since 2012 also predicted a “full blown crisis” in Japan describing its approach to financing debt as a Ponzi scheme similar to Bernie Madoff‘s investment scam. Most experts have disagreed with his analysis.[22][23] Cullen Roche criticized Bass’s Japan analysis in August 2010, noting that Bass comparing Japan to the EU was an error, since their monetary systems are wildly different. Roche stated “people still fail to understand that a nation with monetary sovereignty that is the supplier of currency in a floating exchange rate system never has a problem funding itself.”[24] In May 2012, Business Insider agreed, faulting Bass’s analysis, since debt-to-GDP ratios do not reflect the interest rate or credit risk of a nation. The Business Insider noted that in a nation that borrows its own currency, public spending finances borrowing.[25]
He has been vocal in public appearances about future calamities stemming from financial meltdown. September 14, 2011, Bass maintained on CNBC that Greece’s only way out of its debt mess was a restructuring. Bass noted that despite the strife it would bring to Greece it was the only measure the nation could take. He added that within a year all of Europe would be in default as well.[26] In a speech reported on January 1, 2014, he assured the audience of his confidence that the next few years would be rife with turmoil, including the eruption of major wars. In his speech, he claimed that with the growing debt and inability to pay it off, eventually social unrest will lead to violent outbreaks. Bass finished his speech stating “War is coming – just as it has throughout history.” [27]
Chinese banking collapse
Starting in July 2015, Bass made a multiyear bet against the Chinese yuan based on a predicted banking collapse in China.[28] Bass would close out his position against the Chinese currency in early 2019 when the predicted devaluation of the currency didn’t occur.[28]
Bass argued in 2015 that the Chinese banking system was undercapitalized and its foreign reserves would be insufficient in a crisis. Bass predicted a hard landing for the Chinese economy following a bank crisis and a severe devaluation of the Chinese currency, variously given as “somewhere between 15%-20%” and “30 to 40 percent”.[29][30]
Hayman suffered its worst year in 2017 with a loss of 19% due to the strengthening of the Chinese yuan.[5]
Drug patent challenge campaign
Bass has attempted to profit from filing and publicizing patent challenges against pharmaceutical companies while also betting against their shares.[31][32] After 2 years of setbacks in his effort, Bass by 2017 ended his patent challenges.[6]
In 2015, Bass organized the Coalition For Affordable Drugs (CFAD) to use the inter partes review (IPR) process to challenge patent validity.[33][34] When he initiated this practice in January 2015, he claimed that his motive was to encourage competition in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and thus bring down prices.[35]
Bass filed a total of 35 patent challenges, in collaboration with Erich Spangenberg who has been called “the world’s most notorious patent troll”,[3] including 33 filed by CFAD and two filed by Bass personally on a not-for-profit basis.[36]
In June 2015, Celgene received permission from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to file a motion seeking sanctions against the CFAD for allegedly abusing the patent-review process. The Wall Street Journal noted that this development was “being closely watched because it raises the possibility that patent officials may put an end” to Bass’s patent-challenge scheme. Celgene also told the patent office, through counsel, that CFAD had threatened to challenge its patents unless Celgene met CFAD’s demands.[37]
In October 2016, Bass prevailed in the case, with USPTO invalidating the two Celgene Corp patents related to its cancer drugs Revlimid, Pomalyst, and Thalomid at issue.[38] However, one year later Celgene was able to convince the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to re-hear the case.[39]
Political relationships
Trump administration
Bass is described by a ProPublica story as a friend of Tommy Hicks Jr, a private investor, who was a hunting buddy to Donald Trump Jr. and had further ties to the Trump administration.[40] According to the investigative story on improper links between Hicks and the Trump administration, Hicks had obtained a hearing for Bass with high level officials at an interagency meeting at the Treasury Department to air views on China.[40] This meeting was at the time Bass held a large short position counting on the fall of the Chinese currency.[40]
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
The BBC has described Bass as having a “good relationship” with Argentina’s president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.[41] In February 2014, Bass said that Argentinian bonds represented a profitable opportunity and called Argentina most “interesting” nation for investments. He was virtually alone in this assessment, with one observer noting the poor state of the Argentine economy. The IB Times noted that the country had “cheated creditors seven times since it gained independence from Spain in 1816,” most recently defaulting on its debt in 1989.[42] When the Argentine government defaulted on its debt in July 2014, Bass supported the move and criticized the bondholders, notably Elliott Management and Aurelius Capital, that, with the support of U.S. federal judge Thomas Griesa, had held out for full payment. Echoing Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, he called these creditors “vultures,” said that they were “holding up 42 million people from progress,” and were holding Argentina for “ransom”.[43] On August 27, 2014, Bass accused Elliott’s Paul Singer of “holding poor countries as hostages,” prompting The New York Post to comment in an editorial the next day that Bass had “sounded more like Argentina’s leftist economy minister Axel Kicillof than a US hedge-fund manager.” [44]
Philanthropy
Bass serves on the board or in an advisory role for a number of charities and organizations.
He has advised the University of Texas System Investment Management Company (UTIMCO), a public university endowment since 2010.
He also current serves or has served on the board of a number of organizations including the University of Virginia Darden School of Business Advisory Group for the Richard A. Mayo Center for Asset Management, Texas Department of Public Safety Foundation, Business Executives for National Security, Comeback America Initiative, Troops First Foundation and Capital for Kids.[45][46][47][48][49][50]
References …
External links
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyle_Bass
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China’s Spies Are on the Offensive
China’s spies are waging an intensifying espionage offensive against the United States. Does America have what it takes to stop them?
n early 2017, Kevin Mallory was struggling financially. After years of drawing a government salary as a member of the military and as a CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency officer, he was behind on his mortgage and $230,000 in debt. Though he had, like many veteran intelligence officials, ventured into the private sector, where the pay can be considerably better, things still weren’t going well; his consulting business was floundering.
Then, prosecutors said, he received a message on LinkedIn, where he had more than 500 connections. It had come from a Chinese recruiter with whom Mallory had five mutual connections. The recruiter, according to the message, worked for a think tank in China, where Mallory, who spoke fluent Mandarin, had been based for part of his career. The think tank, the recruiter said, was interested in Mallory’s foreign-policy expertise. The LinkedIn message led to a phone call with a man who called himself Michael Yang. According to the FBI, the initial conversations that would lead Mallory down a path of betrayal were conducted in the bland language of professional courtesy. That February, according to a search warrant, Yang sent Mallory an email requesting “another short phone call with you to address several points.” Mallory replied, “So I can be prepared, will we be speaking via Skype or will you be calling my mobile device?”
Espionage and counterespionage have been essential tools of statecraft for centuries, of course, and U.S. and Chinese intelligence agencies have been battling one another for decades. But what these recent cases suggest is that the intelligence war is escalating—that China has increased both the scope and the sophistication of its efforts to steal secrets from the U.S. “The fact that we have caught three at the same time is telling of how focused China is on the U.S.,” John Demers, the head of the National Security Division at the Justice Department, which brought the charges against Mallory, Hansen, and Lee, told me. “If you think about what it takes to co-opt three people, you start to appreciate the actual extent of their efforts. There may be people we haven’t caught, and then you have to acknowledge that probably a small percentage of the people who’ve been approached ever go as far as these three did.”
Many espionage cases don’t go public. “Some of the cases rarely see the light of a courtroom, because there’s classified material we’re not willing to risk,” one U.S. intelligence official told me, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. “Sometimes they’re not charged at all and are handled through other means. And there are others that remain ongoing that have not and will not become public.”
These recent cases provide just a small glimpse of the growing intelligence war that is playing out in the shadows of the U.S.-China struggle for global dominance, and of the aggressiveness and skillfulness with which China is waging it. As China advances economically and technologically, its spy services are keeping pace: Their intelligence officers are more sophisticated, the tools at their disposal are more powerful, and they are engaged in what appears to be an intensifying array of espionage operations that have their American counterparts on the defensive. China’s efforts aimed at former U.S. intelligence officers are just one part of a Chinese campaign that U.S. officials say also includes cyberattacks against U.S. government databases and companies, stealing trade secrets from the private sector, using venture-capital investment to acquire sensitive technology, and targeting universities and research institutions.
China has been seeking to turn American spies for decades. But the rules of the game have changed. About 10 years ago, Charity Wright was a young U.S. military linguist training at the elite Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at a base called the Presidio in Monterey, California. Like many of her peers, Wright relied on taxis to visit the city. There were usually a few waiting outside the base’s gate. She’d been assigned to the institute’s Mandarin program, so she felt lucky to frequently find herself in the cab of an old man who told her he’d emigrated from China years ago. He was inquisitive in a way she found charming at first, letting her practice her new language skills as he asked about her background and family. After several months, though, she grew suspicious. The old man seemed to have an unusually good memory, and his questions were becoming more specific: Where is it that your father works? What will you be doing for the military once you graduate?Wright had been briefed on the possibility of foreign intelligence operatives collecting information on the institute’s trainees, building profiles for potential recruitment, given that many of them would move on to careers in intelligence. She reported the man to an officer at the base. Not long after, she heard that he’d been arrested and that there had been a crackdown in Monterey on a suspected Chinese spy ring.
Wright went on to spend five years as a cryptologic language analyst with the National Security Agency, assessing communications intercepts from China. Now she works in private-sector cybersecurity. As a reservist, she still holds a U.S. government clearance that allows her access to classified secrets. And she’s still the target of what she suspects are Chinese espionage efforts. Only these days, the agents don’t approach her in person. They get in touch the same way they reached Kevin Mallory: online. She gets messages through LinkedIn and other social-media sites proposing various opportunities in China: a contract with a consulting firm, a trip to speak at a conference for a generous stipend. The offers seem tempting, but this type of outreach comes straight from the Chinese-spy playbook. “I’ve heard that they can be very convincing, and by the time you fly over, they’ve got you in their lair,” Wright told me.
The tactics she saw from the old man in Monterey were “cut and dry HUMINT,” or human intelligence, she said. They were old school. But those tactics have been amplified by the tools of the social-media age, which allow intelligence officers to reach out to their targets en masse from China, where there’s no risk of getting caught. Meanwhile, intelligence experts tell me, Chinese intelligence officers have only been getting better at the traditional skills involved in persuading a target to turn on his or her country.
Read: The Chinese influence effort happening in plain sight
Donald Trump has made getting tough on China a central aspect of his foreign policy. He has focused on a trade war and tariffs aimed at rectifying what he portrays as an unfair economic playing field—earlier this month, the U.S. designated China as a currency manipulator—while holding onto the idea that China’s powerful leader, Xi Jinping, can be an ally and a friend. U.S. political and business leaders for decades pushed the idea that embracing trade with China would help to normalize its behavior, but Beijing’s aggressive espionage efforts have fueled an emerging bipartisan consensus in Washington that the hope was misplaced. Since 2017, the DOJ has brought at least a dozen cases against alleged agents and spies for conducting cyber- and economic espionage on behalf of China. “The hope was, as they develop, as they become more wealthy, as they start being a part of the club of developed nations, they’re going to change their behavior—once they get closer to the top, they’re going to operate by our rules,” John Demers told me. “What we’ve seen instead is [China] becoming better resourced and more methodical about the theft of information.”
For the past 20 years, America’s intelligence community’s top priority has been counterterrorism. A generation of operations officers and analysts has been geared more toward finding and killing America’s enemies and preventing extremist attacks than toward the more patient and strategic work that comes with peer competition and counterintelligence. If America is indeed entering an era of “great power” conflict with China, then the crux of the struggle will likely take place not on a battlefield, but in the race for information, at least for now. And here China is using an age-old human frailty to gain advantage in the competition with its more powerful adversary: greed. U.S. officials have been warning companies and research institutions not just of the strings that might be attached to Chinese money, but of the danger of corrupted employees turned spies. They are also worried about current and former U.S. officials who have been entrusted with protecting the nation’s secrets.
When I told William Evanina, America’s top counterintelligence official, Wright’s story about the cab driver in Monterey, he replied: “Of course.”
Spy rings operating out of taxis are relatively unoriginal, he told me, and have long been an issue around U.S. military and intelligence installations. An FBI and CIA veteran who is now the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Evanina has a suspicious mind—and perhaps one of the country’s worst Uber ratings. He sees the risk of intelligence collection and hidden cameras in any hired car, he told me, and if a driver ever tries to make small talk, he immediately shuts it down.
Knowing someone’s background can help an intelligence agency build a profile for potential recruitment. The person might have medical bills piling up, a parent in debt, a sibling in jail, or an infidelity that exposes him or her to blackmail. What really worries Evanina is that so much of this information can now be obtained online, legally and illegally. People can ignore Uber drivers all they want, but a good hacker or even someone savvy at mining social media might be able to track down targets’ financial records, their political views, profiles of their family members, and their upcoming travel plans. “It makes it so damn easy,” he said.
Security breaches happen with alarming regularity. Capital One announced in July that a data breach had exposed about 100 million people in America. During one of my conversations with Wright, she mused that whatever information the old man in the taxi might have wanted to glean from her, all that and much more may have been revealed in the 2015 breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. In that sophisticated attack, widely believed to have been carried out by state-sponsored Chinese hackers, an enormous batch of data was stolen, including detailed information the government collects as part of the process of approving security clearances. The stolen information contained “probing questions about an applicant’s personal finances, past substance abuse, and psychiatric care,” according to Wired, as well as “everything from lie detector results to notes about whether an applicant engages in risky sexual behavior.”
Read: There’s no real difference between online espionage and online attack
Russia, the U.S. adversary that is often included with China in discussions of “near peer” conflict, has a modus operandi when it comes to recruiting spies that is similar to America’s, Evanina said. While some of their intelligence efforts, such as election interference, are loud and aggressive and seemingly unconcerned with being discovered, Russians are careful and targeted when trying to turn a well-placed asset. Russia tends to have veteran intelligence operatives make contact in person and proceed with care and patience. “Their worst-case scenario is getting caught,” Evanina told me. “They take pride in their HUMINT operations. They’re very targeted. They take extra time to increase the percentage of success. Whereas the Chinese don’t care.” (This doesn’t mean that the Chinese can’t also be targeted and discreet when needed, he added.)
“What you have is an intelligence officer sitting in Beijing,” he said. “And he can send out 30,000 emails a day. And if he gets 300 replies, that’s a high-yield, low-risk intelligence operation.” Concerning those who have left government for the private sector—and who sometimes keep their clearance to continue doing sensitive government work—it can be hard to know where to draw the line. Evanina said China will sometimes wait years to target former officials: “Your Spidey sense goes down.” But “your memory is not erased”—that is, they’ve still got the information the Chinese want.
Often, Chinese spies don’t even have to look too hard. Many of those who have left U.S. intelligence jobs reveal on their LinkedIn profiles which agencies they worked for and the countries and topics on which they focused. If they still have a government clearance, they might advertise that too. Buried in the questionnaire Evanina filled out for his Senate confirmation is a question asking whether he had any plans for a career after government. “I currently have no plans subsequent to completing government service,” he wrote. When I asked him about this, he admitted that this is becoming less common among intelligence officials his age. (He’s 52.) “All of my friends are leaving like crazy now because they have kids in college,” he said. “The money is [better]. It’s hard to say no.”
If a former intelligence officer lands a job at a prominent government contractor, such as Booz Allen Hamilton or DynCorp International, he or she can expect to be well compensated. But others find themselves in less lucrative posts, or try to strike out on their own. Evanina told me that Chinese intelligence operatives pose online as Chinese professors, think-tank experts, or executives. They usually propose a trip to China as a business opportunity. “Especially the ones who have retired from the CIA, DIA, and are now contractors—they have to make the bucks,” Evanina said. “And a lot of times that’s in China. And they get compromised.”
Once a target is in China, Chinese operatives might try to get the person to start passing over sensitive information in degrees. The first request could be for information that doesn’t seem like a big deal. But by then the trap is set. “When they get that [first] envelope, it’s being photographed. And then they can blackmail you. And then you’re being sucked in,” Evanina said. “One document becomes 10 documents becomes 15 documents. And then you have to rationalize that in your mind: I am not a spy, because they’re forcing me to do this.”
In the cases of Mallory, Hansen, and Lee, Evanina said, the lure wasn’t ideology. It was money. Money was also the lure in two similar cases, in which suspects were convicted of lesser charges than espionage. Both apparently began their relationship with Chinese intelligence officers while still employed in sensitive U.S. government jobs.
In 2016, Kun Shan Chun, a veteran FBI employee who had a top-secret security clearance, pleaded guilty to acting as an agent of China. Prosecutors said that while working for the agency in New York he sent his Chinese handler, “at minimum, information regarding the FBI’s personnel, structure, technological capabilities, general information regarding the FBI’s surveillance strategies, and certain categories of surveillance targets.” And in April, Candace Claiborne, a former State Department employee, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. According to the criminal complaint, Claiborne, who had served in a number of posts overseas including China, and held a top-secret security clearance, did not report her contacts with suspected Chinese agents, who provided her and a co-conspirator with “tens of thousands of dollars in gifts and benefits,” including New Year’s gifts, international travel and vacations, fashion-school tuition, rent, and cash payments. In exchange, Claiborne provided copies of State Department documents and analysis, prosecutors said.
Two decades ago, Chinese intelligence officers were largely seen as relatively amateurish, even sloppy, a former U.S. intelligence official who spent years focusing on China told me. Usually, their English was poor. They were clumsy. They used predictable covers. Chinese military intelligence officers masquerading as civilians often failed to hide a military bearing and could come across as almost laughably uptight. Typically their main targets tended to be of Chinese descent. In recent years, however, Chinese intelligence officers have become more sophisticated—they can come across as suave, personable, even genteel. Their manners can be fluid. Their English is usually good. “Now this is the norm,” the former official said, speaking with me on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “They really have learned quite a bit and grown up.”
Rodney Faraon, a former senior analyst at the CIA, told me that the Mallory and Hansen cases show just how far China’s espionage services have come. “They’ve broadened their tactics to go beyond relatively easy targets, from recruiting among the ethnically Chinese community to a much more diverse set of human assets,” he said. “In a sense, they’ve become more traditional.”
In his recently published book, To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence, James Olson, a veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service and its former chief of counterintelligence, breaks down the basics of China’s espionage services and how they operate. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), its main service, focuses on overseas intelligence. The Ministry of Public Security focuses on domestic intelligence, but also has agents abroad. The People’s Liberation Army, which focuses on military intelligence, “has defined its role broadly and has competed with the MSS in a widerange of economic, political, and technological intelligence collection operations overseas, in addition to its more traditional military targeting.” Olson adds that “the PLA has been responsible for the bulk” of China’s cyberespionage, though the MSS may also be expanding in this realm. Both the MSS and PLA, meanwhile, “make regular use of diplomatic, commercial, journalistic, and student covers for their operations in the United States. They aggressively use Chinese travelers to the US, especially business representatives, academics, scientists, students, and tourists, to supplement their intelligence collection. US intelligence experts have been amazed at how voracious the Chinese have been in their collection activity.”
Read: China’s plan to buy influence and undermine democracy
In a sense, going after American spies and government officials is fair game in the intelligence world. The U.S. does the same against the Chinese. “Intelligence operations are universal, with every country—other than a few isolated island-states who are concerned mainly with the danger of approaching cyclones—engaging in them, to one degree or another,” Loch K. Johnson, a professor emeritus at the University of Georgia, the author of Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, and one of America’s foremost intelligence scholars, told me in an email. He added that while almost every nation fields capabilities to both collect information about its adversaries and defend itself against espionage, a much smaller number have meaningful networks for covert action, which he described as “secret propaganda; political and economic manipulation; even paramilitary activities.” Both America and China count themselves among this group.
“The United States used propaganda, political, and economic ops during the Cold War and (somewhat less aggressively) since. China returns [the] favor,” Johnson said. “Both are major powers and have a full complement of intelligence capabilities, aimed at each other and other significant targets around the world. This means that the United States (like China in reverse) is constantly trying to learn what China is doing when it comes to military, economic, political, and cultural activities, since they may impinge upon U.S. interests in Asia and elsewhere.” To that end, the U.S. uses signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, and HUMINT, Johnson said, “all aided by a diligent searching through the available (and voluminous) [open-source intelligence] materials for background.”
She added that innocent people had been framed in some cases and that “such false accusations severely undermine China-U.S. people-to-people exchanges, and scientific and technological cooperation.”
Read: The Huawei drama is a gift to U.S. tech companies
The litany of cases the DOJ has brought over the past year or so underscores the comprehensive quality of China’s espionage efforts: a former General Electric engineer charged with theft of trade secrets related to gas and steam turbines (he has pleaded not guilty); an American and a Chinese citizen charged with attempting to steal trade secrets related to plastics (the American has pleaded not guilty and the Chinese defendant, as of March 2019, had yet to appear in a U.S. court); a state-owned Chinese chip-making company and a Taiwanese company that makes semiconductors charged with stealing from an American competitor(the chipmaker has pleaded not guilty); two Chinese hackers charged with targeting intellectual property (China denied the “slanderous” economic espionage charges). In Senate testimony in July, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that the agency has “probably about 1,000 plus investigations all across the country involving attempted theft of U.S. intellectual property … almost all leading back to China.”
Story 3: Big Brother Is Watching Every Move You Make With Social Credit System — Chinese Communist Control Digital Dictatorship Surveillance State — From Authoritarian to Totalitarian State — Socialist Serfs — Videos
The Police – Every Breath You Take (Official Music Video)
The Police – Every breath you take lyrics
Social surveillance in China – Credit or control? | DW Documentary
China’s Secret File on Everyone
Big Brother is watching you: How China is ranking its citizens
Exposing China’s Digital Dystopian Dictatorship | Foreign Correspondent
A Look Inside China’s Social Credit System | NBC News Now
Hong Kong police fire live round warning shot and use water cannon on protesters
China ranks ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens with ‘social credit’ system
China Expert Gordon Chang On Its Social Credit Rating System & Surveillance State
China’s TERRIFYING Social Credit System
Inside China’s High-Tech Dystopia
China Social Credit System: Beijing plans to go full on Big Brother in 2020 – TomoNews
China’s “Social Credit System” Has Caused More Than Just Public Shaming (HBO)
Chinese “Social Credit System” rewards Obedient Citizens – Infowars News 12/24
China’s Secret Plan to Control the Internet | China Uncensored
20 Years Ago, This Changed China Forever: Here Are 5 Ways | China Uncensored
Big Brother: China Edition!
1984 Introduction
What is 1984?
Uh-oh: Silicon Valley is building a Chinese-style social credit system
In China, scoring citizens’ behavior is official government policy. U.S. companies are increasingly doing something similar, outside the law.
Have you heard about China’s social credit system? It’s a technology-enabled, surveillance-based nationwide program designed to nudge citizens toward better behavior. The ultimate goal is to “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step,” according to the Chinese government.
In place since 2014, the social credit system is a work in progress that could evolve by next year into a single, nationwide point system for all Chinese citizens, akin to a financial credit score. It aims to punish for transgressions that can include membership in or support for the Falun Gong or Tibetan Buddhism, failure to pay debts, excessive video gaming, criticizing the government, late payments, failing to sweep the sidewalk in front of your store or house, smoking or playing loud music on trains, jaywalking, and other actions deemed illegal or unacceptable by the Chinese government.
It can also award points for charitable donations or even taking one’s own parents to the doctor.
Punishments can be harsh, including bans on leaving the country, using public transportation, checking into hotels, hiring for high-visibility jobs, or acceptance of children to private schools. It can also result in slower internet connections and social stigmatization in the form of registration on a public blacklist.
China’s social credit system has been characterized in one pithy tweet as “authoritarianism, gamified.”
At present, some parts of the social credit system are in force nationwide and others are local and limited (there are 40 or so pilot projects operated by local governments and at least six run by tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent).
Beijing maintains two nationwide lists, called the blacklist and the red list—the former consisting of people who have transgressed, and the latter people who have stayed out of trouble (a “red list” is the Communist version of a white list.) These lists are publicly searchable on a government website called China Credit.
The Chinese government also shares lists with technology platforms. So, for example, if someone criticizes the government on Weibo, their kids might be ineligible for acceptance to an elite school.
Public shaming is also part of China’s social credit system. Pictures of blacklisted people in one city were shown between videos on TikTok in a trial, and the addresses of blacklisted citizens were shown on a map on WeChat.
Some Western press reports imply that the Chinese populace is suffocating in a nationwide Skinner box of oppressive behavioral modification. But some Chinese are unaware that it even exists. And many others actually like the idea. One survey found that 80% of Chinese citizens surveyed either somewhat or strongly approve of social credit system.
IT CAN HAPPEN HERE
Many Westerners are disturbed by what they read about China’s social credit system. But such systems, it turns out, are not unique to China. A parallel system is developing in the United States, in part as the result of Silicon Valley and technology-industry user policies, and in part by surveillance of social media activity by private companies.
Here are some of the elements of America’s growing social credit system.
INSURANCE COMPANIES
The New York State Department of Financial Services announced earlier this year that life insurance companies can base premiums on what they find in your social media posts. That Instagram pic showing you teasing a grizzly bear at Yellowstone with a martini in one hand, a bucket of cheese fries in the other, and a cigarette in your mouth, could cost you. On the other hand, a Facebook post showing you doing yoga might save you money. (Insurance companies have to demonstrate that social media evidence points to risk, and not be based on discrimination of any kind—they can’t use social posts to alter premiums based on race or disability, for example.)
The use of social media is an extension of the lifestyle questions typically asked when applying for life insurance, such as questions about whether you engage in rock climbing or other adventure sports. Saying “no,” but then posting pictures of yourself free-soloing El Capitan, could count as a “yes.”
PATRONSCAN
A company called PatronScan sells three products—kiosk, desktop, and handheld systems—designed to help bar and restaurant owners manage customers. PatronScan is a subsidiary of the Canadian software company Servall Biometrics, and its products are now on sale in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
PatronScan helps spot fake IDs—and troublemakers. When customers arrive at a PatronScan-using bar, their ID is scanned. The company maintains a list of objectionable customers designed to protect venues from people previously removed for “fighting, sexual assault, drugs, theft, and other bad behavior,” according to its website. A “public” list is shared among all PatronScan customers. So someone who’s banned by one bar in the U.S. is potentially banned by all the bars in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada that use the PatronScan system for up to a year. (PatronScan Australia keeps a separate system.)
Judgment about what kind of behavior qualifies for inclusion on a PatronScan list is up to the bar owners and managers. Individual bar owners can ignore the ban, if they like. Data on non-offending customers is deleted in 90 days or less. Also: PatronScan enables bars to keep a “private” list that is not shared with other bars, but on which bad customers can be kept for up to five years.
PatronScan does have an “appeals” process, but it’s up to the company to grant or deny those appeals.
UBER AND AIRBNB
Thanks to the sharing economy, the options for travel have been extended far beyond taxis and hotels. Uber and Airbnb are leaders in providing transportation and accommodation for travelers. But there are many similar ride-sharing and peer-to-peer accommodations companies providing similar services.
Airbnb—a major provider of travel accommodation and tourist activities—bragged in March that it now has more than 6 million listings in its system. That’s why a ban from Airbnb can limit travel options.
Airbnb can disable your account for life for any reason it chooses, and it reserves the right to not tell you the reason. The company’s canned message includes the assertion that “This decision is irreversible and will affect any duplicated or future accounts. Please understand that we are not obligated to provide an explanation for the action taken against your account.” The ban can be based on something the host privately tells Airbnb about something they believe you did while staying at their property. Airbnb’s competitors have similar policies.
It’s now easy to get banned by Uber, too. Whenever you get out of the car after an Uber ride, the app invites you to rate the driver. What many passengers don’t know is that the driver now also gets an invitation to rate you. Under a new policy announced in May: If your average rating is “significantly below average,” Uber will ban you from the service.
WHATSAPP
You can be banned from communications apps, too. For example, you can be banned on WhatsApp if too many other users block you. You can also get banned for sending spam, threatening messages, trying to hack or reverse-engineer the WhatsApp app, or using the service with an unauthorized app.
WhatsApp is small potatoes in the United States. But in much of the world, it’s the main form of electronic communication. Not being allowed to use WhatsApp in some countries is as punishing as not being allowed to use the telephone system in America.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH SOCIAL CREDIT, ANYWAY?
Nobody likes antisocial, violent, rude, unhealthy, reckless, selfish, or deadbeat behavior. What’s wrong with using new technology to encourage everyone to behave?
The most disturbing attribute of a social credit system is not that it’s invasive, but that it’s extralegal. Crimes are punished outside the legal system, which means no presumption of innocence, no legal representation, no judge, no jury, and often no appeal. In other words, it’s an alternative legal system where the accused have fewer rights.
Social credit systems are an end-run around the pesky complications of the legal system. Unlike China’s government policy, the social credit system emerging in the U.S. is enforced by private companies. If the public objects to how these laws are enforced, it can’t elect new rule-makers.
An increasing number of societal “privileges” related to transportation, accommodations, communications, and the rates we pay for services (like insurance) are either controlled by technology companies or affected by how we use technology services. And Silicon Valley’s rules for being allowed to use their services are getting stricter.
If current trends hold, it’s possible that in the future a majority of misdemeanors and even some felonies will be punished not by Washington, D.C., but by Silicon Valley. It’s a slippery slope away from democracy and toward corporatocracy.
In other words, in the future, law enforcement may be determined less by the Constitution and legal code, and more by end-user license agreements.
Social Credit System
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The Social Credit System (Chinese: 社会信用体系; pinyin: shèhuì xìnyòng tǐxì) is a national reputation system being developed by the Chinese government.[1][2][3] By 2020, it is intended to standardise the assessment of citizens’ and businesses’ economic and social reputation, or ‘Social Credit’.[4][5][6][7][8]
The system will be one unified system and there will be a single system-wide social credit score for each citizen and business.[9] By 2018, some restrictions had been placed on citizens, whom state-owned media described as the first step toward creating a national social credit system.[10][11][12][7][13][14]
The system is considered a form of mass surveillance which uses big data analysis technology.[15] The government of modern China has also maintained systems of paper records on individuals and households such as the dàng’àn (档案) and hùkǒu (户口) systems which officials might refer to, but did not provide the same degree and rapidity of feedback and consequences for Chinese citizens as the integrated electronic system because of the much greater difficulty of aggregating paper records for rapid, robust analysis.
The social credit system traces its origin from both policing and work management practices.[16] During the rule of Mao, the work unit was the main intermediate between the individual and the Communist Party of China. The unit concept, as such, is derived from Hegelianand especially behaviorist social science. Other related examples include the neighbourhood unit in developments, study of living creatures at the level of a defined ecological unit, the entity concept from accounting, the strategic business unit in commerce, the unit concept of church fellowship in the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, the use of individual behavior as the unit of study in radical behaviorism, and the meme in anthropology.[citation needed]
The Social Credit System also originated from Grid-style social management, a policing strategy first implemented in select locations from 2001 and 2002 (during the rule of Paramount leader Jiang Zemin) in specific locations across mainland China. In its first phase, grid-style policing was a system for more effective communication between public security bureaus. Within a few years the grid system was adapted for use in distributing social services. Grid management provided the authorities not only with greater situational awareness on the group level, but also enhanced the tracking and monitoring of individuals.[16][17]
In 2018, sociologist Zhang Lifan explained that Chinese society today is still deficient in trust. People often expect to be cheated or to get in trouble even if they are innocent. He believes that it is due to the Cultural Revolution, where friends and family members were deliberately pitted against each other and millions of Chinese were killed. The stated purpose of the social credit system is to help Chinese people trust each other again.[17]
Implementation by Chinese government
The Social Credit System is an example of China’s “top-level design” (顶层设计) approach. It is coordinated by the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.[8]
It is unclear whether the system will work as envisioned by 2020, but the Chinese government has fast-tracked the implementation of the system, resulting in the publication of numerous policy documents and plans since the main plan was issued in 2013. If the Social Credit System is implemented as envisioned, it will constitute a new way of controlling both the behavior of individuals and of businesses.[8]
Progress of implementation (2013–present)
In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of China started a blacklist of debtors with roughly thirty two thousand names. The list has since been described as a first step towards a national Social Credit System by state-owned media.[18][19]
In 2015, the People’s Bank of China licensed eight companies to begin a trial of social credit systems.[20][21] Among these eight firms is Sesame Credit, owned by Alibaba Group, Tencent, as well as China’s biggest ride-sharing and online-dating service, Didi Chuxing and Baihe.com, respectively.[22][20] In general, multiple firms are collaborating with the government to develop the system of software and algorithms used to calculate credit.[22][23] The SPC also began working with private companies – for example, Sesame Credit began deducting credit points from people who defaulted on court fines.[18]
The government originally considered that the Social Credit System be run by a private firm, but it has since acknowledged the need for third-party administration.[20][when?]
In 2017, no licenses to private companies were granted.[20] The reasons include conflict of interest, the remaining control of the government, as well as the lack of cooperation in data sharing among the firms that participate in the development.[20] However, the Social Credit System’s operation by a seemingly external association, such as a formal collaboration between private firms, has not been ruled out yet.[20] Private companies have also signed contracts with provincial governments to set up the basic infrastructure for the Social Credit System at a provincial level.[24]
As of March 2017, 137 commercial credit reporting companies are active on the Chinese market.[8] As part of the development of the Social Credit System, the Chinese government has been monitoring the progress of third-party Chinese credit rating systems.[4]
As of February 2018, no comprehensive, nation-wide social credit system exists, but there are multiple pilots testing the system on a local level as well as in specific sectors of industry.[25] One such program has been implemented in Shanghai through its Honest Shanghaiapp, which uses facial recognition software to browse government records, and rates users accordingly.[26]
In March 2018, Reuters reported that restrictions on citizens and businesses with low Social Credit ratings, and thus low trustworthiness, would come into effect on May 1.[27][28] By May 2018, several million flight and high-speed train trips had been denied to people who had been blacklisted.[11]
In April 2018, journalist Simina Mistreanu described a community where people’s social credit scores were posted near the village center.[17]
As of mid-2018, it was unclear whether the system will be an ‘ecosystem’ of various scores and blacklists run by both government agencies and private companies, or if it will be one unified system. It is also unclear whether there will be a single system-wide social credit score for each citizen and business.[10][11][12][7][13][14]
In November, a detailed plan was produced for further implementation of the program for 2018–2020. The plans included black listing people from public transport and publicly disclosing individuals’ and businesses’ untrustworthiness rating.[29][30]
In January 2019, Beijing government officially announced that it will start to test “Personal Credit Score”.[31]
In April 2019, the People’s Bank of China announces that a new version of Personal Credit Report will be put which allows to collect more personal information. State-run media has described it as “more detailed, more comprehensive and more precisely”[32]
In May 2019, Beijing announced that some inappropriate behavior in the subway could result in the person being blacklisted.[33]
National plans and local government Social Credit System pilots
As of 2018, over forty different Social Credit System experiments were implemented by local governments in different Chinese provinces.[34] The pilot programs began following the release of the 2014 “Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System” by Chinese authorities. The government oversees the creation and development of these governmental pilots by requesting they each publish a regular “interdepartmental agreement on joint enforcement of rewards and punishments for ‘trustworthy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ conduct.”[35]
In December 2017 the National Development and Reform Commission and People’s Bank of China selected “model cities” that demonstrated the steps needed to make a functional and efficient implementation of the Social Credit System. Among them are Hangzhou, Nanjing, Xiamen, Chengdu, Suzhou, Suqian, Huizhou, Wenzhou, Weihai, Weifang, Yiwu, and Rongcheng.[36][37] These pilots were deemed successful in their handling of “blacklists and ‘redlists’”, their creation of “credit sharing platforms”, and their “data sharing efforts with the other cities”. The local government Social Credit System experiments are focused more on the construction of transparent rule-based systems, in contrast with the more advanced rating systems used in the commercial pilots: Citizens often begin with an initial score, to which points are added or deducted depending on their actions. The specific number of points for each action are often listed in publicly available catalogs. Cities also experimented with a multi-level system, in which districts decide on scorekeepers who are responsible for reporting scores to higher-ups. Some experiments also allowed citizens to appeal the scores they were attributed.[38]
The government alleges these systems mean to penalize citizens generally agreed as ‘untrustworthy’. They claim they will be able to “change people’s behavior by ensuring they are closely associated with it.” Researchers[who?], however, argue the system will be part of the government’s plan to automate their authoritarian rule over the Chinese population.[16][39][40] According to Genia Kostka, a Professor of Chinese Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin, “if successful in [their] effort, the Communist Party will possess a powerful means of quelling dissent, one that is comparatively low-cost and which does not require the overt (and unpopular) use of coercion by the state.”[41]
Commercial Social Credit System pilots
There are also commercial pilots developed by private Chinese conglomerates that have an authorization from the state to test out social credit experiments. The pilots are more widespread than their local government counterparts, but function on an voluntary basis: Citizens can decide to opt-out of these systems at any time on request. Users with good scores are offered advantages such as easier access to credit loans, discounts for car and bike sharing services, fast-tracked visa application, or free health check-ups and preferential treatment at hospitals.[41] The algorithms used to assign scores in commercial pilots remain unknown, although sources say some pilots use a big-data analysis and artificial intelligence approach.[23]
In 2015, the People’s Bank of China issued temporary licenses to eight companies for the creation of commercial pilots, among them Zhima Credit owned by Ant Financial Services, a subsidiary of Alibaba Group Holding, and Tencent Credit owned by Tencent Holdings. However, in 2017 the People’s Bank of China refused to transform their licenses into official ones, citing concerns regarding conflict of interest in the companies development of systems that may in the future assign their own scores.[42] Instead it issued a jointly owned license to “Baihang Credit” valid for three years.[43] Baihang Credit is co-owned by the National Internet Finance Association (36%) and the eight other companies (8% each), allowing the state to maintain control and oversee the creation of a new commercial pilot.[44]
Implementation of technology platform
It is unclear what technology will be used in the fully implemented system. As of mid 2018, only pilot schemes have been tested.[10][11][12][7][13][14] Some of the technology is provided by the Alibaba Group’s Ant Financial which operates the Sesame Credit loyalty program.[22][20] Alibaba is China’s largest conglomerate of online services, including the largest online shopping and payment providers.[22] In November 2017, Sesame Credit’s general manager, Hu Tao, denied that Sesame Credit data is shared with the Chinese government.[45] There are also seven other technology partners.
Data collection
The Chinese government aims at assessing the trustworthiness and compliance of each person.[22][clarification needed] The data collected stems both from peoples’ own accounts, as well as their network’s activities. Website operators can mine the traces of data that users exchange with websites and derive a full social profile that includes location, friends, health records, insurance, private messages, financial position, gaming duration, smart home statistics, preferred newspapers, shopping history, and dating behaviour.[22][clarification needed]
Data structuring
Automated algorithms are used to structure the collected data, based on government rules.[22][clarification needed]
Implications for citizens
From the Chinese government’s Plan for Implementation, the SCS is due to be fully implemented by 2020. Once implemented the system will manage the rewards, or punishments, of citizens on the basis of their economic and personal behavior. Some types of punishments include: flight ban, exclusion from private schools, slow internet connection, exclusion from high prestige work, exclusion from hotels, and registration on a public blacklist.
Travel ban
By the end of 2018, 5.5 million high-speed rail trips and 17.5 million flights had been denied to prospective travellers who were on a blacklist.[46][47] The exact reasons for being placed on the list are unknown. Business Insider speculated that the reason could be the debtors list created by the SPC.[11]
Exclusion from school admissions
If the parents of a child were to score below a certain threshold, their children would be excluded from the top schools in the region.[48]
Social status
One’s personal score could be used as a social symbol on social and couples platforms. For example, China’s biggest matchmaking service, Baihe, allows its users to publish their own score.[49]
Repression of religious minorities
City-level pilot projects for the social credit score system have included rewarding individuals for aiding authorities in enforcing restrictions of religious practices, including coercing practitioners of Falun Gong to renounce their beliefs[dubious– discuss] and reporting on Uighurs who publicly pray, fast during Ramadan, or perform other Islamic practices.[50]
Debt Collection
A Hebei court released an app showing a “map of deadbeat debtors” within 500 meters and encouraged users to report individuals who they believed could repay their debts.[50] A spokesman of the court stated that “It’s a part of our measures to enforce our rulings and create a socially credible environment.”[51]
Public display
Mugshots of blacklisted individuals are sometimes displayed on large LED screens on buildings, or shown before the movie in movie theaters.[52]
Other
The rewards of having a high score include easier access to loans and jobs and priority during bureaucratic paperwork. Likewise, the immediate negative consequences for a low score, or being associated to someone with a low score, ranges from lower internet speeds to being denied access to certain jobs, loans and visas.[53][54][55]
Implications for businesses
Among other things, the Social Credit System is meant to provide an answer to the problem of lack of trust on the Chinese market. Proponents argue that it will help eliminate problems such as food safety issues, cheating, and counterfeit goods.[56] China claims its aim is to enhance trust and social stability by creating a “culture of sincerity”.[22]
For businesses, the Social Credit System is meant to serve as a market regulation mechanism. The goal is to establish a self-enforcing regulatory regime fueled by big data in which businesses exercise “self-restraint” (企业自我约束). The basic idea is that with a functional credit system in place, companies will comply with government policies and regulations to avoid having their scores lowered by disgruntled employees, customers or clients.[8] As currently envisioned, companies with good credit scores will enjoy benefits such as good credit conditions, lower tax rates, and more investment opportunities. Companies with bad credit scores will potentially face unfavorable conditions for new loans, higher tax rates, investment restrictions, and lower chances to participate in publicly funded projects.[8]Government plans also envision real-time monitoring of a business’ activities. In that case, infractions on the part of a business could result in a lowered score almost instantly. However, whether this will actually happen depends on the future implementation of the system as well as on the availability of technology needed for this kind of monitoring.[8]
Geographic scope
The Social Credit System will be limited to Mainland China and thus does not apply to Hong Kong and Macau. However, at present, plans do not distinguish between Chinese companies and foreign companies operating on the Chinese market, raising the possibility that foreign businesses operating in China will be subjected to the system as well.[8]
The Hong Kong Government stated in July 2019 that claims that the social credit system will be rolled out in Hong Kong are “totally unfounded”, and stated that the system will not be implemented there.[57]
Criticism
The system has been implicated in a number of controversies. Of particular note is how it is applied to individuals as well as companies. People have already faced various punishments for violating social protocols. The system has been used to already block nine million people with “low scores” from purchasing domestic flights.[58] While still in the preliminary stages, the system has been used to ban people and their children from certain schools, prevent low scorers from renting hotels, using credit cards, and blacklist individuals from being able to procure employment.[58] The system has also been used to rate individuals on their internet habits (excessive online gaming reduces one’s score), personal shopping habits, and a variety of other personal and wholly innocuous acts that have no impact on the wider community.[59][60] Criticism of this program has been widespread outside China with the proposed system being described by Human Rights Watch as “chilling” and filled with arbitrary abuses.[59]
Vision Times labeled the system as a mass surveillance tool and mass disciplinary machine.[61]
Comparison to other countries
Chile
Since the early days of the Pinochet dictatorship, a Directory of Commercial Information (DICOM) has featured prominently in the economic life of the country. People who have poor DICOM scores find it harder to find housing, start new businesses, get loans and, though not the intended usage of the system, find jobs, since employers tend to check scores as a part of the selection process.[62][63][64] There have been legal measures taken recently to reduce the negative impact of the system on people with poor scores, such as banning the usage of DICOM scores in determining access to medical attention.[65]
Germany
In February 2018, Handelsblatt Global reported that Germany may be “sleep walking” towards a system comparable to China’s. Using data from the universal credit rating system, Schufa, geolocation and health records to determine access to credit and health insurance.[66]
Russia
Around 80% of Russians will reportedly get a digital profile that will document personal successes and failures in less than a decade under the government’s comprehensive plans to digitize the economy. Observers have compared this to China’s social credit system,[67]although Deputy Prime Minister Maxim Akimov has denied that, saying a Chinese-style social credit system is a “threat”.[68][69]
United Kingdom
In 2018, the New Economics Foundation compared the Chinese citizen score to other rating systems in the United Kingdom. These included using data from a citizen’s credit score, phone usage, rent payment, etc. to filter job applications, determine access to social services, determine advertisements served, etc.[70][71]
Venezuela
In 2018, Venezuela started developing a smart-card ID known as the “carnet de la patria,” or “fatherland card,” with the help of Chinese telecom company ZTE.[72] The system also includes a database which stores details like birthdays, family information, employment and income, property owned, medical history, state benefits received, presence on social media, membership of a political party, and whether a person voted.[72] Many in Venezuela have expressed concern that the card is an attempt to tighten social control through monitoring all aspects of daily life, similar to that of China’s social credit system.[73][74]
See also
References …
External links
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Credit_System
Falun Gong
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Falun Gong (UK: /ˌfɑːlʊn ˈɡɒŋ, ˌfæl-, – ˈɡʊŋ/, US: /- ˈɡɔːŋ/)[1] or Falun Dafa (/ˈdɑːfə/; Standard Mandarin Chinese: [fàlwə̌n tâfà]; literally, “Dharma Wheel Practice” or “Law Wheel Practice”) is a Chinese religious spiritual practice that combines meditation and qigong exercises with a moral philosophy centered on the tenets of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance (Chinese: 真、善、忍). The practice emphasizes morality and the cultivation of virtue, and identifies as a qigong practice of the Buddhist school, though its teachings also incorporate elements drawn from Taoist traditions. Through moral rectitude and the practice of meditation, practitioners of Falun Gong aspire to eliminate attachments, and ultimately to achieve spiritual enlightenment.
Falun Gong originated and was first taught publicly in northeastern China in 1992 by Li Hongzhi. It emerged toward the end of China’s “qigong boom”—a period that saw a proliferation of similar practices of meditation, slow-moving energy exercises and regulated breathing. It differs from other qigong schools in its absence of fees or formal membership, lack of daily rituals of worship, its greater emphasis on morality, and the theological nature of its teachings. Western academics have described Falun Gong as a qigong discipline, a “spiritual movement”, a “cultivation system” in the tradition of Chinese antiquity, or as a form of Chinese religion.
The practice initially enjoyed support from Chinese officialdom, but by the mid to late 1990s, the Communist Party and public security organizations increasingly viewed Falun Gong as a potential threat due to its size, independence from the state, and spiritual teachings. By 1999, government estimates placed the number of Falun Gong practitioners at 70 million.[2] During that time, negative coverage of Falun Gong began to appear in the state-run press, and practitioners usually responded by picketing the source involved. Most of the time, the practitioners succeeded, but controversy and tension continued to build. The scale of protests grew until April 1999, when over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered near the central government compound in Beijing to request legal recognition and freedom from state interference. This demonstration is widely seen as catalyzing the persecution that followed.
On 20 July 1999, the Communist Party leadership initiated a nationwide crackdown and multifaceted propaganda campaign intended to eradicate the practice. It blocked Internet access to websites that mention Falun Gong, and in October 1999 it declared Falun Gong a “heretical organization” that threatened social stability. Falun Gong practitioners in China are reportedly subject to a wide range of human rights abuses: hundreds of thousands are estimated to have been imprisoned extrajudicially,[3] and practitioners in detention are subject to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive methods of thought reform at the hands of Chinese authorities.[4] As of 2009, human rights groups estimated that at least 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners had died as a result of abuse in custody.[5] One observer reported that tens of thousands may have been killed to supply China’s organ transplant industry (see Organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China).[6][7] In the years since the persecution began, Falun Gong practitioners have become active in advocating for greater human rights in China.
Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi has lived in New York City since 1996, and Falun Gong has a sizable global constituency. Inside China, estimates suggest that tens of millions continued to practice Falun Gong in spite of the persecution.[8][9][10] Hundreds of thousands are estimated to practice Falun Gong outside China in over 70 countries worldwide.[11][12]
Contents
Origins
Falun Gong is most frequently identified with the qigong movement in China. Qigong is a modern term that refers to a variety of practices involving slow movement, meditation, and regulated breathing. Qigong-like exercises have historically been practiced by Buddhist monks, Daoist martial artists, and Confucian scholars as a means of spiritual, moral, and physical refinement. [13]
The modern qigong movement emerged in the early 1950s, when Communist cadres embraced the techniques as a way to improve health.[13] The new term was constructed to avoid association with religious practices, which were prone to being labeled as “feudal superstition” and persecuted during the Maoist era.[13][14] Early adopters of qigong eschewed its religious overtones and regarded qigong principally as a branch of Chinese medicine. In the late 1970s, Chinese scientists purported to have discovered the material existence of the qi energy that qigong seeks to harness.[15] In the spiritual vacuum of the post-Mao era, tens of millions of mostly urban and elderly Chinese citizens took up the practice of qigong,[16][17][18] and a variety of charismatic qigong masters established practices. At one time, over 2,000 disciplines of qigong were being taught.[19] The state-run China Qigong Science Research Society (CQRS) was established in 1985 to oversee and administer the movement.[20]
On 13 May 1992, Li Hongzhi gave his first public seminar on Falun Gong (alternatively called Falun Dafa) in the northeastern Chinese city of Changchun. In his hagiographic spiritual biography, Li Hongzhi is said to have been taught ways of “cultivation practice” by several masters of the Buddhist and Daoist traditions, including Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, and a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist from the Changbai Mountains. Falun Dafa is said to be the result of his reorganizing and writing down the teachings that were passed to him.[21]
Li presented Falun Gong as part of a “centuries-old tradition of cultivation”,[22] and in effect sought to revive the religious and spiritual elements of qigong practice that had been discarded in the earlier Communist era. David Palmer writes that Li “redefined his method as having entirely different objectives from qigong: the purpose of practice should neither be physical health nor the development of extraordinary powers, but to purify one’s heart and attain spiritual salvation.”[13]
Falun Gong is distinct from other qigong schools in that its teachings cover a wide range of spiritual and metaphysical topics, placing emphasis on morality and virtue and elaborating a complete cosmology.[23] The practice identifies with the Buddhist School (Fojia) but also draws on concepts and language found in Taoism and Confucianism.[20] This has led some scholars to label the practice as a syncretic faith.[24]
Beliefs and practices
Central teachings
Falun Gong adherents practice the fifth exercise, a meditation, in Manhattan
Falun Gong aspires to enable the practitioner to ascend spiritually through moral rectitude and the practice of a set of exercises and meditation. The three central tenets of the belief are Truthfulness (真, Zhēn), Compassion (善, Shàn), and Forbearance (忍, Rěn).[25][26] Together these principles are regarded as the fundamental nature of the cosmos, the criteria for differentiating right from wrong, and are held to be the highest manifestations of the Tao, or Buddhist Dharma.[27][28][29][30] Adherence to and cultivation of these virtues is regarded as a fundamental part of Falun Gong practice.[31] In Zhuan Falun (转法轮), the foundational text published in 1995, Li Hongzhi writes “It doesn’t matter how mankind’s moral standard changes … The nature of the cosmos doesn’t change, and it is the only standard for determining who’s good and who’s bad. So to be a cultivator you have to take the nature of the cosmos as your guide for improving yourself.”[27][32]
Practice of Falun Gong consists of two features: performance of the exercises, and the refinement of one’s xinxing (moral character, temperament). In Falun Gong’s central text, Li states that xinxing “includes virtue (which is a type of matter), it includes forbearance, it includes awakening to things, it includes giving up things—giving up all the desires and all the attachments that are found in an ordinary person—and you also have to endure hardship, to name just a few things.”[27][33] The elevation of one’s moral character is achieved, on the one hand, by aligning one’s life with truth, compassion, and tolerance; and on the other, by abandoning desires and “negative thoughts and behaviors, such as greed, profit, lust, desire, killing, fighting, theft, robbery, deception, jealousy, etc.”[34]
Among the central concepts found in the teachings of Falun Gong is the existence of ‘Virtue’ (‘德, Dé) and ‘Karma’ (‘業, Yè).[35][36] The former is generated through doing good deeds and suffering, while the latter is accumulated through doing wrong deeds. A person’s ratio of karma to virtue is said to determine his or her fortunes in this life or the next. While virtue engenders good fortune and enables spiritual transformation, an accumulation of karma results in suffering, illness, and alienation from the nature of the universe.[20][36][37] Spiritual elevation is achieved through the elimination of negative karma and the accumulation of virtue.[20][38] Practitioners believe that through a process of moral cultivation, one can achieve Tao and obtain special powers and a level of divinity.[39][40]
Falun Gong’s teachings posit that human beings are originally and innately good—even divine—but that they descended into a realm of delusion and suffering after developing selfishness and accruing karma.[27][41][42] The practice holds that reincarnation exists and that different people’s reincarnation processes are overseen by different gods.[43] To re-ascend and return to the “original, true self”, Falun Gong practitioners are supposed to assimilate themselves to the qualities of truthfulness, compassion and tolerance, let go of “attachments and desires” and suffer to repay karma.[20][27][44] The ultimate goal of the practice is enlightenment or spiritual perfection (yuanman), and release from the cycle of reincarnation, known in Buddhist tradition as samsara.[27][45]
Traditional Chinese cultural thought and modernity are two focuses of Li Hongzhi’s teachings. Falun Gong echoes traditional Chinese beliefs that humans are connected to the universe through mind and body, and Li seeks to challenge “conventional mentalities”, concerning the nature and genesis of the universe, time-space, and the human body.[46][47] The practice draws on East Asian mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes the purportedly self-imposed limits of modern science, especially evolution, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid ontological system.[48]
Exercises
The five exercises of Falun Gong
In addition to its moral philosophy, Falun Gong consists of four standing exercises and one sitting meditation. The exercises are regarded as secondary to moral elevation, though is still an essential component of Falun Gong cultivation practice.[20][49]
The first exercises, called “Buddha Stretching a Thousand Arms”, are intended to facilitate the free flow of energy through the body and open up the meridians. The second exercise, “Falun Standing Stance”, involves holding four static poses—each of which resembles holding a wheel—for an extended period. The objective of this exercise is to “enhances wisdom, increases strength, raises a person’s level, and strengthens divine powers”. The third, “Penetrating the Cosmic Extremes”, involves three sets of movements, which aim to enable the expulsion of bad energy (e.g., pathogenic or black qi) and the absorption of good energy into the body. Through practice of this exercise, the practitioner aspires to cleanse and purify the body. The fourth exercise, “Falun Cosmic Orbit”, seeks to circulate energy freely throughout the body. Unlike the first through fourth exercises, the fifth exercise is performed in the seated lotus position. Called “Reinforcing Supernatural Powers”, it is a meditation intended to be maintained as long as possible.[50][51]
Falun Gong exercises can be practiced individually or in group settings, and can be performed for varying lengths of time in accordance with the needs and abilities of the individual practitioner.[27][52] Porter writes that practitioners of Falun Gong are encouraged to read Falun Gong books and practice its exercises on a regular basis, preferably daily.[53] Falun Gong exercises are practiced in group settings in parks, university campuses, and other public spaces in over 70 countries worldwide, and are taught for free by volunteers.[53][54] In addition to five exercises, in 2001 another meditation activity was introduced called “sending righteous thoughts,” which is intended to reduce persecution on the spiritual plane.[53]
A pilot study involving genomic profiling of six Falun Dafa practitioners indicated that, “changes in gene expression of [Falun Gong] practitioners in contrast to normal healthy controls were characterized by enhanced immunity, downregulation of cellular metabolism, and alteration of apoptotic genes in favor of a rapid resolution of inflammation.”[55]
In addition to the attainment of physical health, many Buddhist and Daoist meditation systems aspire to transform the physical body and cultivate a variety of supernatural capabilities (shentong), such as telepathy and divine sight.[56] Discussions of supernatural skills also feature prominently within the qigong movement, and the existence of these skills gained a level mainstream acceptance in China’s scientific community in the 1980s.[15] Falun Gong’s teachings hold that practitioners can acquire supernatural skills through a combination of moral cultivation, meditation and exercises. These include—but are not limited to—precognition, clairaudience, telepathy, and divine sight (via the opening of the third eye or celestial eye). However, Falun Gong stresses that these powers can be developed only as a result of moral practice, and should not be pursued or casually displayed.[39] According to David Ownby, Falun Gong teaches that “Pride in one’s abilities, or the desire to show off, are marks of dangerous attachments,” and Li warns his followers not to be distracted by the pursuit of such powers.[15]
Social practices
Falun Gong adherents practice the third exercise in Toronto.
Falun Gong differentiates itself from Buddhist monastic traditions in that it places great importance on participation in the secular world. Falun Gong practitioners are required to maintain regular jobs and family lives, to observe the laws of their respective governments, and are instructed not to distance themselves from society. An exception is made for Buddhist monks and nuns, who are permitted to continue a monastic lifestyle while practicing Falun Gong.[27][57]
As part of its emphasis on ethical behavior, Falun Gong’s teachings prescribe a strict personal morality for practitioners. They are expected to act truthfully, do good deeds, and conduct themselves with patience and forbearance when encountering difficulties. For instance, Li stipulates that a practitioner of Falun Gong must “not hit back when attacked, not talk back when insulted.”[58] In addition, they must “abandon negative thoughts and behaviors,” such as greed, deception, jealousy, etc.[27][58] The teachings contain injunctions against smoking and the consumption of alcohol, as these are considered addictions that are detrimental to health and mental clarity.[27][59][60] Practitioners of Falun Gong are forbidden to kill living things—including animals for the purpose of obtaining food—though they are not required to adopt a vegetarian diet.[58]
In addition to these things, practitioners of Falun Gong must abandon a variety of worldly attachments and desires.[34] In the course of cultivation practice, the student of Falun Gong aims to relinquish the pursuit of fame, monetary gain, sentimentality, and other entanglements. Li’s teachings repeatedly emphasize the emptiness of material pursuits; although practitioners of Falun Gong are not encouraged to leave their jobs or eschew money, they are expected to give up the psychological attachments to these things.[59] Similarly, sexual desire and lust are treated as attachments to be discarded, but Falun Gong students are still generally expected to marry and have families.[59] All sexual relations outside the confines of monogamous, heterosexual marriage are regarded as immoral.[61] Although gays and lesbians may practice Falun Gong, homosexual conduct is said to generate karma, and is therefore viewed as incompatible with the goals of the practice.[62]
Falun Gong’s cosmology includes the belief that different ethnicities each have a correspondence to their own heavens, and that individuals of mixed race lose some aspect of this connection.[20] Nonetheless, Li maintains that being of mixed race does not affect a person’s soul, nor hinder their ability to practice cultivation.[20] The practice does not have any formal stance against interracial marriage, and many Falun Gong practitioners have interracial children.[63]
Falun Gong doctrine counsels against participation in political or social issues.[64] Excessive interest in politics is viewed as an attachment to worldly power and influence, and Falun Gong aims for transcendence of such pursuits. According to Hu Ping, “Falun Gong deals only with purifying the individual through exercise, and does not touch on social or national concerns. It has not suggested or even intimated a model for social change. Many religions … pursue social reform to some extent … but there is no such tendency evident in Falun Gong.”[65]
Texts
The first book of Falun Gong teachings was published in April 1993. Called China Falun Gong, or simply Falun Gong, it is an introductory text that discusses qigong, Falun Gong’s relationship to Buddhism, the principles of cultivation practice and the improvement of moral character (xinxing). The book also provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises and meditation.[49][66]
The main body of teachings is articulated in the book Zhuan Falun, published in Chinese in January 1995. The book is divided into nine “lectures”, and was based on edited transcriptions of the talks Li gave throughout China in the preceding three years.[67] Falun Gong texts have since been translated into an additional 40 languages.[68] In addition to these central texts, Li has published several books, lectures, articles, books of poetry, which are made available on Falun Gong websites.[69][70]
The Falun Gong teachings use numerous untranslated Chinese religious and philosophical terms, and make frequent allusion to characters and incidents in Chinese folk literature and concepts drawn from Chinese popular religion. This, coupled with the literal translation style of the texts, which imitate the colloquial style of Li’s speeches, can make Falun Gong scriptures difficult to approach for Westerners.[23]
Symbols
The main symbol of the practice is the Falun (Dharma wheel, or Dharmacakra in Sanskrit). In Buddhism, the Dharmacakra represents the completeness of the doctrine. To “turn the wheel of dharma” (Zhuan Falun) means to preach the Buddhist doctrine, and is the title of Falun Gong’s main text.[71] Despite the invocation of Buddhist language and symbols, the law wheel as understood in Falun Gong has distinct connotations, and is held to represent the universe.[72] It is conceptualized by an emblem consisting of one large and four small (counter-clockwise) Swastika symbols, representing the Buddha, and four small Taiji (yin-yang) symbols of the Daoist tradition.[27][72]
Dharma-ending period
Li situates his teaching of Falun Gong amidst the “Dharma-ending period” (Mo Fa, 末法), described in Buddhist scriptures as an age of moral decline when the teachings of Buddhism would need to be rectified.[15][20] The current era is described in Falun Gong’s teachings as the “Fa rectification” period (zhengfa, which might also be translated as “to correct the dharma”), a time of cosmic transition and renewal.[20] The process of Fa rectification is necessitated by the moral decline and degeneration of life in the universe, and in the post-1999 context, the persecution of Falun Gong by the Chinese government has come to be viewed as a tangible symptom of this moral decay.[73] Through the process of the Fa rectification, life will be reordered according to the moral and spiritual quality of each, with good people being saved and ascending to higher spiritual planes, and bad ones being eliminated or cast down.[73] In this paradigm, Li assumes the role of rectifying the Dharma by disseminating through his moral teachings.[13][20]
Some scholars, such as Maria Hsia Chang and Susan Palmer, have described Li’s rhetoric about the “Fa rectification” and providing salvation “in the final period of the Last Havoc”, as apocalyptic.[74][75] However, Benjamin Penny, a professor of Chinese history at the Australian National University, argues that Li’s teachings are better understood in the context of a “Buddhist notion of the cycle of the Dharma or the Buddhist law”.[76] Richard Gunde notes that unlike apocalyptic groups in the West, Falun Gong does not fixate on death or the end of the world, and instead “has a simple, innocuous ethical message”.[17] Li Hongzhi does not discuss a “time of reckoning”,[76] and has rejected predictions of an impending apocalypse in his teachings.[77]
Categorization
Falun Gong is a multifaceted discipline that means different things to different people, ranging from a set of physical exercises for the attainment of better health and a praxis of self-transformation, to a moral philosophy and a new knowledge system.[48] Scholars and journalists have adopted a variety of terms and classifications in describing Falun Gong, some of them more precise than others.
In the cultural context of China, Falun Gong is generally described either as a system of qigong, or a type of “cultivation practice” (xiulian). Cultivation is a Chinese term that describes the process by which an individual seeks spiritual perfection, often through both physical and moral conditioning. Varieties of cultivation practice are found throughout Chinese history, spanning Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian traditions.[20] Benjamin Penny, writes “the best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system. Cultivation systems have been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2,500 years.”[78] Qigong practices can also be understood as a part of a broader tradition of “cultivation practice”.[20]
In the West, Falun Gong is frequently classified as a religion on the basis of its theological and moral teachings,[79] its concerns with spiritual cultivation and transformation, and its extensive body of scripture.[20] Human rights groups report on the persecution of Falun Gong as a violation of religious freedom, and in 2001, Falun Gong was given an International Religious Freedom Award from Freedom House.[20] Falun Gong practitioners themselves have sometimes disavowed this classification, however. This rejection reflects the relatively narrow definition of “religion” (zongjiao) in contemporary China. According to David Ownby, religion in China has been defined since 1912 to refer to “world-historical faiths” that have “well-developed institutions, clergy, and textual traditions”—namely, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism.[80] Falun Gong lacks these features, having no temples, rituals of worship, clergy or formal hierarchy. Moreover, if Falun Gong had described itself as a religion in China, it likely would have invited immediate suppression.[20] These historical and cultural circumstances notwithstanding, the practice has often been described as a form of Chinese religion.[81]
Although it is often referred to as such in journalistic literature, Falun Gong does not satisfy the definition of a “sect” or “cult.”[46] A sect is generally defined as a branch or denomination of an established belief system or mainstream church. Although Falun Gong draws on both Buddhist and Daoist ideas and terminology, it claims no direct relationship or lineage connection to these religions.[22][82] Sociologists regard sects as exclusive groups that exist within clearly defined boundaries, with rigorous standards for admission and strict allegiances.[83] However, as noted by Noah Porter, Falun Gong does not share these qualities: it does not have clearly defined boundaries, and anyone may practice it.[53] Cheris Shun-ching Chan likewise writes that Falun Gong is “categorically not a sect”: its practitioners do not sever ties with secular society, it is “loosely structured with a fluctuating membership and tolerant of other organizations and faiths,” and it is more concerned with personal, rather than collective worship.[83]
Organization
As a matter of doctrinal significance, Falun Gong is intended to be “formless”, having little to no material or formal organization. Practitioners of Falun Gong cannot collect money or charge fees, conduct healings, or teach or interpret doctrine for others.[84] There are no administrators or officials within the practice, no system of membership, and no churches or physical places of worship.[15][74][85][86] In the absence of membership or initiation rituals, Falun Gong practitioners can be anyone who chooses to identify themselves as such.[87] Students are free to participate in the practice and follow its teachings as much or as little as they like, and practitioners do not instruct others on what to believe or how to behave.[53][65][88]
Spiritual authority is vested exclusively in the teachings of founder Li Hongzhi.[84] But organizationally Falun Gong is decentralized, and local branches and assistants are afforded no special privileges, authority, or titles. Volunteer “assistants” or “contact persons” do not hold authority over other practitioners, regardless of how long they have practiced Falun Gong.[47][73] Li’s spiritual authority within the practice is absolute, yet the organization of Falun Gong works against totalistic control, and Li does not intervene in the personal lives of practitioners. Falun Gong practitioners have little to no contact with Li, except through the study of his teachings.[53][73] There is no hierarchy in Falun Gong to enforce orthodoxy, and little or no emphasis is given on dogmatic discipline; the only thing emphasized is the need for strict moral behavior, according to Craig Burgdoff, a professor of religious studies.[73]
To the extent that organization is achieved in Falun Gong, it is accomplished through a global, networked, and largely virtual online community. In particular, electronic communications, email lists and a collection of websites are the primary means of coordinating activities and disseminating Li Hongzhi’s teachings.[89]
Outside Mainland China, a network of volunteer ‘contact persons’, regional Falun Dafa Associations and university clubs exist in approximately 80 countries.[90] Li Hongzhi’s teachings are principally spread through the Internet.[74][91] In most mid- to large-sized cities, Falun Gong practitioners organize regular group meditation or study sessions in which they practice Falun Gong exercises and read Li Hongzhi’s writings. The exercise and meditation sessions are described as informal groups of practitioners who gather in public parks—usually in the morning—for one to two hours.[53][74][92] Group study sessions typically take place in the evenings in private residences or university or high school classrooms, and are described by David Ownby as “the closest thing to a regular ‘congregational experience'” that Falun Gong offers.[52] Individuals who are too busy, isolated, or who simply prefer solitude may elect to practice privately.[52] When there are expenses to be covered (such as for the rental of facilities for large-scale conferences), costs are borne by self-nominated and relatively affluent individual members of the community.[52][93]
Organization within China
Morning Falun Dafa exercises, in Guangzhou.
In 1993, the Beijing-based Falun Dafa Research Society was accepted as a branch of the state-run China Qigong Research Society (CQRS), which oversaw the administration of the country’s various qigong schools, and sponsored activities and seminars. As per the requirements of the CQRS, Falun Gong was organized into a nationwide network of assistance centers, “main stations”, “branches”, “guidance stations”, and local practice sites, mirroring the structure of the qigong society or even of the Communist Party itself.[86][94] Falun Gong assistants were self-selecting volunteers who taught the exercises, organized events, and disseminated new writings from Li Hongzhi. The Falun Dafa Research Society provided advice to students on meditation techniques, translation services, and coordination for the practice nationwide.[86]
Following its departure from the CQRS in 1996, Falun Gong came under increased scrutiny from authorities and responded by adopting a more decentralized and loose organizational structure.[53] In 1997, the Falun Dafa Research Society was formally dissolved, along with the regional “main stations.”[95] Yet practitioners continued to organize themselves at local levels, being connected through electronic communications, interpersonal networks and group exercise sites.[53][96] Both Falun Gong sources and Chinese government sources claimed that there were some 1,900 “guidance stations” and 28,263 local Falun Gong exercise sites nationwide by 1999, though they disagree over the extent of vertical coordination among these organizational units.[97] In response to the persecution that began in 1999, Falun Gong was driven underground, the organizational structure grew yet more informal within China, and the internet took precedence as a means of connecting practitioners.[98]
Following the persecution of Falun Gong in 1999, Chinese authorities sought to portray Falun Gong as a hierarchical and well-funded organization. James Tong writes that it was in the government’s interest to portray Falun Gong as highly organized in order to justify its repression of the group: “The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime’s repression in the name of social order was.”[99] He concluded that Party’s claims lacked “both internal and external substantiating evidence”, and that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities never “credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals”.[100]
Demography
Falun Gong practitioners meditating in Sydney, Australia
Prior to July 1999, official estimates placed the number of Falun Gong practitioners at 70 million nationwide, rivaling membership in the Communist Party.[2][101][102][103][104] By the time of the persecution on 22 July 1999, most Chinese government numbers said the population of Falun Gong was between 2 and 3 million,[96][105] though some publications maintained an estimate of 40 million.[86][106] Most Falun Gong estimates in the same period placed the total number of practitioners in China at 70 to 80 million.[23][86][107] Other sources have estimated the Falun Gong population in China to have peaked between 10 and 70 million practitioners.[108][109] The number of Falun Gong practitioners still practicing in China today is difficult to confirm, though some sources estimate that tens of millions continue to practice privately.[8][110]
Demographic surveys conducted in China in 1998 found a population that was mostly female and elderly. Of 34,351 Falun Gong practitioners surveyed, 27% were male and 73% female. Only 38% were under 50 years old.[111] Falun Gong attracted a range of other individuals, from young college students to bureaucrats, intellectuals and Party officials.[112][113] Surveys in China from the 1990s found that between 23–40% of practitioners held university degrees at the college or graduate level—several times higher than the general population.[53]
Falun Gong is practiced by tens, and possibly hundreds of thousands outside China,[12] with the largest communities found in Taiwan and North American cities with large Chinese populations, such as New York and Toronto. Demographic surveys by Palmer and Ownby in these communities found that 90% of practitioners are ethnic Chinese. The average age was approximately 40.[114] Among survey respondents, 56% were female and 44% male; 80% were married. The surveys found the respondents to be highly educated: 9% held PhDs, 34% had master’s degrees, and 24% had a bachelor’s degree.[114]
The most commonly reported reasons for being attracted to Falun Gong were intellectual content, cultivation exercises, and health benefits.[115] Non-Chinese Falun Gong practitioners tend to fit the profile of “spiritual seekers”—people who had tried a variety of qigong, yoga, or religious practices before finding Falun Gong. According to Richard Madsen[who?], Chinese scientists with doctorates from prestigious American universities who practice Falun Gong claim that modern physics (for example, superstring theory) and biology (specifically the pineal gland‘s function) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. From their point of view, “Falun Dafa is knowledge rather than religion, a new form of science rather than faith”.[79]
History inside China
1992–1996
Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public on 13 May 1992, in Changchun, Jilin Province.[15] Several months later, in September 1992, Falun Gong was admitted as a branch of qigong under the administration of the state-run China Qigong Scientific Research Society (CQRS). Li was recognized as a qigong master, and was authorized to teach his practice nationwide.[116] Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. He was granted a number of awards by PRC governmental organizations.[15][78][117][118]
According to David Ownby, Professor of History and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Université de Montréal, Li became an “instant star of the qigong movement”,[119] and Falun Gong was embraced by the government as an effective means of lowering health care costs, promoting Chinese culture, and improving public morality. In December 1992, for instance, Li and several Falun Gong students participated in the Asian Health Expo in Beijing, where he reportedly “received the most praise [of any qigong school] at the fair, and achieved very good therapeutic results”, according to the fair’s organizer.[15] The event helped cement Li’s popularity, and journalistic reports of Falun Gong’s healing powers spread.[15][20] In 1993, a publication of the Ministry of Public Security praised Li for “promoting the traditional crime-fighting virtues of the Chinese people, in safeguarding social order and security, and in promoting rectitude in society.”[120]
Falun Gong had differentiated itself from other qigong groups in its emphasis on morality, low cost, and health benefits. It rapidly spread via word-of-mouth, attracting a wide range of practitioners from all walks of life, including numerous members of the Chinese Communist Party.[23][121]
From 1992 to 1994, Li did charge fees for the seminars he was giving across China, though the fees were considerably lower than those of competing qigong practices, and the local qigong associations received a substantial share.[46] Li justified the fees as being necessary to cover travel costs and other expenses, and on some occasions, he donated the money earned to charitable causes. In 1994, Li ceased charging fees altogether, thereafter stipulating that Falun Gong must always be taught for free, and its teachings made available without charge (including online).[122] Although some observers believe Li continued to earn substantial income through the sale of Falun Gong books,[123] others dispute this, noting that most Falun Gong books in circulation were bootleg copies.[61]
At the Asian Health Expo in Beijing, 1994, Li Hongzhi is proclaimed the “Most Acclaimed Qigong Master.” Falun Gong also received the “Special Gold Award” and award for “Advancing Frontier Science.”
With the publication of the books Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun, Li made his teachings more widely accessible. Zhuan Falun, published in January 1995 at an unveiling ceremony held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Public Security, became a best-seller in China.[124][125]
In 1995, Chinese authorities began looking to Falun Gong to solidify its organizational structure and ties to the party-state.[53] Li was approached by the Chinese National Sports Committee, Ministry of Public Health, and China Qigong Science Research Association (CQRS) to jointly establish a Falun Gong association. Li declined the offer. The same year, the CQRS issued a new regulation mandating that all qigong denominations establish a Communist Party branch. Li again refused.[13]
Tensions continued to mount between Li and the CQRS in 1996. In the face of Falun Gong’s rise in popularity—a large part of which was attributed to its low cost—competing qigong masters accused Li of undercutting them. According to Schechter, the qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but Li emphasized the need for the teachings to be free of charge.[46]
In March 1996, in response to mounting disagreements, Falun Gong withdrew from the CQRS, after which time it operated outside the official sanction of the state. Falun Gong representatives attempted to register with other government entities, but were rebuffed.[126] Li and Falun Gong were then outside the circuit of personal relations and financial exchanges through which masters and their qigong organizations could find a place within the state system, and also the protections this afforded.[127]
1996–1999
Falun Gong’s departure from the state-run CQRS corresponded to a wider shift in the government’s attitudes towards qigong practices. As qigong’s detractors in government grew more influential, authorities began attempting to rein in the growth and influence of these groups, some of which had amassed tens of millions of followers.[15] In the mid-1990s the state-run media began publishing articles critical of qigong.[13][15]
Falun Gong was initially shielded from the mounting criticism, but following its withdrawal from the CQRS in March 1996, it lost this protection. On 17 June 1996, the Guangming Daily, an influential state-run newspaper, published a polemic against Falun Gong in which its central text, Zhuan Falun, was described as an example of “feudal superstition.”[15][128] The author wrote that the history of humanity is a “struggle between science and superstition,” and called on Chinese publishers not to print “pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers.” The article was followed by at least twenty more in newspapers nationwide. Soon after, on 24 July, the Central Propaganda Department banned all publication of Falun Gong books (though the ban was not consistently enforced).[128] The state-administered Buddhist Association of China also began issuing criticisms of Falun Gong, urging lay Buddhists not to take up the practice.[129]
The events were an important challenge to Falun Gong, and one that practitioners did not take lightly.[130] Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to Guangming Daily and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated Hu Yaobang‘s 1982 ‘Triple No’ directive, which prohibited the media from either encouraging or criticizing qigong practices.[128][131] In other instances, Falun Gong practitioners staged peaceful demonstrations outside media or local government offices to request retractions of perceived unfair coverage.[20]
The polemics against Falun Gong were part of a larger movement opposing qigong organizations in the state-run media.[132] Although Falun Gong was not the only target of the media criticism, nor the only group to protest, theirs was the most mobilized and steadfast response.[48] Many of Falun Gong’s protests against negative media portrayals were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of the practice. This contributed to practitioners’ belief that the media claims against them were false or exaggerated, and that their stance was justified.[133]
In June 1998, He Zuoxiu, an outspoken critic of qigong and a fierce defender of Marxism, appeared on a talk show on Beijing Television and openly disparaged qigong groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.[134] Falun Gong practitioners responded with peaceful protests and by lobbying the station for a retraction. The reporter responsible for the program was reportedly fired, and a program favorable to Falun Gong was aired several days later.[135][136] Falun Gong practitioners also mounted demonstrations at 14 other media outlets.[135]
In 1997, The Ministry of Public Security launched an investigation into whether Falun Gong should be deemed xie jiao (邪教, “heretical teaching”). The report concluded that “no evidence has appeared thus far”.[137] The following year, however, on 21 July 1998, the Ministry of Public Security issued Document No. 555, “Notice of the Investigation of Falun Gong”. The document asserted that Falun Gong is a “heretical teaching”, and mandated that another investigation be launched to seek evidence in support of the conclusion.[138] Falun Gong practitioners reported having phone lines tapped, homes ransacked and raided, and Falun Gong exercise sites disrupted by public security agents.[20]
Li Hongzhi (right) receiving a proclamation from Illinois Governor George Ryan in 1999
In this time period, even as criticism of qigong and Falun Gong mounted in some circles, the practice maintained a number of high-profile supporters in the government. In 1998, Qiao Shi, the recently retired Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, initiated his own investigation into Falun Gong. After months of investigations, his group concluded that “Falun Gong has hundreds of benefits for the Chinese people and China, and does not have one single bad effect.”[139] In May of the same year, China’s National Sports Commission launched its own survey of Falun Gong. Based on interviews with over 12,000 Falun Gong practitioners in Guangdong province,[13] they stated that they were “convinced the exercises and effects of Falun Gong are excellent. It has done an extraordinary amount to improve society’s stability and ethics.”
The practice’s founder, Li Hongzhi, was largely absent from the country during the period of rising tensions with the government. In March 1995, Li had left China to first teach his practice in France and then other countries, and in 1998 obtained permanent residency in the United States.[13][20][140]
By 1999, estimates provided by the State Sports Commission suggested there were 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in China.[2][141] An anonymous employee of China’s National Sports Commission, was at this time quoted in an interview with U.S. News & World Report as speculating that if 100 million had taken up Falun Gong and other forms of qigong there would be a dramatic reduction of health care costs and that “Premier Zhu Rongji is very happy about that.”[101]
Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests
By the late 1990s, the Communist Party’s relationship to the growing Falun Gong movement had become increasingly tense. Reports of discrimination and surveillance by the Public Security Bureau were escalating, and Falun Gong practitioners were routinely organizing sit-in demonstrations responding to media articles they deemed to be unfair. The conflicting investigations launched by the Ministry of the Public Security on one side and the State Sports Commission and Qiao Shi on the other spoke of the disagreements among China’s elites on how to regard the growing practice.
In April 1999, an article critical of Falun Gong was published in Tianjin Normal University‘s Youth Reader magazine. The article was authored by physicist He Zuoxiu who, as Porter and Gutmann note, is a relative of Politburo member and public security secretary Luo Gan.[53][142] The article cast qigong, and Falun Gong in particular, as superstitious and harmful for youth.[143] Falun Gong practitioners responded by picketing the offices of the newspaper requesting a retraction of the article.[138] Unlike past instances in which Falun Gong protests were successful, on 22 April the Tianjin demonstration was broken up by the arrival of three hundred riot police. Some of the practitioners were beaten, and forty-five arrested.[46][138][144] Other Falun Gong practitioners were told that if they wished to appeal further, they needed to take the issue up with the Ministry of Public Security and go to Beijing to appeal.[142][144][145]
Falun Gong adherents demonstrate in front of Zhongnanhai, 25 April 1999.
The Falun Gong community quickly mobilized a response, and on the morning of 25 April, upwards of 10,000 practitioners gathered near the central appeals office to demand an end to the escalating harassment against the movement, and request the release of the Tianjin practitioners. According to Benjamin Penny, practitioners sought redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, “albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily.”[78] Journalist Ethan Gutmann wrote that security officers had been expecting them, and corralled the practitioners onto Fuyou Street in front of Zhongnanhai government compound.[142] They sat or read quietly on the sidewalks surrounding the Zhongnanhai.[146]
Five Falun Gong representatives met with Premier Zhu Rongji and other senior officials to negotiate a resolution. The Falun Gong representatives were assured that the regime supported physical exercises for health improvements and did not consider the Falun Gong to be anti-government.[146] Upon reaching this resolution, the crowd of Falun Gong protesters dispersed.[142]
Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin was alerted to the demonstration by CPC Politburo member Luo Gan,[105] and was reportedly angered by the audacity of the demonstration—the largest since the Tiananmen Square protests ten years earlier. Jiang called for resolute action to suppress the group,[96] and reportedly criticized Premier Zhu for being “too soft” in his handling of the situation.[46] That evening, Jiang composed a letter indicating his desire to see Falun Gong “defeated”. In the letter, Jiang expressed concerns over the size and popularity of Falun Gong, and in particular about the large number of senior Communist Party members found among Falun Gong practitioners. He noted the possibility of foreign forces behind Falun Gong’s protests (the practice’s founder, Li Hongzhi, had emigrated to the United States), and expressed concern about their use of the internet to coordinate a large-scale demonstration. Jiang also intimated that Falun Gong’s moral philosophy was at odds with the atheist values of Marxist–Leninism, and therefore constituted a form of ideological competition.[147]
Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for this decision to persecute Falun Gong.[148][149] Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi; Saich points to Jiang’s anger at Falun Gong’s widespread appeal, and ideological struggle as causes for the crackdown that followed. Willy Wo-Lap Lam suggests Jiang’s decision to suppress Falun Gong was related to a desire to consolidate his power within the Politburo.[150] According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown.[136]
Persecution
A Falun Gong practitioner arrested by Chinese police in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.
On 20 July 1999, security forces abducted and detained thousands of Falun Gong practitioners that they identified as leaders.[96] Two days later, on 22 July, the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs outlawed the Falun Dafa Research Society as an illegal organization “engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability”.[151][152] The same day, the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular forbidding citizens from practicing Falun Gong in groups, possessing Falun Gong’s teachings, displaying Falun Gong banners or symbols, or protesting the ban.[136]
The ensuing campaign aimed to “eradicate” the group through a combination of propaganda, imprisonment, and coercive thought reform of practitioners, sometimes resulting in deaths. In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw “heterodox religions” and sentence Falun Gong devotees to prison terms.[153][154]
Hundreds of thousands are estimated to have been imprisoned extrajudicially, and practitioners in detention are reportedly subjected to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive methods of thought reform at the hands of Chinese authorities.[4][155][156] The U.S. Department of State and Congressional-Executive Commission on China cite estimates that as much as half of China’s reeducation-through-labor camp population is made up of Falun Gong practitioners.[157][158] Researcher Ethan Gutmann estimates that Falun Gong represents an average of 15 to 20 percent of the total “laogai” population, which includes reeducation through labor camps as well as prisons and other forms of administrative detention.[159] Former detainees of the labor camp system have reported that Falun Gong practitioners are one of the largest groups of prisoners; in some labor camp and prison facilities, they comprise the majority of detainees, and are often said to receive the longest sentences and the worst treatment.[160][161] A 2013 report by Amnesty International on labor reeducation camps found that Falun Gong practitioners “constituted on average from one third to in some cases 100 per cent of the total population” of certain camps.[162]
According to Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong extends to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces.[61] An extra-constitutional body, the “610 Office” was created to “oversee” the effort.[4][153][163] Human Rights Watch (2002) commented that families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government.[136]
Speculation on rationale
Foreign observers have attempted to explain the Party’s rationale for banning Falun Gong as stemming from a variety of factors. These include Falun Gong’s popularity, China’s history of quasi-religious movements that turned into violent insurrections, its independence from the state and refusal to toe the party line, internal power politics within the Communist Party—and Falun Gong’s moral and spiritual content, which put it at odds with aspects of the official Marxist ideology.
610 Office’s organization in China.
Xinhua News Agency, the official news organization of the Communist Party, declared that Falun Gong is “opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition.”[164] Xinhua also asserted that “the so-called ‘truth, kindness and forbearance’ principle preached by [Falun Gong] has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve”, and argued that it was necessary to crush Falun Gong to preserve the “vanguard role and purity” of the Communist Party.[165] Other articles appearing in the state-run media in the first days and weeks of the ban posited that Falun Gong must be defeated because its “theistic” philosophy was at odds with the Marxist–Leninism paradigm and with the secular values of materialism.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam writes that Jiang Zemin’s campaign against Falun Gong may have been used to promote allegiance to himself; Lam quotes one party veteran as saying “by unleashing a Mao-style movement [against Falun Gong], Jiang is forcing senior cadres to pledge allegiance to his line.”[166] The Washington Post reported that sources indicated not all of the standing committee of the Politburo shared Jiang’s view that Falun Gong should be eradicated,[167] but James Tong suggests there was not substantial resistance from the Politburo.
Human Rights Watch commented that the crackdown on Falun Gong reflects historical efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion, which the government believes is inherently subversive.[136] The Chinese government protects five “patriotic”, Communist Party-sanctioned religious groups. Unregistered religions that fall outside the state-sanctioned organizations are thus vulnerable to suppression.[168] The Globe and Mail wrote : “… any group that does not come under the control of the Party is a threat”.[169] Craig S. Smith of The Wall Street Journal wrote that the party feels increasingly threatened by any belief system that challenges its ideology and has an ability to organize itself.[170] That Falun Gong, whose belief system represented a revival of traditional Chinese religion, was being practiced by a large number of Communist Party members and members of the military was seen as particularly disturbing to Jiang Zemin; according to Julia Ching, “Jiang accepts the threat of Falun Gong as an ideological one: spiritual beliefs against militant atheism and historical materialism. He [wished] to purge the government and the military of such beliefs.”[171]
A Falun Gong adherent sitting in Tiananmen Square
Yuezhi Zhao points to several other factors that may have led to a deterioration of the relationship between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and media.[48] These included infighting within China’s qigong establishment, the influence of qigong opponents among Communist Party leaders, and the struggles from mid-1996 to mid-1999 between Falun Gong and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.[48] According to Zhao, Falun Gong practitioners have established a “resistance identity”—one that stands against prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality, and “the entire value system associated with China’s project of modernization.”[48] In China the practice represented an indigenous spiritual and moral tradition, a cultural revitalization movement, and drew a sharp contrast to “Marxism with Chinese characteristics”.[172]
Vivienne Shue similarly writes that Falun Gong presented a comprehensive challenge to the Communist Party’s legitimacy. Shue argues that Chinese rulers historically have derived their legitimacy from a claim to possess an exclusive connection to the “Truth”. In imperial China, truth was based on a Confucian and Daoist cosmology, where in the case of the Communist Party, the truth is represented by Marxist–Leninism and historical materialism. Falun Gong challenged the Marxist–Leninism paradigm, reviving an understanding based on more traditionally Buddhist or Daoist conceptions.[173] David Ownby contends that Falun Gong also challenged the Communist Party’s hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse: “[Falun Gong’s] evocation of a different vision of Chinese tradition and its contemporary value is now so threatening to the state and party because it denies them the sole right to define the meaning of Chinese nationalism, and perhaps of Chineseness.”[174]
Maria Chang noted that since the overthrow of the Qin Dynasty, “Millenarian movements had exerted a profound impact on the course of Chinese history,” cumulating in the Chinese Revolutions of 1949, which brought the Chinese Communists to power.[75] Patsy Rahn (2002) describes a paradigm of conflict between Chinese sectarian groups and the rulers they often challenge. According to Rahn, the history of this paradigm goes back to the collapse of the Han dynasty: “The pattern of ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at times threatened by them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early as the second century and continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era and into the present.”[175]
Conversion program
Falun Gong practitioner Tang Yongjie was tortured by prison guards, who applied hot rods to his legs in an attempt to force him to recant his beliefs.
According to James Tong, the regime aimed at both coercive dissolution of the Falun Gong denomination and “transformation” of the practitioners.[176] By 2000, the Party upped its campaign by sentencing “recidivist” practitioners to “re-education through labor“, in an effort to have them renounce their beliefs and “transform” their thoughts.[136] Terms were also arbitrarily extended by police, while some practitioners had ambiguous charges levied against them, such as “disrupting social order”, “endangering national security”, or “subverting the socialist system”.[177] According to Bejesky, the majority of long-term Falun Gong detainees are processed administratively through this system instead of the criminal justice system. Upon completion of their re-education sentences, those practitioners who refused to recant were then incarcerated in “legal education centers” set up by provincial authorities to “transform minds”.[177][178]
Much of the conversion program relied on Mao-style techniques of indoctrination and thought reform, where Falun Gong practitioners were organized to view anti-Falun Gong television programs and enroll in Marxism and materialism study sessions.[179] Traditional Marxism and materialism were the core content of the sessions.[180]
Gao Rongrong, a Falun Gong practitioner from Liaoning Province, was reportedly tortured to death in custody in 2005.[181]
The government-sponsored image of the conversion process emphasizes psychological persuasion and a variety of “soft-sell” techniques; this is the “ideal norm” in regime reports, according to Tong. Falun Gong reports, on the other hand, depict “disturbing and sinister” forms of coercion against practitioners who fail to renounce their beliefs.[182] 14,474 cases are classified by different methods of torture, according to Tong (Falun Gong agencies document over 63,000 individual cases of torture).[183] Among them are cases of severe beatings; psychological torment, corporal punishment and forced intense, heavy-burden hard labor and stress positions; solitary confinement in squalid conditions;[182] “heat treatment” including burning and freezing; electric shocks delivered to sensitive parts of the body that may result in nausea, convulsions, or fainting;[182] “devastative” forced feeding; sticking bamboo strips into fingernails; deprivation of food, sleep, and use of toilet;[182] rape and gang rape; asphyxiation; and threat, extortion, and termination of employment and student status.[182]
The cases appear verifiable, and the great majority identify (1) the individual practitioner, often with age, occupation, and residence; (2) the time and location that the alleged abuse took place, down to the level of the district, township, village, and often the specific jail institution; and (3) the names and ranks of the alleged perpetrators. Many such reports include lists of the names of witnesses and descriptions of injuries, Tong says.[182] The publication of “persistent abusive, often brutal behavior by named individuals with their official title, place, and time of torture” suggests that there is no official will to cease and desist such activities.[182]
Deaths
Due to the difficulty in corroborating reports of torture deaths in China, estimates on the number of Falun Gong practitioners killed under persecution vary widely. In 2009, The New York Times reported that, according to human rights groups, the repressions had claimed “at least 2,000” lives.[5] Amnesty International said at least 100 Falun Gong practitioners had reportedly died in the 2008 calendar year, either in custody or shortly after their release.[184] Falun Gong sources have documented over 3,700 deaths.[185] Investigative journalist Ethan Gutmann estimated 65,000 Falun Gong were killed for their organs from 2000 to 2008 based on extensive interviews,[159][186] while researchers David Kilgour and David Matas reported, “the source of 41,500 transplants for the six-year period 2000 to 2005 is unexplained”.[187][188]
Chinese authorities do not publish statistics on Falun Gong practitioners killed amidst the crackdown. In individual cases, however, authorities have denied that deaths in custody were due to torture.[189]
Organ harvesting
In 2006, allegations emerged that a large number of Falun Gong practitioners had been killed to supply China’s organ transplant industry. These allegations prompted an investigation by former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas.
The Kilgour-Matas report[187][190][191] was published in July 2006, and concluded that “the government of China and its agencies in numerous parts of the country, in particular hospitals but also detention centers and ‘people’s courts’, since 1999 have put to death a large but unknown number of Falun Gong prisoners of conscience.” The report, which was based mainly on circumstantial evidence, called attention to the extremely short wait times for organs in China—one to two weeks for a liver compared with 32.5 months in Canada—noting that this was indicative of organs being procured on demand. It also tracked a significant increase in the number of annual organ transplants in China beginning in 1999, corresponding with the onset of the persecution of Falun Gong. Despite very low levels of voluntary organ donation, China performs the second-highest number of transplants per year. Kilgour and Matas also presented self-accusatory material from Chinese transplant center web sites[192][193][194] advertising the immediate availability of organs from living donors, and transcripts of interviews in which hospitals told prospective transplant recipients that they could obtain Falun Gong organs.[187]
Ethan Gutmann (left) with Edward McMillan-Scott at a Foreign Press Association press conference, 2009
In May 2008 two United Nations Special Rapporteurs reiterated requests for the Chinese authorities to respond to the allegations,[195] and to explain a source for the organs that would account for the sudden increase in organ transplants in China since 2000. Chinese officials have responded by denying the organ harvesting allegations, and insisting that China abides by World Health Organization principles that prohibit the sale of human organs without written consent from donors. Responding to a U.S. House of Representatives Resolution calling for an end to abusing transplant practices against religious and ethnic minorities, a Chinese embassy spokesperson said “the so-called organ harvesting from death-row prisoners is totally a lie fabricated by Falun Gong.”[196] In August 2009, Manfred Nowak, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, said, “The Chinese government has yet to come clean and be transparent … It remains to be seen how it could be possible that organ transplant surgeries in Chinese hospitals have risen massively since 1999, while there are never that many voluntary donors available.”[197]
In 2014, investigative journalist Ethan Gutmann published the result of his own investigation.[198] Gutmann conducted extensive interviews with former detainees in Chinese labor camps and prisons, as well as former security officers and medical professionals with knowledge of China’s transplant practices.[7][199] He reported that organ harvesting from political prisoners likely began in Xinjiang province in the 1990s, and then spread nationwide. Gutmann estimates that some 64,000 Falun Gong prisoners may have been killed for their organs between the years 2000 and 2008.[198][200]
In a 2016 report, David Kilgour found that he had underestimated. In the new report he found that the government’s official estimates for the volume of organs harvested since the persecution of Falun Gong began to be 150,000 to 200,000.[201] Media outlets have extrapolated from this study a death toll of 1,500,000.[202][203] Ethan Gutmann estimated from this update that 60,000 to 110,000 organs are harvested in China annually noting it is (paraphrasing): “difficult but plausible to harvest 3 organs from a single body” and also calls the harvest “a new form of genocide using the most respected members of society.”[204]
In June 2019, the China Tribunal – an independent tribunal set up by the International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China – concluded that detainees including imprisoned followers of the Falun Gong movement are still being killed for organ harvesting. The Tribunal, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, said it was “certain that Falun Gong as a source – probably the principal source – of organs for forced organ harvesting”.[205][206]
Media campaign
The Chinese government’s campaign against Falun Gong was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet.[96][153] Within the first month of the crackdown, 300–400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media.[207] The propaganda campaign focused on allegations that Falun Gong jeopardized social stability, was deceiving and dangerous, was “anti-science” and threatened progress, and argued that Falun Gong’s moral philosophy was incompatible with a Marxist social ethic.[15]
China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith asserted that for several months after Falun Gong was outlawed, China Central Television’s evening news contained little but anti-Falun Gong rhetoric; the government operation was “a study in all-out demonization”, they wrote.[208] Falun Gong was compared to “a rat crossing the street that everyone shouts out to squash” by Beijing Daily;[209] other officials said it would be a “long-term, complex and serious” struggle to “eradicate” Falun Gong.[210]
State propaganda initially used the appeal of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong’s worldview was in “complete opposition to science” and communism.[211] For example, the People’s Daily asserted on 27 July 1999, that the fight against Falun Gong “was a struggle between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism.” Other editorials declared that Falun Gong’s “idealism and theism” are “absolutely contradictory to the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism,” and that the “‘truth, kindness and forbearance’ principle preached by [Falun Gong] has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve.” Suppressing Falun Gong was presented as a necessary step to maintaining the “vanguard role” of the Communist Party in Chinese society.[212]
Despite Party efforts, initial charges leveled against Falun Gong failed to elicit widespread popular support for the persecution of the group. In the months following July 1999, the rhetoric in the state-run press escalated to include charges that Falun Gong was colluding with foreign, “anti-China” forces. In October 1999, three months after the persecution began, the People’s Daily newspaper claimed Falun Gong as a xiejiao.[24][83] A direct translation of that term is “heretical teaching”, but during the anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign was rendered as “evil cult” in English.[154] In the context of imperial China, the term “xiejiao” was used to refer to non-Confucian religions, though in the context of Communist China, it has been used to target religious organizations that do not submit to Communist Party authority.[213][214]
Ian Johnson argued that applying the ‘cult’ label to Falun Gong effectively “cloaked the government’s crackdown with the legitimacy of the West’s anticult movement.” He wrote that Falun Gong does not satisfy common definitions of a cult: “its members marry outside the group, have outside friends, hold normal jobs, do not live isolated from society, do not believe that the world’s end is imminent and do not give significant amounts of money to the organisation … it does not advocate violence and is at heart an apolitical, inward-oriented discipline, one aimed at cleansing oneself spiritually and improving one’s health.”[61] David Ownby similarly wrote that “the entire issue of the supposed cultic nature of Falun Gong was a red herring from the beginning, cleverly exploited by the Chinese state to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong.”.[15] According to John Powers and Meg Y. M. Lee, because the Falun Gong was categorized in the popular perception as an “apolitical, qigong exercise club,” it was not seen as a threat to the government. The most critical strategy in the Falun Gong suppression campaign, therefore, was to convince people to reclassify the Falun Gong into a number of “negatively charged religious labels”,[215] like “evil cult”, “sect”, or “superstition”. The group’s silent protests were reclassified as creating “social disturbances”. In this process of relabelling, the government was attempting to tap into a “deep reservoir of negative feelings related to the historical role of quasi-religious cults as a destabilising force in Chinese political history.”[215]
A turning point in the propaganda campaign came on the eve of Chinese New Year on 23 January 2001, when five people attempted to set themselves ablaze on Tiananmen Square. The official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that the self-immolators were practitioners, though the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed this,[216] on the grounds that the movement’s teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing,[217] further alleging that the event was “a cruel (but clever) piece of stunt-work.”[218] The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). The broadcasts showed images of a 12-year-old girl, Liu Siying, burning, and interviews with the other participants in which they stated a belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise.[216][219] But one of the CNN producers on the scene did not even see a child there. Falun Gong sources and other commentators pointed out that the main participants’ account of the incident and other aspects of the participants’ behavior were inconsistent with the teachings of Falun Dafa.[220] Media Channel and the International Education Development (IED) agree that the supposed self-immolation incident was staged by CCP to “prove” that Falun Gong brainwashes its followers to commit suicide and has therefore to be banned as a threat to the nation. IED’s statement at the 53rd UN session describes China’s violent assault on Falun Gong practitioners as state terrorism and that the self-immolation “was staged by the government.” Washington Post journalist Phillip Pan wrote that the two self-immolators who died were not actually Falun Gong practitioners.[221] On March 21, 2001, Liu Siying suddenly died after appearing very lively and being deemed ready to leave the hospital to go home. Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state’s crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, the mainland Chinese media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.[222] As public sympathy for Falun Gong declined, the government began sanctioning “systematic use of violence” against the group.[223]
In February, 2001, the month following the Tiananmen Square incident, Jiang Zemin convened a rare Central Work Conference to stress the importance of continuity in the anti-Falun Gong campaign and unite senior party officials behind the effort.[136] Under Jiang’s leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of “upholding stability” – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. Jiang’s message was echoed at the 2001 National People’s Congress, where the Falun Gong’s eradication was tied to China’s economic progress.[136] Though less prominent on the national agenda, the persecution of Falun Gong has carried on after Jiang was retired; successive, high-level “strike hard” campaigns against Falun Gong were initiated in both 2008 and 2009. In 2010, a three-year campaign was launched to renew attempts at the coercive “transformation” of Falun Gong practitioners.[224]
In education system
Anti-Falun Gong propaganda efforts have also permeated the Chinese education system. Following Jiang Zemin’s 1999 ban of Falun Gong, then-Minister of Education Chen Zhili launched an active campaign to promote the Party’s line on Falun Gong within all levels of academic institutions, including graduate schools, universities and colleges, middle schools, primary schools, and kindergartens. Her efforts included a “Cultural Revolution-like pledge” in Chinese schools that required faculty members, staff, and students to publicly denounce Falun Gong. Teachers who did not comply with Chen’s program were dismissed or detained; uncooperative students were refused academic advancement, expelled from school, or sent to “transformation” camps to alter their thinking.[225] Chen also worked to spread the anti-Falun Gong academic propaganda movement overseas, using domestic educational funding to donate aid to foreign institutions, encouraging them to oppose Falun Gong.[225]
Falun Gong’s response to the persecution
Practitioners meditate to protest the persecution of Falun Gong at a demonstration in Washington, D.C.
Falun Gong’s response to the persecution in China began in July 1999 with appeals to local, provincial, and central petitioning offices in Beijing.[226] It soon progressed to larger demonstrations, with hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners traveling daily to Tiananmen Square to perform Falun Gong exercises or raise banners in defense of the practice. These demonstrations were invariably broken up by security forces, and the practitioners involved were arrested—sometimes violently—and detained. By 25 April 2000, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners had been arrested on the square;[227] seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the square on 1 January 2001.[228] Public protests continued well into 2001. Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Ian Johnson wrote that “Falun Gong faithful have mustered what is arguably the most sustained challenge to authority in 50 years of Communist rule.”[229]
By late 2001, demonstrations in Tiananmen Square had become less frequent, and the practice was driven deeper underground. As public protest fell out of favor, practitioners established underground “material sites,” which would produce literature and DVDs to counter the portrayal of Falun Gong in the official media. Practitioners then distribute these materials, often door-to-door.[230] Falun Gong sources estimated in 2009 that over 200,000 such sites exist across China today.[231] The production, possession, or distribution of these materials is frequently grounds for security agents to incarcerate or sentence Falun Gong practitioners.[232]
In 2002, Falun Gong activists in China tapped into television broadcasts, replacing regular state-run programming with their own content. One of the more notable instances occurred in March 2002, when Falun Gong practitioners in Changchun intercepted eight cable television networks in Jilin Province, and for nearly an hour, televised a program titled “Self-Immolation or a Staged Act?”. All six of the Falun Gong practitioners involved were captured over the next few months. Two were killed immediately, while the other four were all dead by 2010 as a result of injuries sustained while imprisoned.[233][234]
Outside China, Falun Gong practitioners established international media organizations to gain wider exposure for their cause and challenge narratives of the Chinese state-run media. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, New Tang Dynasty Television, and Sound of Hope radio station.[15] According to Zhao, through The Epoch Times it can be discerned how Falun Gong is building a “de facto media alliance” with China’s democracy movements in exile, as demonstrated by its frequent printing of articles by prominent overseas Chinese critics of the PRC government.[48] In 2004, The Epoch Times published a collection of nine editorials that presented a critical history of Communist Party rule.[65][235] This catalyzed the Tuidang movement, which encourages Chinese citizens to renounce their affiliations to the Chinese Communist Party, including ex post facto renunciations of the Communist Youth League and Young Pioneers. The Epoch Times claims that tens of millions have renounced the Communist Party as part of the movement, though these numbers have not been independently verified.[236]
In 2006, Falun Gong practitioners in the United States formed Shen Yun Performing Arts, a dance and music company that tours internationally.[237]
Falun Gong software developers in the United States are also responsible for the creation of several popular censorship-circumvention tools employed by internet users in China.[238]
Falun Gong Practitioners outside China have filed dozens of lawsuits against Jiang Zemin, Luo Gan, Bo Xilai, and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity.[239] According to International Advocates for Justice, Falun Gong has filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century and the charges are among the most severe international crimes defined by international criminal laws.[240] As of 2006, 54 civil and criminal lawsuits were under way in 33 countries.[15] In many instances, courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity. In late 2009, however, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang Zemin and Luo Gan on charges of “crimes of humanity” and genocide, and asked for their arrest—the ruling is acknowledged to be largely symbolic and unlikely to be carried out.[241][242][243][244] The court in Spain also indicted Bo Xilai, Jia Qinglin and Wu Guanzheng.[241][242]
Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters also filed a lawsuit in May 2011 against the technology company Cisco Systems, alleging that the company helped design and implement a surveillance system for the Chinese government to suppress Falun Gong. Cisco denied customizing their technology for this purpose.[245]
Falun Gong outside China
Falun Gong practitioners outside China hold events such as this group exercise in Los Angeles.
Falun Gong procession in Dublin on May 6, 2017
Li Hongzhi began teaching Falun Gong internationally in March 1995. His first stop was in Paris where, at the invitation of the Chinese ambassador, he held a lecture seminar at the PRC embassy. This was followed by lectures in Sweden in May 1995. Between 1995 and 1999, Li gave lectures in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, and Singapore.[15]
Falun Gong’s growth outside China largely corresponded to the migration of students from Mainland China to the West in the early- to mid-1990s. Falun Gong associations and clubs began appearing in Europe, North America and Australia, with activities centered mainly on university campuses.[246] Falun Gong volunteer instructors and Falun Dafa Associations are currently found in 80 countries outside China.[11]
Translations of Falun Gong teachings began appearing in the late 1990s. As the practice began proliferating outside China, Li Hongzhi was beginning to receive recognition in the United States and elsewhere in the western world. In May 1999, Li was welcomed to Toronto with greetings from the city’s mayor and the provincial lieutenant governor, and in the two months that followed also received recognition from the cities of Chicago and San Jose.[247]
Although the practice was beginning to attract an overseas constituency in the 1990s, it remained relatively unknown outside China until the Spring of 1999, when tensions between Falun Gong and Communist Party authorities became a subject of international media coverage. With the increased attention, the practice gained a greater following outside China. Following the launch of the Communist Party’s suppression campaign against Falun Gong, the overseas presence became vital to the practice’s resistance in China and its continued survival.[15] Falun Gong practitioners overseas have responded to the persecution in China through regular demonstrations, parades, and through the creation of media outlets, performing arts companies, and censorship-circumvention software mainly intended to reach Mainland Chinese audiences.[238]
International reception
Since 1999, numerous Western governments and human rights organizations have expressed condemnation of the Chinese government’s suppression of Falun Gong.[248] Since 1999, members of the United States Congress have made public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong.[249] In 2010, U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 605 called for “an immediate end to the campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners,” condemned the Chinese authorities’ efforts to distribute “false propaganda” about the practice worldwide, and expressed sympathy to persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and their families.[250][251]
Rally of Falun Gong’s adherents in Washington, D.C., 2003.
From 1999 to 2001, Western media reports on Falun Gong—and in particular, the mistreatment of practitioners—were frequent, if mixed.[207] By the latter half of 2001, however, the volume of media reports declined precipitously, and by 2002, major news organizations like The New York Times and Washington Post had almost completely ceased their coverage of Falun Gong from China.[207] In a study of media discourse on Falun Gong, researcher Leeshai Lemish found that Western news organizations also became less balanced, and more likely to uncritically present the narratives of the Communist Party, rather than those of Falun Gong or human rights groups.[207] Adam Frank writes that in reporting on the Falun Gong, the Western tradition of casting the Chinese as “exotic” took dominance, and that while the facts were generally correct in Western media coverage, “the normalcy that millions of Chinese practitioners associated with the practice had all but disappeared.”[252] David Ownby noted that alongside these tactics, the “cult” label applied to Falun Gong by the Chinese authorities never entirely went away in the minds of some Westerners, and the stigma still plays a role in wary public perceptions of Falun Gong.[253]
To counter the support of Falun Gong in the West, the Chinese government expanded their efforts against the group internationally. This included visits to newspaper officers by diplomats to “extol the virtues of Communist China and the evils of Falun Gong”,[254] linking support for Falun Gong with “jeopardizing trade relations,” and sending letters to local politicians telling them to withdraw support for the practice.[254] According to Perry Link, pressure on Western institutions also takes more subtle forms, including academic self-censorship, whereby research on Falun Gong could result in a denial of visa for fieldwork in China; or exclusion and discrimination from business and community groups who have connections with China and fear angering the Communist Party.[254][255]
Although the persecution of Falun Gong has drawn considerable condemnation outside China, some observers note that Falun Gong has failed to attract the level of sympathy and sustained attention afforded to other Chinese dissident groups.[256] Katrina Lantos Swett, vice chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, notes that most Americans are aware of the suppression of “Tibetan Buddhists and unregistered Christian groups or pro-democracy and free speech advocates such as Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei,” and yet “know little to nothing about China’s assault on the Falun Gong.”[257]
Ethan Gutmann, a journalist reporting on China since the early 1990s, has attempted to explain this apparent dearth of public sympathy for Falun Gong as stemming, in part, from the group’s shortcomings in public relations. Unlike the democracy activists or Tibetans, who have found a comfortable place in Western perceptions, “Falun Gong marched to a distinctly Chinese drum”, Gutmann writes. Moreover, practitioners’ attempts at getting their message across carried some of the uncouthness of Communist party culture, including a perception that practitioners tended to exaggerate, create “torture tableaux straight out of a Cultural Revolution opera”, or “spout slogans rather than facts”. This is coupled with a general doubtfulness in the West of persecuted refugees.[258] Gutmann also notes that media organizations and human rights groups also self-censor on the topic, given the PRC governments vehement attitude toward the practice, and the potential repercussions that may follow for making overt representations on Falun Gong’s behalf.[256]
Richard Madsen writes that Falun Gong lacks robust backing from the American constituencies that usually support religious freedom. For instance, Falun Gong’s conservative moral beliefs have alienated some liberal constituencies in the West (e.g. its teachings against promiscuity and homosexual behavior).[61] Christian conservatives, by contrast, don’t accord the practice the same space[clarification needed] as persecuted Chinese Christians.[259] Madsen charges that the American political center does not want to push the human rights issue so hard that it would disrupt commercial and political relations with China. Thus, Falun Gong practitioners have largely had to rely on their own resources in responding to suppression.[259]
In August 2007 at the request of the Falun Gong, the newly reestablished Rabbinic Sanhedrin deliberated persecution of the movement by Chinese government.[260][261][262]
See also
References …
Further reading
External links
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falun_Gong
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The messages behind Hong Kong’s foreign flags
Hong Kong protesters fight back with TENNIS RACQUETS to volley back tear gas after police opened fire with live bullets for the first time during weeks of demonstrations
By HARRY HOWARD FOR MAILONLINE and AFP and REUTERS
PUBLISHED: 21:13 EDT, 25 August 2019 | UPDATED: 02:13 EDT, 26 August 2019
Protesters in Hong Kong are using tennis racquets to fend off tear gas while police fired live bullets for the first time in the weeks-long demonstrations.
Pro-democracy protesters were seen armed with metal poles and sports equipment to protect themselves from a police crackdown amid escalating tensions in the city.
An afternoon rally in the district of Tsuen Wan spiralled into violent clashes on Sunday with officers caught isolated by masked youths wielding sticks and throwing rocks.
Tensions escalated when police began hoisting warning flags before firing tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowd, who reacted angrily by throwing bricks and molotov cocktails.
‘My initial understanding was that it was a uniformed policeman who fired his gun.’
Scroll down for video
Protesters in Hong Kong are using tennis racquets to fend off tear gas after police fired live bullets for the first time in the weeks-long demonstration
Pro-democracy protesters were seen armed with sports equipment to protect themselves from a police crackdown amid escalating tensions in the city
A Hong Kong police officer fired at least one gunshot Sunday, the first time a live round has been used during three months of protests. Above: Officers point their guns at protesters on the streets of Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong
There has been a worrying change in the methods being used by city police to break up the crowds, with one instance where several police officers drew their sidearms, an AFP reporter at the scene said
Another protestor, wearing the symbolic yellow helmet, is held down by two officers in riot gear as the police force clears out a street previously held by protestors
Tens of thousands of protesters skirmished with police in Hong Kong for a second straight day on Sunday following a pro-democracy march in an outlying district. After hoisting warning flags, police used tear gas to try to disperse the crowd. Above: A protester throws a Molotov cocktail at police
Flames from molotov cocktails and petrol bombs linger on the road and pavement after anti-extradition bill protesters clashed with riot police during a protest to demand democracy and political reforms, at Tsuen Wan, in Hong Kong this evening
A makeshift barricade of bollards and railings separates protestors from police officers as night falls across Hong Kong
It was unclear where the shot was aimed, but it was the first live round fired since the protests started three months ago.
The Hong Kong Free Press reported that three officers drew pistols in Tsuen Wan, a built up north of the main city, as two ‘got on their knees’ to beg the officers not to fire any shots.
There was a sense of chaos across swathes of the Kowloon peninsula, over the harbour from the main island of Hong Kong, with police sirens blaring, tear gas wafting throughout densely populated areas and running clashes on the streets.
The skirmishes between police and tens of thousands of protesters occurred for a second straight day yesterday following a pro-democracy march from a sports stadium in Kwai Fong to Tsuen Wan.
While a large crowd rallied in a nearby park, another group of protesters took over a main street, strewing bamboo poles on the pavement and lining up orange and white traffic barriers and cones to try to obstruct the police.
One woman looked undeterred by a police officer clutching a baton as she faced him while holding a purple umbrella above her head
While a large crowd rallied in a nearby park, another group of protesters took over a main street, strewing bamboo poles on the pavement and lining up orange and white traffic barriers and cones to try to obstruct the police. Above: Police fire tear gas at protesters
After hoisting warning flags, police used tear gas to try to disperse the crowd. Protesters responded by throwing bricks and gasoline bombs toward the police
The result was a surreal scene of small fires and scattered paving bricks on the street between the two, rising clouds of tear gas and green and blue laser lights pointed by the protesters at the police. Above: Riot police aim their guns at protesters
Some protesters wore protective gear including helmets and gas masks to guard against tear gas volleys by police. One mn (right) appeared to be holding his own weapon
The demonstrators were not deterred by police as they charged towards them. Their defiance was despite multiple warnings by the Chinese government that the protests must stop
Some police drew their weapons as the clashes with protesters escalated. Sunday’s reported gunshots were the first in the three months of pro-democracy protests
After hoisting warning flags, police used tear gas to try to disperse the crowd. Protesters responded by throwing bricks and gasoline bombs toward the police.
The result was a surreal scene of small fires and scattered paving bricks on the street between the two, rising clouds of tear gas and green and blue laser lights pointed by the protesters at the police.
Prior to the skirmishes, tens of thousands of umbrella-carrying protesters marched in the rain in Hong Kong’s latest pro-democracy demonstration.
Many filled Tsuen Wan Park, the endpoint of the rally, chanting, ‘Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,’ the South China Morning Post newspaper said.
What do Hong Kong protesters want?
Apart from the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Hong Kong demonstrators have listed five demands and have continued to urge the government to respond to them.
These five demands are:
1. A complete withdrawal of the extradition bill
2. A retraction from the government to its characterisation that the protesters were ‘rioters’
3. Unconditional and immediate release of protesters who were arrested and charges against them dropped
4. Establishment of an independent enquiry to investigate police violence during clashes
5. Genuine universal suffrage
The protests began with people gathering at a sports stadium in Kwai Fong, western Hong Kong, where they then marched to nearby Tsuen Wan and clashed with police.
The Chinese-ruled city’s rail operator, MTR Corp, had suspended some services to try to prevent people gathering.
M. Sung, a 53-year-old software engineer in a black mask emblematic of the many older, middle-class citizens at the march, said he had been at almost every protest and would keep coming.
‘We know this is the last chance to fight for ‘one country, two systems’, otherwise the Chinese Communist Party will penetrate our home city and control everything,’ he said.
‘If we keep a strong mind, we can sustain this movement for justice and democracy. It won’t die,’ Sung said.
Hong Kong has been gripped by three months of street demonstrations that started against a proposed extradition bill to China, but have spun out into a wider pro-democracy movement.
Protesters say they are fighting the erosion of the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement under which the former British colony returned to China in 1997 with the promise of continued freedoms not enjoyed on the mainland.
The protests pose a direct challenge for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, who are eager to quell the unrest ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1.
Beijing has sent a clear warning that forceful intervention is possible, with paramilitary forces holding drills just over the border.
The Chinese Government has used a mix of intimidation, propaganda and economic muscle to constrict the protests in a strategy dubbed ‘white terror’ by the movement.
The MTR – the city’s metro – is the latest Hong Kong business to be rebuked by the public, after appearing to bend to Chinese state-media attacks accusing the transport system of being an ‘exclusive’ service to ferry protesters to rallies.
Yesterday, the MTR shut stations near the main demonstration area in Tsuen Wan, the second day of station closures in a row
The officer appeared to shine a light into the man’s eyes while others stood guard around him as others continued to protest
Riot police successfully detain one protester who is seen lying on their stomach with their hands on the wet road as officers talk to each other
Hong Kong was filled with clouds of tear gas as the sun began to go down in the region and protesters stayed on the streets
Some were armed with metal bars and wore helmets, goggles and gas masks for protection. Others wore body armour, including one man whose arms and chest were covered in protective gear
Lines of police were matched by masses of protesters who stood behind makeshift barriers. Many of those protesting wore yellow helmets and held umbrellas aloft
Bamboo poles were left strewn over the street as protesters tried to build barricades to push back the police in Tsuen Wan
Some protesters, undeterred by the robust police response, threw projectiles including Molotov cocktails at police
Other protesters were seen cowering in the streets of Tsuen Wan while wearing gas masks and helmets and holding umbrellas
Some rioters were detained by police, including one woman who cowered on the floor with her head bowed as two officers with shields and batons stood over her
The protesters filled Hong Kong’s streets, with thousands holding umbrellas over their heads both as protection against the rain and as a reference to the original ‘Umbrella Movement’ in 2014
The protests began with people gathering at a sports stadium in Kwai Fong, western Hong Kong, where they then marched to nearby Tsuen Wan and clashed with police. The Chinese-ruled city’s rail operator, MTR Corp, had suspended some services to try to prevent people gathering
Protesters were not afraid to have physical clashes with police as they were seen fighting with officers. Above: One policeman crouches on the floor as a protester stands over him with a metal bar
Despite the defiance of protesters, a seemingly-endless stream of police filled the streets to deal with demonstrations
Many of those clashes with officers were dressed in helmets and face coverings and some had makeshift weapons
As well as clashing with police, a hoard of protesters were seen breaking into and trashing a restaurant in Tsuen Wan
After smashing windows, protesters were seen standing amid upturned tables and chairs and shards of broken glass
Some protesters used metal poles to smash the window of a shop run by mainland Chinese people where Mahjong – a traditional Chinese domino-like tile game – can be played. The tactics are likely to further anger the Chinese government
After the windows were smashed, people inside huddled in a doorway while one man sitting at a table appeared to be crying
Worried-looking Hong Kong residents stood and watched the protesters break into the shop. The residents have witnessed three months of ongoing protests
Police facing protesters were backed up by trucks firing water cannon which helped to knock down makeshift barricades
Officers were seen walking through the streets behind and head of police vans as protesters massed up ahead of them
A petrol bomb thrown on the road by a protester lands next to police officers who keep a safe distance from leaping flames
Bricks thrown by protesters are seen near tear gas fired by the police during violent clashes between officers and those on the streets
One protester holds an umbrella as they react to the haze of tear gas which hung over the streets of Hong Kong for much of the day
A second rally of a few hundred, some of them family members of police, was also held on Sunday afternoon.
One relative, who said she was the wife of an officer, said they had received enough criticism. ‘I believe within these two months, police have got enough opprobrium.’
‘I really want you to know even if the whole world spits on you, we as family members will not,’ she said, giving her surname only as Si.
Police said they would launch a ‘dispersal operation’ soon.
‘Some radical protesters have removed railings … and set up barricades with water-filled barriers, bamboo sticks, traffic cones and other objects,’ they said in a statement. ‘Such acts neglect the safety of citizens and road users, paralysing traffic in the vicinity.
‘Remember, your job is to serve Hong Kong residents, not be the enemies of Hong Kong.’
The city’s officers are often the focus of protesters’ anger because of their perceived heavy-handling of the rallies.
The neighbouring gambling territory of Macau, a former Portuguese colony that returned to Chinese rule in 1999, elected former legislature head Ho Iat Seng as its leader on Sunday – the sole approved candidate.
One defiant-looking man is detained by officers as they continue to try to deal with the ongoing protests which have rocked Hong Kong
One protester held an egg above his head as he prepares to launch it at police while others cower behind him
One protester held a tennis racket as he and others fled from a tear gas canister. Yesterday, the MTR shut stations near the main demonstration area in Tsuen Wan, the second day of station closures in a row
A demonstrator uses a slingshot as they clash with riot police during Sunday’s protest in Tsuen Wan in Hong Kong
Protesters who were not cowed by tear gas from police used slingshots to fire bricks back at them. Many wore gas masks to guard against tear gas
This man wearing a gas mask had a closed umbrella in one hand and some kind of inflatable in the other as he faced the police
Protesters constructed barricades from road barriers and wooden pallets as they faced police amid a cloud of tear gas which had been fired by officers
An anti-riot police vehicle equipped with a water cannon clears the road from a barricade set up by protesters during an anti-government rally in Kwai Fung and Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong
Some protesters wore gas masks to protect against a barrage of tear gas from police in Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong
Many crouched behind makeshift barriers while others watched the clashes from inside a glass-panelled walkway above
Riot police wearing gas masks and armed with batons walked in front of a water cannon truck as they continued to respond to the ongoing protests
Some protesters threw slightly less dangerous projectiles at police, in the form of eggs. One man (above) was pictured throwing an egg and he had a plentiful supply behind him
Even though most protesters engaging in clashes with police were wearing as masks, officers continued to fire volleys of tear gas at them
Battle lines drawn: protesters and police faced each other in the street in Tsuen Wan in Hong Kong. Demonstrators stood behind makeshift barricades while officers held up riot shields
The city had earlier appeared to have pulled back from a sharp nosedive into violence, with the last serious confrontation taking place more than a week ago, shortly after protests paralysed the financial hub’s airport. But Sunday’s clashes again brought more violence. Above: A man helps a fellow protester as he falls to the floor amid the heavy use of tear gas by police
One man defiantly waved his middle finger at police as he stood behind makeshift barricades and others cowered in the face of tear gas
Some officers appeared to be in plain clothes as they clashed with protesters for the second straight day in what has been three months of ongoing protests
Amid the use of tear gas by police, protesters were pictured running away while wearing gas masks and holding umbrellas
Children were pictured with their parents during some of yesterday’s protests as thousands of people took to the streets
Protesters were armed with metal poles and even tennis rackets as dozens of people watched the clashes with police from a walkway above the street
Protesters broke into restaurants during clashes. Above: A group of six men use metal poles to smash the glass of one venue
One protester reaches out at what appears to be a tear gas canister as it sprays out gas intended to subdue protesters
Ho, who has deep ties to China, is expected to cement Beijing’s control over the ‘special administrative region’, the same status given to Hong Kong, and distance it from the unrest there.
Ten people were left in hospital after Saturday’s clashes in Hong Kong – two in a serious condition – staff said, without detailing if they were police or protesters.
Saturday’s clashes saw police baton-charge protesters and fire tear gas, while demonstrators threw rocks and bottles later into the night in a working-class neighbourhood.
The city had earlier appeared to have pulled back from a sharp nosedive into violence, with the last serious confrontation taking place more than a week ago, shortly after protests paralysed the financial hub’s airport.
Demonstrations started against a bill that would have allowed extradition to China, but have bled into wider calls for democracy and police accountability in the semi-autonomous city.
Protesters say Hong Kong’s unique freedoms are in jeopardy as Beijing tightens its political choke hold on the city.
Police fired volleys of tear gas throughout clashes with demonstrators as they attempted to quell the ongoing protests
Protesters wearing helmets, gas masks and gloves wield makeshift weapons. Others hold lasers and shine them at police
Violent clashes between police and protesters saw officers wielding their batons and riot shields as their opponents held makeshift weapons
A protester holds his arm out as a policeman prepares to hit him with his baton. The protests have seen further violence descend onto the streets of Hong Kong
Some police were dressed in plain clothes as they clashed with demonstrators. Above: An officer cries out as a protester smashes a metal bar against his shield
Some protesters directed laser pens towards police as the streets were filled with thousands of people in Hong Kong
M. Sung, a 53-year-old software engineer in a black mask emblematic of the many older, middle-class citizens at the march, said he had been at almost every protest and would keep coming. ‘We know this is the last chance to fight for ‘one country, two systems’, otherwise the Chinese Communist Party will penetrate our home city and control everything,’ he said. Above: A protester holds up a sign reading ‘corrupt police return eyes to victims’ as demonstrators march in the rain
Hong Kong has been gripped by three months of street demonstrations that started against a proposed extradition bill to China , but have spun out into a wider pro-democracy movement. Above: Protesters also carried bamboo sticks to block a road during the protests. Yesterday, riot police fired tear gas and baton-charged protesters who retaliated with a barrage of the bamboo poles, stones and bottles
Demonstrators used the poles to block a road. The MTR – the city’s metro – is the latest Hong Kong business to be rebuked by the public, after appearing to bend to Chinese state-media attacks accusing the transport system of being an ‘exclusive’ service to ferry protesters to rallies
The protests pose a direct challenge for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, who are eager to quell the unrest ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1. Above: Protesters march from Kwai Fung to Tsuen Wan in Hong Kong
Some protesters were seen holding U.S. flags as they join marchers heading from Kwai Fung to Tsuen Wan, further north
One woman, who said she was the wife of an officer, said the police had received enough criticism. ‘I believe within these two months, police have got enough opprobrium’. Above: Riot police officers stand guard as protesters march in Tsuen Wan
In Tsuen Wan, demonstrators marched through the area, including one man who was seen in a yellow helmet and military vest
Yesterday, the MTR shut stations near the main demonstration area in Tsuen Wan in western Hong Kong, it was the second day of station closures in a row. Above: Protesters march past rows of police
Beijing has used a mix of intimidation, propaganda and economic muscle to constrict the protests in a strategy dubbed ‘white terror’ by the movement, but that has not stopped hundreds of thousands of protesters from gathering on their streets. Above: Protesters clutching umbrellas gather yesterday in Hong Kong
Ten people were left in hospital after Saturday’s clashes – two in a serious condition – staff said, without detailing if they were police or protesters
Saturday’s clashes saw police baton-charge protesters and fire tear gas, while demonstrators threw rocks and bottles later into the night in a working-class neighbourhood
On Friday, tens of thousands of people had held hands across Hong Kong in a dazzling, neon-framed recreation of a pro-democracy ‘Baltic Way’ protest against Soviet rule three decades ago.
The city’s skyscraper-studded harbour-front as well as several busy shopping districts were lined with peaceful protesters, many wearing surgical masks to hide their identity and holding Hong Kong flags or mobile phones with lights shining.
The human chain was another creative demonstration in the rolling protests which have tipped Hong Kong into an unprecedented political crisis.
Chinese state media says Hong Kong’s ‘toxic’ textbooks lead to protests
Chinese state newspaper has suggested that the cause of the anti-government protests in Hong Kong is the city’s education system, particularly its textbooks.
Tung Chee-hwa, the city’s first Chief Executive, has confessed that the General Education system in Hong Kong was a failure and the young generations became ‘problematic’ as a result, claimed People’s Daily in a column today.
The op-ed, penned by Professor Gu Minggang, said Hong Kong needed to reflect on its entire education system.
The author said: ‘After Hong Kong returned to the arms of the motherland, the first and foremost issue to resolve should be to establish the concept of the country. The problem is, how many educators in Hong Kong have this notion?’
On Wednesday, China’s Guancha.cn called the General Education textbook in Hong Kong ‘toxic’, ‘biased’ and ‘erroneous’.
Citing Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing newspaper Wenweipo, Guancha.cn accused the textbook of encouraging pupils to hate police, promoting Occupy Central campaign and twisting facts.
The article said that the textbook had become a political propaganda and brought up a generation of ‘useless youngsters’.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7394069/Hong-Kong-protesters-fight-tennis-racquets.html
Story 5: Three Way Tie In Race For 2020 Democratic Presidential Canidate — Biden, Sander and Warren — Videos
Biden plunges, tied with Warren and Sanders in new national poll
Joe Biden Doesn’t Know What State He Is In
3-Way Lead as Dem 2020 Picture Shifts
Sanders and Warren rise; Biden drops
West Long Branch, NJ – Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and former Vice President Joe Biden are currently bunched together in the national Democratic presidential preference contest. Movement in the latest Monmouth University Poll – positive for Warren and Sanders, negative for Biden – suggests the 2020 presidential nomination process may be entering a volatile stage. The poll results also suggest that liberal voters are starting to take a closer look at a wider range of candidates, while moderates are focusing on those with the highest name recognition. Another key finding that could contribute to growing volatility in the race is confusion over “Medicare for All.” Most say support for this policy is an important factor in choosing a Democratic nominee, but voters actually prefer a public option over a single payer plan.
The poll finds a virtual three-way tie among Sanders (20%), Warren (20%), and Biden (19%) in the presidential nomination preferences of registered Democrats and Democratic-leaning voters across the country. Compared to Monmouth’s June poll, these results represent an increase in support for both Sanders (up from 14%) and Warren (up from 15%), and a significant drop for Biden (down from 32%).
Results for the rest of the field are fairly stable compared to two months ago. These candidates include California Sen. Kamala Harris at 8% support (identical to 8% in June), New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker at 4% (2% in June), South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg at 4% (5% in June), entrepreneur Andrew Yang at 3% (2% in June), former cabinet secretary Julián Castro at 2% (<1% in June), former Texas Rep. Beto O’Rourke at 2% (3% in June), and author Marianne Williamson at 2% (1% in June). Support for the remaining 13 candidates included in the preference poll registered only 1% or less.
Biden has suffered an across the board decline in his support since June. He lost ground with white Democrats (from 32% to 18%) and voters of color (from 33% to 19%), among voters without a college degree (from 35% to 18%) and college graduates (from 28% to 20%), with both men (from 38% to 24%) and women (from 29% to 16%), and among voters under 50 years old (from 21% to 6%) as well as voters aged 50 and over (from 42% to 33%). Most of Biden’s lost support in these groups shifted almost equally toward Sanders and Warren.
“The main takeaway from this poll is that the Democratic race has become volatile. Liberal voters are starting to cast about for a candidate they can identify with. Moderate voters, who have been paying less attention, seem to be expressing doubts about Biden. But they are swinging more toward one of the left-leaning contenders with high name recognition rather than toward a lesser known candidate who might be more in line with them politically,” said Patrick Murray, director of the independent Monmouth University Polling Institute. He added, “It’s important to keep in mind this is just one snapshot from one poll. But it does raise warning signs of increased churning in the Democratic nomination contest now that voters are starting to pay closer attention.”
Biden lost support over the past two months among Democrats who call themselves moderate or conservative (from 40% to 22%) with the shift among these voters accruing to both Sanders (from 10% to 20%) and Warren (from 6% to 16%). Biden also lost support among liberals (from 24% to 15%), but this group’s backing has scattered to a variety of other candidates. Sanders has picked up a few points among liberal voters (from 17% to 21%) while Warren has held fairly steady (from 25% to 24%). Also, Harris has not budged with this group (from 10% to 11%) and Buttigieg has slipped slightly (from 8% to 5%). However, the aggregate support for four other candidates – namely Booker, Castro, Williamson and Yang – has gone up a total of 8 points among liberal Democrats (from 8% to 16% for the four combined).
The Monmouth poll also finds that Biden has lost his small edge in the early states where Democrats will cast ballots from February through Super Tuesday. His even larger lead in the later states has vanished as well. Biden (20%), Warren (20%), Sanders (16%), and Harris (12%) are all in the top tier among voters in the early states. Biden has slipped by 6 points since June and Warren has gained 5 points over the same time span. Early state support for Sanders and Harris has not changed much. In the later states, Biden’s support has plummeted from 38% in June to 17% now, while both Warren (from 16% to 20%) and Sanders (from 13% to 23%) have made gains.
“Biden’s drop in support is coming disproportionately from later states that have less impact on the process. But if this trend continues it could spell trouble for him in the early states if it undermines his claim to being the most electable candidate. This could benefit someone like Harris, who remains competitive in the early states and could use a strong showing there to propel her into the top tier. Based on the current data, though, Warren looks like the candidate with the greatest momentum right now,” said Murray.
primary/caucus event in February 2020 or on Super Tuesday (March 3rd).
Warren has seen her personal ratings improve steadily over the past few months. She currently earns a 65% favorable and 13% unfavorable rating, up from 60%-14% in May, the last time Monmouth tracked the 2020 candidate ratings. At the same, time Biden has seen his ratings drop to 66% favorable and 25% unfavorable, from 74%-17% three months ago. The ratings for Sanders have been comparatively more stable at 64% favorable and 24% unfavorable compared with 65%-21% in Monmouth’s May poll.
At least 2-in-3 Democratic voters can now recognize the names of 11 candidates Monmouth has been tracking in terms of voter favorability since January. Most have seen a small uptick in basic name recognition over the past three months of between 5 and 13 percentage points. The exceptions are Biden and Sanders on one hand, both of whom have been universally familiar to Democratic voters since the beginning of the campaign, and Williamson on the other hand, whose name recognition shot up 19 points from 48% in May to 67% in the current poll. In Williamson’s case, though, the increased notoriety has led to a rise in negative views, currently earning her a 14% favorable and 25% unfavorable rating, which is down from an evenly divided 10%-10% rating in May.
Other candidates who have seen a downturn in their ratings are Harris at 56% favorable and 17% unfavorable (from 58%-9% in May) and Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar at 27% favorable and 18% unfavorable (from 32%-10% in May). Those who have seen a slight improvement in their ratings are Booker at 49% favorable and 14% unfavorable (from 41%-13% in May), Buttigieg at 43% favorable and 14% unfavorable (from 35%-11% in May), and Yang at 24% favorable and 12% unfavorable (from 12%-13% in May). Candidates who are holding relatively steady are Castro at 35% favorable and 13% unfavorable (from 28%-10% in May) and O’Rourke at 39% favorable and 20% unfavorable (from 40%-19% in May).
The two most recent entrants in the crowded field earn net negative ratings. Former naval officer and Pennsylvania Rep. Joe Sestak has a negative 5% favorable and 11% unfavorable rating with 53% name recognition. Former hedge fund manager Tom Steyer, who has spent heavily on advertising since getting into the race, earns a 9% favorable and 25% unfavorable rating with 70% name recognition.
On the issue of health care, 58% of party voters say it is very important to them that the Democrats nominate someone who supports “Medicare for All.” Another 23% say it is somewhat important, 10% say it is not important, and 9% are unsure. However, it is not clear that Medicare for All means the same thing to all voters. When asked specifically about what type of health insurance system they prefer, 53% of Democratic voters say they want a system that offers an opt in to Medicare while retaining the private insurance market. Just 22% say they want to move to a system where Medicare for All replaces private insurance. Another 7% prefer to keep insurance private for people under 65 but regulate the costs and 11% want to leave the system basically as it is now.
Those who prefer a public option are divided into two camps that include 18% who would like to move to a universal public insurance system eventually and 33% who say that there should always be the choice of private coverage. In other words, only 4-in-10 Democrats want to get rid of the private insurance market when the 22% who want Medicare for All now are combined with the 18% who would like to move to a universal public system at some point in the future.
“We asked the public option question in our Iowa poll earlier this month and got a lot of flak from Medicare for All advocates who claim that polls show widespread support for their idea. It seems from these results, though, the term has a wide range of meanings among Democratic voters. Many conflate the public-only program name with a public option. There is a lot more nuance in public opinion on this issue that could become problematic for proponents as voters become more familiar with what Medicare for All actually entails,” said Murray.
The Monmouth University Poll was conducted by telephone from August 16 to 20, 2019 with 800 adults in the United States. Results in this release are based on 298 registered voters who identify as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party, which has a +/- 5.7 percentage point sampling margin of error. The poll was conducted by the Monmouth University Polling Institute in West Long Branch, NJ.
QUESTIONS AND RESULTS
(* Some columns may not add to 100% due to rounding.)
[Q1-13 previously released.]
14.I know the 2020 election is far away, but who would you support for the Democratic nomination for president if the candidates were the following? [INCLUDES LEANERS] [NAMES WERE ROTATED]
(with leaners)
2019
2019
2019
2019
2019
2019
* The poll was conducted before Inslee and Moulton dropped out of the race.
15.I’m going to read you the names of some people who are running for president in 2020. Please tell me if your general impression of each is favorable or unfavorable, or if you don’t really have an opinion. If you have not heard of the person, just let me know. [NAMES WERE ROTATED]
opinion
heard of
16.How important is it to you that the Democrats nominate someone who supports Medicare for All – very important, somewhat important, not important, or are you not sure?
2019
17.Which of the following comes closest to how you would like to see health care handled: A. get rid of all private insurance coverage in favor of having everyone on a single public plan like Medicare for All, B. allow people to either opt into Medicare or keep their private coverage, C. keep health insurance private for people under age 65 but regulate the costs, or D. keep the health insurance system basically as it is?
2019
17A.[If “B. ALLOW PEOPLE TO OPT INTO MEDICARE OR KEEP THEIR PRIVATE COVERAGE” in Q17, ASK:] Would you eventually like to see the nation’s health care coverage move to a universal public system like Medicare for All or do you think there should always be a choice to keep your private coverage? [Percentages are based on the total sample of Democrats.]
2019
[Q18-26 held for future release.]
METHODOLOGY
The Monmouth University Poll was sponsored and conducted by the Monmouth University Polling Institute from August 16 to 20, 2019 with a national random sample of 800 adults age 18 and older, in English. This includes 314 contacted by a live interviewer on a landline telephone and 486 contacted by a live interviewer on a cell phone. The results in this poll release are based on a subsample of 298 registered voters who identify themselves as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party. Telephone numbers were selected through random digit dialing and landline respondents were selected with a modified Troldahl-Carter youngest adult household screen. Monmouth is responsible for all aspects of the survey design, data weighting and analysis. Final sample is weighted for region, age, education, gender and race based on US Census information. Data collection support provided by Braun Research (field) and Dynata (RDD sample). For results based on the Democratic voter sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling has a maximum margin of plus or minus 5.7 percentage points (unadjusted for sample design). Sampling error can be larger for sub-groups (see table below). In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.
Click on pdf file link below for full methodology and crosstabs by key demographic groups.
Joe Biden: ‘I want to be clear, I’m not going nuts’
Former Vice President Joe Biden is hopping on the defensive.
After months of gaffes on the 2020 campaign trail prompting even his brain surgeon to chime in and defend his mind, Biden made a pointed comment about the state of his brain over the weekend. “I want to be clear, I’m not going nuts,” Biden said during a campaign rally in New Hampshire — a comment that surely extended beyond the confusion he was trying to clear up at the time, theLos Angeles Times reports.
Biden made the declaration while speaking to supporters at New Hampshire’s Loon Lake, defending his inability to remember just where he’d spoken at Dartmouth College a few hours earlier. “I’m not sure whether it was the medical school or where the hell I spoke. But it was on the campus,” he said, looking at the gathered reporters as he did it, per the Times.
The obviously defensive comment comes after months of Biden stumbling over some pretty important details at campaign rallies, namely the locations of two mass shootings earlier this month. There’s also the time Biden said “poor kids are just as bright and just as talented as white kids” in front of the the Asian & Latino Coalition in Iowa. Yet the man who performed surgery on Biden three decades ago following two brain aneurysms agrees with the 76-year-old’s weekend comment, saying that he’s clearly “as sharp as he was 31 years ago.” Kathryn Krawczyk
The presidential campaign freshly launched by former Rep. Joe Walsh (R-Ill.) also appears to be doubling as some kind of an apology — or at least personal accountability — tour.
Walsh, who on Sunday officially announced that he was challenging President Trump in the Republican primary, has routinely come under fire for his own controversial remarks, including a plethora of racist and insensitive tweets over the years. Walsh acknowledged his Twitter feed on Monday in an appearance on MSNBC, and concurred that some of what he said is, indeed, racist. But, as Walsh sees it, that doesn’t influence whether he’s actually a racist offline, or, as the youth say, “IRL.”
When he made his announcement on Sunday, Walsh said he regretted helping “create” Trump by playing into divisive, personal politics, so it seems he’s trying to rip off the Band-Aid at the beginning of his campaign and address criticism that was sure to arise otherwise. Read more about Walsh’s presidential campaign here at The Week. Tim O’Donnell
Your favorite vintage of French wine likely won’t get much more expensive in the near future.
Officials from France and the United States reportedly reached a compromise on Monday following the Group of Seven summit in Biarritz, France, on a new French tax passed last month on digital services provided by large internet companies, like Google and Amazon.
The new agreement stipulates that France would repay companies the difference between its digital tax and whatever taxes come from the agreed-upon Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s planned mechanism. The threshold for the French tax to be applicable for a company is annual revenues of more than $830 million — including $27 million generated in France — from “digital activities,” like collection of user data and selling targeted advertising.
French President Emmanuel Macron praised the compromise, while maintaining that France will nix its national tax if and when his preferred method of an international system for digital taxation is implemented. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said OECD nations want a solution on that by next year.
President Trump had previously threatened to tax French wine if Paris moved forward with its approved three percent tax on digital services. Tim O’Donnell
https://theweek.com/speedreads/861285/french-wine-might-safe-from-tariffs-after-france-strike-compromise-digital-tax
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Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 106-108
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 104-105
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 101-103
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 98-100
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 94-97
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 93
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 92
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 91
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 88-90
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 84-87
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 79-83
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 74-78
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 71-73
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 68-70
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 65-67
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 62-64
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 58-61
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 55-57
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 52-54
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 49-51
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 45-48
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 41-44
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 38-40
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 34-37
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 30-33
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 27-29
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 17-26
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 16-22
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 10-15
Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 1-9
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