The Pronk Pops Show 854, March 8, 2017, Story 1: FBI Search For Vault 7 Leaker Who Gave Wikileaks The CIA Collection of Hacking and Malware Software Tools — Sources and Methods — Treason By The Lying Lunatic Left — Videos — Story 2: -Soros’ and Obama’s Seditious and Subversive War On Trump With Organizing For Action Applying Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals — Videos

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 Story 1: FBI Search For Vault 7 Leaker Who Gave Wikileaks The CIA Collection of Hacking and Malware Software Tools — Treason By The Lying Lunatic Left — Videos —

 

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TREASON OR BETRAYAL? FBI SET TO LAUNCH CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO WIKILEAKS OVER CIA HACK

Hannity : Former intelligence officials on surveillance tactics and document leaks : 3/8/2017

Treason is in the air

Investigating national security leaks

UK: Assange holds presser on CIA hacking leaks

WATCH: WikiLeaks Julian Assange Press Conference On CIA Hacking (3/9/2017)

Julian Assange Press Conference On The CIA Vault 7 Release | March 9th, 2017

Julian Assange Wikileaks Press Conference, Q&A on CIA Vault 7, Year Zero [03/09/2017]

WikiLeaks publishes apparent CIA hacking tools

WikiLeaks Dump Shows CIA Using Cell Phones And Smart TVs To Listen And WATCH “Everyday Americans”

Can the CIA control your phone? WikiLeaks claims explained

What Pisses Me Off About Wikileaks Vault 7 Release

WikiLeaks Vault 7: What You Should Know and Fear, CIA vs. NSA Turf Battles, How Trump Was Right

VAULT 7: CIA Staged Fake Russian Hacking to Set Up Trump — Russian Cyber-Attack M.O. As False Flag

Lionel “Wikileaks Vault 7 Shows That Trump Is Not Crazy. The CIA Spy On Everybody.”

Wikileaks Claims CIA Is Hacking Americans’ Electronics – Tucker Carlson Tonight – Fox News – 3/7/17

Silent Coup: Obama, FISA, NSA, Deep State vs. President Donald Trump

TUCKER CARLSON reacts to latest CIA scandal and the big story ‘OBAMA CARE LITE’

Former CIA Director: Wikileaks Dump Could Be ‘Very Damaging’ | Andrea Mitchell | MSNBC

CIA lost control of its hacking tools – Wikileaks Vault7 report finding

Fall Out of Wikileak’s Vault 7 Year Zero Release Has Begun. Investigations Initiated.

WikiLeaks Fallout: CIA Revelations Rock The Political Establishment

Bombshell: WikiLeaks Releases Trove Of CIA Documents

Whistleblower: NSA Collecting Data On Every U.S. Citizen

NSA Whistleblower William Binney: The Future of FREEDOM

NSA Surveillance and What To Do About It

Our Almost Orwellian State & NSA Surveillance Forum

How the Government Tracks You: NSA Surveillance

US Surveillance: An Analysis of EO 12333 and Its Global Implications

E.O: 12333 VS Kyle from Secular Talk, debunked again.

Executive Order 12333 (The President’s Inherent Article II Power to Conduct Foreign Intelligence)

Executive Order 12333 (Greatest Hits)

The Silent Order NSA Sees Everything Hears Everything Documentary HD

Judge Rules NSA Surveillance “Almost Orwellian” — Obama Prepares to Leave Spying Program Intact

Glenn Greenwald: The NSA Can “Literally Watch Every Keystroke You Make”

NSA has collected bulk data on Americans since Reagan

NSA surveillance program “almost Orwellian,” federal judge rules

Judgement NSA Violates Unconstitutional Patriot Act

ALGORITHM: The Hacker Movie

FBI prepares for new hunt for WikiLeaks’ source

March 7 at 6:55 PM
The FBI has begun preparing for a major mole hunt to determine how anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks got an alleged arsenal of hacking tools the CIA has used to spy on espionage targets, according to people familiar with the matter.

The leak rattled government and technology industry officials, who spent Tuesday scrambling to determine the accuracy and scope of the thousands of documents released by the group. They were also trying to assess the damage the revelations may cause, and what damage may come from future releases promised by WikiLeaks, these people said.

It was all a familiar scenario for a government that has repeatedly seen sensitive information compromised in recent years.

But cracks keep appearing in the system. Last year, the FBI arrested Harold T. Martin III, an NSA contractor who took home documents detailing some of the agency’s most sensitive offensive cyberweapons. Some of those files later appeared online, although investigators are still trying to determine Martin’s role, if any, in that part of the case.

WikiLeaks says it has a trove on the CIA’s hacking secrets. Washington Post national security reporter Greg Miller explains what these documents reveal. (Dalton Bennett, Greg Miller/The Washington Post)

He has pleaded not guilty to charges that he violated the Espionage Act. Officials call the Martin case the largest theft of classified information in U.S. history.

Now, less than a year after the Martin case, U.S. intelligence agencies are rushing to determine whether they again have suffered an embarrassing compromise at the hands of one of their own.

“Anybody who thinks that the Manning and Snowden problems were one-offs is just dead wrong,’’ said Joel Brenner, former head of U.S. counterintelligence at the office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Ben Franklin said three people can keep a secret if two of them are dead. If secrets are shared on systems in which thousands of people have access to them, that may really not be a secret anymore. This problem is not going away, and it’s a condition of our existence.’’

In Silicon Valley, industry figures said they received no heads-up from the government or the hacking community that such a move by WikiLeaks was in the works. By midday Tuesday, industry officials said they still had not heard from the FBI.

It wasn’t immediately clear if the CIA had sent a crimes report to the Justice Department — a formal mechanism alerting law enforcement of a potentially damaging and illegal national security leak. Such a report would offer the FBI a road map for where to begin investigating, and whom to question.

The FBI and CIA both declined to comment.

Once investigators verify the accuracy of the WikiLeaks documents, a key question to answer is who had access to the information, according to veterans of past leak probes. The FBI has spent years investigating WikiLeaks, and authorities are eager to figure out whether it has recruited a new, well-placed source from the U.S. government.

Anti-secrecy group Wikileaks on Tuesday said it had obtained a top-secret trove of hacking tools used by the CIA to break into phones, communication apps and other electronic devices, and published confidential documents on those programs. (Reuters)

In releasing thousands of pages of documents, WikiLeaks indicated that its source was a former government employee or contractor.

“This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA,’’ WikiLeaks said in announcing the first release of documents. “The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive.’’

One former intelligence official said if that claim is accurate, “there’s going to be another major mole hunt . . . If this is all correct, it’s a big deal.’’

A key distinction for investigators will be whether WikiLeaks reveals the actual computer code — or enough details about such code — that others can develop and deploy some of the hacking tools, according to current and former officials.

The security failures highlighted by damaging leaks from Snowden and Manning have proven difficult to address.

Manning was arrested in Iraq in May 2010 after transmitting documents to WikiLeaks that came to be known as the Iraq and Afghanistan “War Logs.’’ She also leaked a video showing a U.S. Apache helicopter in Baghdad opening fire on a group of people that the crew thought were insurgents. Among the dead were two journalists who worked for Reuters. She also leaked documents pertaining to Guantanamo Bay prisoners, as well as 250,000 State Department cables.

In response to the Manning case, the Obama administration created the National Insider Threat Task Force, designed to teach and train government workers and contractors to spot potential leakers.

Manning, formerly known as Bradley Manning, came out as transgender after her 2013 conviction. In the waning days of his presidency, Barack Obama commuted her 35-year prison sentence, and she is due to be released in coming months.

The post-Manning efforts did not stop Snowden from taking reams of data about sensitive bulk intelligence collection in 2013 and giving the material to reporters. Those revelations, including a court document showing how the government gathered Americans’ phone records, sparked years of political debate about privacy and government surveillance in the digital age.

Snowden has remained out of reach of the U.S. government, living in Russia.

Brenner, the former counterintelligence official, said the net effect of the new leaks could be “very dangerous to us, because they “accelerate the leveling of the playing field between the United States and its adversaries in cyberspace.’’

The bigger lesson of the newest leak, Brenner argued, is that U.S. pursuit of dominance in cyberspace may actually be destabilizing over the long run. “That is a very unsettling debate for our military and our intelligence services, but I think it’s coming,’’ he said.

Snowden also weighed in regarding the alleged CIA documents, tweeting: “What @Wikileaks has here is genuinely a big deal. Looks authentic.’’

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-prepares-for-new-hunt-for-wikileaks-source/2017/03/07/28dcb9e0-0356-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.0d9871aa3c4c

U.S. aware of CIA security breach in 2016; contractors suspected in leak

By John Walcott and Andrea Shalal | WASHINGTON/BERLIN

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials said on Wednesday they have been aware since the end of last year of a security breach at the CIA and were focusing on contractors as the likeliest source of documents being passed on to anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks detailing the agency’s hacking tools.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Reuters that they believed documents published by WikiLeaks on Tuesday about CIA techniques used between 2013 and 2016 were authentic.

The documents showed that CIA hackers could get into Apple Inc (AAPL.O) iPhones, Google Inc (GOOGL.O) Android devices and other gadgets in order to capture text and voice messages before they were encrypted with sophisticated software.

The White House said on Wednesday that President Donald Trump was “extremely concerned” about a CIA security breach that led to the Wikileaks release, and the administration would be tough on leakers.

“Anybody who leaks classified information will be held to the highest degree of law,” spokesman Sean Spicer told reporters.

One official with knowledge of the investigation said companies that are contractors for the CIA have been checking to see which of their employees had access to the material that Wikileaks published, and then going over their computer logs, emails and other communications for any evidence of who might be responsible.

One reason the investigation is focused on a potential leak by contractors rather than for example a hack by Russian intelligence, another official said, is that so far there is no evidence that Russian intelligence agencies tried to exploit any of the leaked material before it was published.

One European official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Wikileaks material could in fact lead to closer cooperation between European intelligence agencies and U.S. counterparts, which share concerns about Russian intelligence operations.

U.S. intelligence agencies have accused Russia of seeking to tilt last year’s U.S. presidential election in Trump’s favor, including by hacking into Democratic Party emails. Moscow has denied the allegation.

The lobby of the CIA Headquarters Building in Langley, Virginia, U.S. on August 14, 2008. REUTERS/Larry Downing/File Photo

One major security problem was that the number of contractors with access to information with the highest secrecy classification has “exploded” because of federal budget constraints, the first U.S. official said.

U.S. intelligence agencies have been unable to hire additional permanent staff needed to keep pace with technological advances such as the “Internet of Things” that connects cars, home security and heating systems and other devices to computer networks, or to pay salaries competitive with the private sector, the official said.

Reuters could not immediately verify the contents of the published documents. On Tuesday, several contractors and private cyber security experts said the materials appeared to be legitimate.

A person familiar with Wikileaks’ activities said Wikileaks has had the CIA hacking material for months, and that the release of the material was in the works “for a long time.”

A Congressional official said that the U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence Committee has begun asking questions about the WikiLeaks disclosures.

GERMAN CONCERN

In Germany on Wednesday, the chief federal prosecutor’s office said that it would review the Wikileaks documents because some suggested that the CIA ran a hacking hub from the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt.

“We’re looking at it very carefully,” a spokesman for the federal prosecutor’s office told Reuters. “We will initiate an investigation if we see evidence of concrete criminal acts or specific perpetrators.”

Chancellor Angela Merkel is scheduled to visit Washington on March 14 for her first meeting with Trump, who has sharply criticized Berlin for everything from its trade policy to what he considers inadequate levels of military spending.

The Wikileaks documents may also complicate bilateral intelligence ties that have just begun to recover after a series of scandals, including news in 2013 that the U.S. National Security Agency had bugged Merkel’s cellphone. The Frankfurt consulate was investigated by German lawmakers after that incident.

Merkel told lawmakers last month she did not know how closely Germany’s spies cooperated with their U.S. counterparts until 2015 when former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed the BND spy agency had for years passed on information to the NSA about European companies and politicians.

Germany scaled back the level of cooperation with the NSA after those revelations.

U.S. officials have acknowledged that the consulate in Frankfurt is home to a CIA base. A facility adjacent to the city’s airport and the Rhein-Main Air Base has for many years been home to the CIA’s “Tefran” station, a U.S. center for collecting intelligence on Iranian activities in Europe, maintaining surveillance on Iranian officials and targeting potential defectors working in Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Foreign ministry spokesman Sebastian Fischer told a regular government news conference that Germany took the issue seriously, but more work needed to be done to verify the authenticity of the documents. Berlin was in close touch with Washington about the case and such matters generally, he said.

Government spokesman Steffen Seibert said Germany’s domestic intelligence agency had the job of uncovering espionage activities in Germany, and carried out its work comprehensively.

Wikileaks reported that CIA employees had been given diplomatic passports and State Department identities to carry out their work in Frankfurt, focused on targets in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The documents included advice for CIA experts about life in Germany, noting that shops are closed on Sundays, and to have “your cover-for-action story down pat” when they were asked by German authorities when entering the country.

(Reporting by John Walcott, Mark Hosenball, Yara Bayoumy in Washington and Matthias Sobolewski and Andrea Shalal in Berlin; Writing by Grant McCool; Editing by Peter Graff, Grant McCool and Frances Kerry)

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cia-wikileaks-idUSKBN16F2AP?il=0

Wikileaks to hand over alleged CIA spying tools to tech companies

Assange
Assange said he would give tech companies the details of hacks affecting their products  CREDIT: WIKILEAKS

Wikileaks will hand Central Intelligence Agency hacking tools to technology companies in order for them to defend their customers against spying.

Julian Assange, founder of the website, said he had decided to provide the classified information to giants such as Microsoft, Samsung and Apple whose products were implicated in the alleged CIA leaks.

The announcement comes after Wikileaks on Tuesday released a raft of documents that it claims detail tools the CIA used to hack into peoples computers, televisions and smartphones, among other internet-connected devices.

Wikileaks didn’t disclose details of how the tools worked, but basic information that allegedly proves the cyber weapons arsenal exists.

Samsung F8000
The CIA could have hacked Samsung’s F8000 smart TVs to turn them into spying toolsCREDIT: SAMSUNG

In the wake of the release, Assange said tech companies had asked Wikileaks to pass them details of the hacks that affect their products in order for them to fix them.

“After considering what we think is the best way to proceed and hearing calls from some of the manufacturers we have decided to work with them, to give them exclusive access to some of the technical details we have,” said Assange.

With the information Assange said the companies can “effectively disarm” the alleged CIA hacking tools.

It is not clear how long it will take for all of the vulnerabilities to be fixed or if they can all be solved. Some could be blocked in a couple of days, said Assange, while other more critical one could take weeks.

Assange warned that other hacks, such as the one used to turn on a “fake off” spying mode on Samsung smart TVs, may have to be manually blocked. This could prove difficult as it would require people to know their device had been infected in order for it to be fixed.

https://cf-particle-html.eip.telegraph.co.uk/25f7b704-4ac6-4678-a1a0-b3beeb494718.html?ref=http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/03/09/wikileaks-hand-alleged-cia-spying-tools-tech-companies/&title=Wikileaks%20to%20hand%20over%20alleged%20CIA%20spying%20tools%20to%20tech%20companies

Apple has responded directly to the alleged CIA hacking tools mentioned in the documents. It says the security vulnerabilities that could have been used to access iPhones were fixed as of its latest security update. Samsung and Google meanwhile have said they are investigating the claims but it is unclear what action they have taken.

The CIA has not commented on the authenticity of the leaks.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/03/09/wikileaks-hand-alleged-cia-spying-tools-tech-companies/

Assange: WikiLeaks Will Work With Tech Companies

 WikiLeaks has offered to help the likes of Google and Apple identify the software holes used by purported CIA hacking tools – and that puts the tech industry in something of a bind.

While companies have both a responsibility and financial incentive to fix problems in their software, accepting help from WikiLeaks raises legal and ethical questions. And it’s not even clear at this point exactly what kind of assistance WikiLeaks can offer.

THE PROMISE

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange said Thursday that the anti-secrecy site will help technology companies find and fix software vulnerabilities in everyday gadgets such as phones and TVs. In an online news conference, Assange said some companies had asked for more details about the purported CIA cyberespionage toolkit that he revealed in a massive disclosure on Tuesday.

“We have decided to work with them, to give them some exclusive access to the additional technical details we have, so that fixes can be developed and pushed out,” Assange said. The digital blueprints for what he described as “cyberweapons” would be published to the world “once this material is effectively disarmed by us.”

Any conditions WikiLeaks might set for its cooperation weren’t immediately known. Nor was it clear if WikiLeaks holds additional details on specific vulnerabilities, or merely the tools designed to exploit them.

Apple declined comment on the WikiLeaks offer, and Google didn’t respond to requests for comment. Microsoft said it hopes that anyone with knowledge of software vulnerabilities would report them through the company’s usual channels.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

Tech companies could run into legal difficulties in accepting the offer, especially if they have government contracts or employees with security clearances.

“The unauthorized release of classified documents does not mean it’s unclassified,” said Stewart Baker, a former official at the Department of Homeland Security and former legal counsel for the National Security Agency. “Doing business with WikiLeaks and reviewing classified documents poses a real risk for at least their government contracting arms and their cleared employees.”

Other lawyers, however, are convinced that much of the information in the documents is so widely known that they are now part of the public domain. That means tech companies would be unlikely to face any legal liability for digging deeper with WikiLeaks.

Alternatively, suppose tech companies don’t accept WikiLeaks’ offer to help fix any security flaws – and are subsequently hacked. At that point, they could face charges of negligence, particularly in Europe where privacy laws are much stricter than in the U.S., said Michael Zweiback, a former assistant U.S. attorney and cybercrime adviser now in private practice.

GETTING TOO CLOSE TO WIKILEAKS

Public perception might be a bigger problem. “They don’t want to be seen as endorsing or supporting an organization with a tainted reputation and an unclear agenda,” said Robert Cattanach, a former U.S. Department of Justice attorney.

During the 2016 election, WikiLeaks published thousands of emails, some embarrassing, from breached Democratic Party computers and the account of a top aide to Hillary Clinton. U.S. intelligence agencies concluded those emails were stolen by hackers connected to the Russian government in an attempt to help Donald Trump win the presidency.

The CIA did not respond directly to Assange’s offer, but it appeared to take a dim view of it.

“Julian Assange is not exactly a bastion of truth and integrity,” CIA spokeswoman Heather Fritz Horniak said.

But most tech companies already have digital hotlines to receive tips about security weaknesses, even if they come from unsavory characters. So it wouldn’t break new ground for them to consult with a shadowy organization such as WikiLeaks.

A BETTER PATH

Ideally, the CIA would have shared such vulnerabilities directly with companies, as other government agencies have long done. In that case, companies would not only be dealing with a known entity in an aboveboard fashion, they might also obtain a more nuanced understanding of the problems than their engineers could glean from documents or lines of computer code.

And if companies could learn details about how the CIA found these vulnerabilities, they might also find additional holes using the same technique, said Johannes Ullrich, director of the Internet Storm Center at the SANS Institute.

And there are risks obtaining actual hacking tools from WikiLeaks. Some might have unadvertised features that could, for instance, start extracting data as soon as they launch. Ullrich said the CIA also might have left some traps to attack people running its exploits. If these aren’t detailed in the documents, only the CIA would be able to help tech companies avoid setting them off.

If all goes well, WikiLeaks could emerge looking better than some parts of the U.S. government.

“I am not a fan of WikiLeaks, but I don’t think it is fair to throw rocks at everything they do,” said Cindy Cohn, executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a group specializing in online privacy and other digital rights. “What WikiLeaks is demonstrating is that the CIA does not have the best interests of these companies at heart.”

BETTER THAN NOTHING

There’s one more unknown, which is just how much help WikiLeaks can actually provide. Apple, Google and Microsoft say they’ve already rendered many of the alleged CIA cyberespionage tools obsolete with earlier updates that patched related software holes.

Still, the companies will probably want to check out what WikiLeaks has, assuming that the organization hasn’t set unreasonable conditions on its cooperation. Some privacy and security experts believe the CIA’s own refusal to contact the affected companies about the vulnerabilities gives them little choice.

“We all should have better security, and certainly at this point, not trying to fixing them makes no sense,” Cohn said.

Liedtke reported from San Ramon, Calif. Raphael Satter in Paris, Paisley Dodds in London and Deb Riechmann in Washington contributed to this report.

This story has been corrected to reflect that purported CIA tools are not aimed at “defeating encryption” but at hijacking computers.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_WIKILEAKS_CIA?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2017-03-09-17-09-24

Why Is Obama Expanding Surveillance Powers Right Before He Leaves Office?

It could be to prevent Trump from extending them even more.

Obama waves at the end of his farewell address in Chicago
The Obama administration made it easier for the NSA to share information with other intelligence agencies, just weeks before the inauguration.Jonathan Ernst / Reuters
On Thursday, the Obama administration finalized new rules that allow the National Security Agency to share information it gleans from its vast international surveillance apparatus with the 16 other agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community.With the new changes, which were long in the works, those agencies can apply for access to various feeds of raw, undoctored NSA intelligence. Analysts will then be able to sift through the contents of those feeds as they see fit, before implementing required privacy protections. Previously, the NSA applied those privacy protections itself, before forwarding select pieces of information to agencies that might need to see them.The updated procedures will multiply the number of intelligence analysts who have access to NSA surveillance, which is captured in large quantities and often isn’t subject to warrant requirements. The changes rankled privacy advocates, who oppose a broadening of surveillance powers—especially on the cusp of Donald Trump’s inauguration. Trump and Mike Pompeo, the president-elect’s nominee for CIA director, have made it clear that they think overzealous civil-liberties protections should be cleared away in favor of stronger surveillance laws.
But while the changes may subject more Americans to warrantless surveillance, the last-minute timing of the announcement actually might have been designed to cut future privacy losses. Susan Hennessey, a Brookings fellow and the managing editor of Lawfare, says firming up the changes before Trump takes office makes it harder for the incoming president to encroach even further on civil liberties.I spoke with Hennessey, who was previously an attorney in the NSA general counsel’s office, about the lasting effects of the new intelligence-sharing procedures. A transcript of our conversation follows, lightly edited for clarity and concision.


Kaveh Waddell: First off, what do these changes mean for the intelligence community? Has a lack of information-sharing among agencies been holding back investigations?

Susan Hennessey: The origin of these changes dates back, honestly, to just after 9/11. There was this identified issue of “stovepiping”: Intelligence wasn’t being shared frequently or fast enough. Some modifications have already been made throughout the years.

Under Executive Order 12333 as it previously existed, NSA analysts had to make an initial determination and apply a set of privacy rules before sharing raw signals-intelligence information with other parts of the intelligence community. After this change, it doesn’t necessarily have to be an NSA analyst that makes that determination—that information can be shared with other parts of the intelligence community.

So it doesn’t change the substantive rules, it doesn’t change the scope of collection, it doesn’t change the types of protection, it doesn’t change the possible uses; it essentially just broadens the group of people who can apply those protections to the raw intelligence.

Waddell: And by extension, it broadens the group of people who get to see raw intelligence, before those rules are applied?

Hennessey: Yes. This is something that has been at the forefront of privacy and civil-liberties advocates’ minds when they’ve expressed concern with this type of collection. But it’s not accurate to say the rule change means it’s a raw signals-intelligence free-for-all, that anybody can get signals intelligence.

Intelligence agencies other than the NSA will have to provide justification for why they need access to that data. It can only be for foreign intelligence, or other enumerated purposes. So it’s not that those agencies will just be able to see whatever they want—it’s that they will be able to request, with particular justifications, access to more raw signals intelligence than they had before. Then, they will need to apply those minimization procedures for themselves.

The civil-liberties concern often surrounds the use of incidentally collected information. Under the new rule, the FBI could not obtain access to or search raw intelligence information for ordinary criminals in an ordinary criminal investigation against a U.S. person. However, if the FBI incidentally seized evidence of a crime, they are allowed to use that information. So that tends to be where the tension is for people who are concerned with the potential impacts that this change could have on U.S. persons.

Waddell: The fact that more Americans could potentially be subject to warrantless searches, just by virtue of being caught up in the raw signals intelligence that’s shared—is that something that concerns you?

Hennessey: No. Look, I think it’s important to understand that these minimization procedures are taken very seriously, and all other agencies that are handling raw signals intelligence are essentially going to have to import these very complex oversight and compliance mechanisms that currently exist at the NSA.

Within the NSA, those are extremely strong and protective mechanisms. I think people should feel reassured that the rules cannot be violated—certainly not without it coming to the attention of oversight and compliance bodies. I am confident that all of the agencies in the U.S. intelligence community will discharge those very same obligations with the same level of diligence and rigor, adhering to both the spirit and the letter of the law.

That said, there are potentially broader reforms that might be undertaken. I don’t think that they necessarily need to be linked to the sharing of data. But it’s reasonable to at least engage in a conversation about whether or not it’s appropriate to have particular post-collection reforms, like for example imposing an obligation for law enforcement to obtain a warrant in particular circumstances.

That’s a long way of saying that nothing about this particular rule change exposing Americans to additional privacy risks. However, that doesn’t mean that there are not still reasonable and responsible reforms which might take place.

Waddell: I found it interesting that you said the change could, in one way, actually be viewed as a “huge source of comfort.” I think you were referring to the timing of the change. Why is that?

Hennessey: These changes have actually been in process for eight or nine years. One of the things that I think individuals who had insight into intelligence activities and were concerned about the election of Donald Trump—specifically, some of the statements he’s made about adherence to the rule of law—a lot of those people’s minds went very quickly to these procedures.

It’s important to understand the distinction between Executive Order 12333 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: One very oversimplified way to think about it is that FISA is a statute that governs collection that takes place within the United States, but that is aimed at a foreign target; 12333 collection is aimed at a foreign target, and takes place outside the United States. That’s shorthand that glosses over some technical and legal nuance, but those are the broad buckets people should be thinking about.

FISA is a statute, so you’d need congressional action to change those rules, and you have a built-in check there. But 12333 is not constrained by statute; it’s constrained by executive order. In theory, a president could change an executive order—that’s within his constitutional power. It’s not as easy as just a pen stroke, but it’s theoretically possible.

Executive Order 12333 requires that this series of protective procedures exist and are adhered to. The procedures are kind of where the rubber meets the road on privacy. They’re the details, the nitty-gritty: What can you actually see? What can you share? What do you have to minimize? So they’re really, really important in terms of what the relationship between U.S. citizens and the intelligence community looks like.

When they were in rewrites, they were sort of vulnerable. There was the possibility that an incoming administration would say, “Hey! While you’re in the process of rewriting, let’s go ahead and adjust some of the domestic protections.” And I think a reasonable observer might assume that while the protections the Obama administration was interested in putting into place increased privacy protections—or at the very least did not reduce them—that the incoming administration has indicated that they are less inclined to be less protective of privacy and civil liberties. So I think it is a good sign that these procedures have been finalized, in part because it’s so hard to change procedures once they’re finalized.

Waddell: Is that why we just went through an eight- or nine-year process to get here?

Hennessey: Exactly. For questions both of genuine complexity and just government bureaucracy, the time horizon here is longer than a single term of the presidency.

So I don’t think that it’s necessarily true that the intelligence community or the Department of Justice was rushing to get these procedures passed; if anything, they’re a little bit late. But I think the bottom line is that it’s comforting to a large national-security community that these are procedures that are signed off by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Attorney General Loretta Lynch, and not by the DNI and attorney general that will ultimately be confirmed under the Trump Administration.

Waddell: Is there anything else we should be thinking about with these new changes?

Hennessey: People sometimes focus on the top-line stuff and end up missing the things that aren’t necessarily the symbolic expressions of privacy—the things that make us feel good—but are the functional elements of privacy and civil liberties. What rules do people apply day-to-day and how? There’s going to be a need moving forward to have disciplined conversations about the legal protections that really matter.

If there is a silver lining to some of the anxieties that the incoming administration has produced, I think it’s the potential to move the conversation into a much more productive place. But that opportunity will end up being lost if the responses are the same old same. That’s my last shred of optimism, and I’m hanging on to it.

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/obama-expanding-nsa-powers/513041/

Executive Orders

Executive Order 12333–United States intelligence activities

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 200, unless otherwise noted.

Table of Contents

Preamble

Part 1.Goals, Direction, Duties, and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort
1.1 Goals
1.2 The National Security Council
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups
1.4 The Intelligence Community
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence
1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community
1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency
1.9 The Department of State
1.10 The Department of the Treasury
1.11 The Department of Defense
1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense
1.13 The Department of Energy
1.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
Part 2.Conduct of Intelligence Activities
2.1 Need
2.2 Purpose
2.3 Collection of Information
2.4 Collection Techniques
2.5 Attorney General Approval
2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities
2.7 Contracting
2.8 Consistency With Other Laws
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States
2.10 Human Experimentation
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination
2.12 Indirect Participation
Part 3.General Provisions
3.1 Congressional Oversight
3.2 Implementation
3.3 Procedures
3.4 Definitions
3.5 Purpose and Effect
3.6 Revocation

Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available. For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Part 1

Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort

1.1Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.
(a) Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.
(b) All means, consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to develop intelligence information for the President and the National Security Council. A balanced approach between technical collection efforts and other means should be maintained and encouraged.
(c) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, or United States corporations, establishments, or persons.
(d) To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort.

1.2The National Security Council.
(a) Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities, and attendant policies and programs.
(b) Committees. The NSC shall establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its functions and responsibilities under this Order. The NSC, or a committee established by it, shall consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity and shall review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.

1.3National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups.
(a) Establishment and Duties. The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish such boards, councils, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community concerning:
(1) Production, review and coordination of national foreign intelligence;
(2) Priorities for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget;
(3) Interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information;
(4) Arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters;
(5) Protection of intelligence sources and methods;
(6) Activities of common concern; and
(7) Such other matters as may be referred by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(b) Membership. Advisory groups established pursuant to this section shall be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence or his designated representative and shall consist of senior representatives from organizations within the Intelligence Community and from departments or agencies containing such organizations, as designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. Groups for consideration of substantive intelligence matters will include representatives of organizations involved in the collection, processing and analysis of intelligence. A senior representative of the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall be invited to participate in any group which deals with other than substantive intelligence matters.

1.4The Intelligence Community. The agencies within the Intelligence Community shall, in accordance with applicable United States law and with the other provisions of this Order, conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States, including:
(a) Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
(b) Production and dissemination of intelligence;
(c) Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents;
(d) Special activities;
(e) Administrative and support activities within the United States and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and
(f) Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.

1.5Director of Central Intelligence. In order to discharge the duties and responsibilities prescribed by law, the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible directly to the President and the NSC and shall:
(a) Act as the primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and provide the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with national foreign intelligence;
(b) Develop such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community as will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national foreign intelligence;
(c) Promote the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community;
(d) Ensure implementation of special activities;
(e) Formulate policies concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments, coordinate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments, and establish procedures governing the conduct of liaison by any department or agency with such services on narcotics activities;
(f) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;
(g) Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products;
(h) Ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures;
(i) Establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence;
(j) Establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the Director’s responsibilities;
(k) Have full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence, and authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations, in consultation with those organizations, ensuring that appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis are developed so that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgment within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national policymakers;
(l) Ensure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by national foreign intelligence collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities and military commands;
(m) Establish mechanisms which translate national foreign intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the NSC into specific guidance for the Intelligence Community, resolve conflicts in tasking priority, provide to departments and agencies having information collection capabilities that are not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program advisory tasking concerning collection of national foreign intelligence, and provide for the development of plans and arrangements for transfer of required collection tasking authority to the Secretary of Defense when directed by the President;
(n) Develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President and the Congress;
(o) Review and approve all requests for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds, in accordance with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget;
(p) Monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation, and, as necessary, conduct program and performance audits and evaluations;
(q) Together with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs consistent with the requirement to develop competitive analysis, and provide to and obtain from the Secretary of Defense all information necessary for this purpose;
(r) In accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, give the heads of the departments and agencies access to all intelligence, developed by the CIA or the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence, relevant to the national intelligence needs of the departments and agencies; and
(s) Facilitate the use of national foreign intelligence products by Congress in a secure manner.

1.6Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies.
(a) The heads of all Executive Branch departments and agencies shall, in accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, give the Director of Central Intelligence access to all information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States, and shall give due consideration to the requests from the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate support for Intelligence Community activities.
(b) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall ensure timely development and submission to the Director of Central Intelligence by the program managers and heads of component activities of proposed national programs and budgets in the format designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall also ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence is provided, in a timely and responsive manner, all information necessary to perform the Director’s program and budget responsibilities.
(c) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program may appeal to the President decisions by the Director of Central Intelligence on budget or reprogramming matters of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

1.7Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community or the heads of such organizations, as appropriate, shall:
(a) Report to the Attorney General possible violations of federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as specified in those procedures;
(b) In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security, recommend to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation;
(c) Furnish the Director of Central Intelligence and the NSC, in accordance with applicable law and procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, the information required for the performance of their respective duties;
(d) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and keep the Director of Central Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning any intelligence activities of their organizations that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive;
(e) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure consistent with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(f) Disseminate intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under arrangements established or agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(g) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination of intelligence resulting from criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad if their departments, agencies, or organizations have intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic narcotics production and trafficking;
(h) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Intelligence Oversight Board; and
(i) Ensure that the Inspectors General and General Counsels for their organizations have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by this Order.

1.8The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the CIA shall be related to the intelligence functions set out below. As authorized by this Order; the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the CIA Act of 1949, as amended; appropriate directives or other applicable law, the CIA shall:
(a) Collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(b) Collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking;
(c) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(d) Coordinate counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other departments and agencies;
(e) Conduct special activities approved by the President. No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87 Stat. 855)1) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective;
(f) Conduct services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as directed by the NSC;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
(h) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary; and
(i) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (h) above, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements.

1.9The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:
(a) Overtly collect information relevant to United States foreign policy concerns;
(b) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of the Secretary’s responsibilities;
(c) Disseminate, as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic and consular posts;
(d) Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of United States Missions abroad; and
(e) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their statutory responsibilities for direction and coordination of mission activities.

1.10The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(a) Overtly collect foreign financial and monetary information;
(b) Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information;
(c) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States economic policy as required for the execution of the Secretary’s responsibilities; and
(d) Conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment being used against the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President, and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, other Secret Service protectees and United States officials. No information shall be acquired intentionally through such activities except to protect against such surveillance, and those activities shall be conducted pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.

1.11The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall:
(a) Collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(b) Collect, produce and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as required for execution of the Secretary’s responsibilities;
(c) Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental and tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(e) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals intelligence and communications security activities, except as otherwise directed by the NSC;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions;
(h) Protect the security of Department of Defense installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Department of Defense as are necessary;
(i) Establish and maintain military intelligence relationships and military intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and international organizations, and ensure that such relationships and programs are in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(j) Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal management for the National Security Agency and for defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance entities; and
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.

1.12Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the following:
(a) Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include;
(1) Collection, production, or, through tasking and coordination, provision of military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies;
(2) Collection and provision of military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence products;
(3) Coordination of all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements;
(4) Management of the Defense Attache system; and
(5) Provision of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) National Security Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense;
(2) Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders;
(3) Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(4) Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(5) Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(6) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information for counterintelligence purposes;
(7) Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(8) Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the communications security of the United States Government;
(9) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence and communications security;
(10) Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the NSA as are necessary;
(11) Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the NSA, and exercising the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations;
(12) Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence; and
(13) Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.
(c) Offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs for specialized intelligence;
(2) Responding to tasking in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence; and
(3) Delegating authority to the various departments and agencies for research, development, procurement, and operation of designated means of collection.

(d)

The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,

whose responsibilities shall include:

(1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
(2) Conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI; and
(3) Monitoring of the development, procurement and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conducting related research, development, and test and evaluation activities.
(e) Other offices within the Department of Defense appropriate for conduct of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense. If such other offices are used for intelligence purposes, the provisions of Part 2 of this Order shall apply to those offices when used for those purposes.

1.13The Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy shall:
(a) Participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information with respect to foreign energy matters;
(b) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the Secretary’s responsibilities;
(c) Participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the Department can contribute; and
(d) Provide expert technical, analytical and research capability to other agencies within the Intelligence Community.

1.14The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:
(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the FBI involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;
(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;
(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and
(e) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Part 2

Conduct of Intelligence Activities

2.1Need. Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Collection of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded.

2.2Purpose. This Order is intended to enhance human and technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of international terrorist activities and espionage conducted by foreign powers. Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.

2.3Collection of Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order. Those procedures shall permit collection, retention and dissemination of the following types of information:
(a) Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned;
(b) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons;
(c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation;
(d) Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations;
(e) Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United States shall be undertaken by the FBI exceptthat other agencies of the Intelligence Community may also collect such information concerning present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting;
(f) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purpose of determining their suitability or credibility;
(g) Information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical or communications security investigation;
(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons;
(i) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws; and
(j) Information necessary for administrative purposes.
In addition, agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each appropriate agency within the Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it.

2.4Collection Techniques. Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize:
(a) The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance;
(b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and
(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in its possession.
(c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present of former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting; and
(2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service.
(d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means.

2.5Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.

2.6Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
(a) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community;
(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
(c) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the General Counsel of the providing agency; and
(d) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable law.

2.7Contracting. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to enter into contracts or arrangements for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions in the United States and need not reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of appropriate officials of the institution.

2.8Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.

2.9Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States. No one acting on behalf of agencies within the Intelligence Community may join or otherwise participate in any organization in the United States on behalf of any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing his intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the agency head or designee. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the organization or its members except in cases where:
(a) The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation; or
(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

2.10Human Experimentation. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject’s informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.

2.11Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.

2.12Indirect Participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order.

Part 3

General Provisions

3.1Congressional Oversight. The duties and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments, agencies, and entities engaged in intelligence activities to cooperate with the Congress in the conduct of its responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall be as provided in title 50, United States Code, section 413. The requirements of section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2422), and section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413), shall apply to all special activities as defined in this Order.

3.2Implementation. The NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are necessary to implement this Order. Heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue appropriate supplementary directives and procedures consistent with this Order. The Attorney General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving any procedures established by the head of an agency in the Intelligence Community other than the FBI. The National Security Council may establish procedures in instances where the agency head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds.

3.3Procedures. Until the procedures required by this Order have been established, the activities herein authorized which require procedures shall be conducted in accordance with existing procedures or requirements established under Executive Order No. 12036. Procedures required by this Order shall be established as expeditiously as possible. All procedures promulgated pursuant to this Order shall be made available to the congressional intelligence committees.

3.4Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have these meanings:
(a) Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.
(b) Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
(c) Employee means a person employed by, assigned to or acting for an agency within the Intelligence Community.
(d) Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.
(e) Intelligence activities means all activities that agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order.
(f) Intelligence Community and agencies within the Intelligence Community refer to the following agencies or organizations:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
(2) The National Security Agency (NSA);
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
(4) The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
(5) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
(6) The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and
(7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.
(g) The National Foreign Intelligence Program includes the programs listed below, but its composition shall be subject to review by the National Security Council and modification by the President:
(1) The programs of the CIA;
(2) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance, except such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded;
(3) Other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
(4) Activities of the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence;
(5) Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations by the United States military forces are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(h) Special activities means activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.
(i) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

3.5Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.

3.6Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as amended, entitled “United States Intelligence Activities,” is revoked.


1Editorial note: The correct citation is (87 Stat. 555).

https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html

 

Story 2: -Soros’ and Obama’s  Seditious and Subversive War On Trump With  Organizing For Action Applying Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals — Videos

Judge Nap: If Obama Wiretapped Trump, It Would ‘Destroy Whatever Legacy’ He Has

SARA CARTER VS SEAN HANNITY (3/8/2017)

Laura Ingraham: New WikiLeaks Release Could Be ‘Really Damning’ For CIA

IS THIS THE END OF BARACK OBAMA? More proofs of illegal acts during Barack Obama’s administration

Gingrich talks ‘deep state’ bureaucrats’ attacks on Trump

On the Russia Lunacy & Wikileaks BOMBSHELL Leak of CIA Hacking Force

‘Everyday, a new piece falls into place’׃ Maddow spells out the Trump Russia connection 2

Former DOJ Lawyer: Lynch, Comey Could Have ‘Intimate Knowledge’ of Alleged Wiretapping

REAKING NEWS 03⁄08⁄2017 TRUMP: OBAMA “WEAK”

BREAKING NEWS March 8, 2017 WAR IN WHITE HOUSE, TRUMP vs OBAMA

ORGANIZING FOR ACTION OBAMA TEAM OF 80,000 PROTESTERS NATIONWIDE

Organizing for Action fights President Trump’s policies

Political Group “Organizing for Action” Relaunches For Trump Era

How Obama is Scheming to Sabotage Trump’s Presidency

Lou Dobbs: Obama Looking Very Close To Sedition

Monica Crowley: What happened to me was a political hit job

Tomi Lahren, Jessica Tarlov on attacks against the Trumps

Tomi Lahren – So you want me fired – Final Thoughts With Tomi Lahren

Tomi Lahren – Tantrums Against Trump (Final Thoughts)

Not My President’s Day Protests – Tomi Lahren Final Thoughts – The Blaze

Hannity With 3 Special Guest Uncover Obama’s Sedition Against The Republic For Which WE STAND!

HANNITY 3/7/17 – Ingraham – Crowley, ‘Deep State Plan to Imprison Trump.’

EXPOSED: Trump National Security Pick Monica Crowley Plagiarizes Book, Rewarded Title By President

Trump pick Monica Crowley has a plagiarism problem Viral news US

Lou Dobbs : Paul Sperry – Obama’s ‘shadow government’ is organizing to sabotage Trump : 2/15/2017

BREAKING Obama’s Plan to SABOTAGE Trump’s Presidency EXPOSED No Former President Has Ever Done This

Billionaire Soros linked to anti-Trump protests – WikiLeaks

Personal attacks on President Trump

Obama Moves to Bunker & Prepares To ‘Fight Trump’—30,000 Man Activist Army READY At His COMMAND

What is Organizing for Action?

Obama’s Organizing for Action Partners with Soros-Linked ‘Indivisible’ to Disrupt Trump’s Agenda

Organizing for Action, the activist group that morphed from Barack Obama’s first presidential campaign, has partnered with the newly-formed Indivisible Project for “online trainings” on how to protest President Donald Trump’s agenda.

Last week, Breitbart News extensively reported that Indivisible leaders are openly associated with groups financed by billionaire George Soros.

Politico earlier this month profiled Indivisible in an article titled, “Inside the protest movement that has Republicans reeling.”  The news agency not only left out the Soros links, but failed to note that the organizations cited in its article as helping to amplify Indivisible’s message are either financed directly by Soros or have close ties to groups funded by the billionaire, as Breitbart News documented.

Organizing for Action (OFA) is a so-called community organizing project that sprung from Obama’s 2012 campaign organization, Organizing for America, becoming a nonprofit described by the Washington Post as “advocate[ing] for the president’s policies.”

In a recent Facebook post titled, “Take a deep breath. Then take action,” OFA called on constituents to lobby particularly hard between now and February 26, when lawmakers will be in their home districts.

The post included a link to a guide released by Indivisible on how to organize against Trump. “Stay tuned for online trainings and invitations to calls with coalition partners like Indivisible Guide,” the OFA post states.

Paul Sperry, writing at the New York Post, relates:

The manual, published with OFA partner “Indivisible,” advises protesters to go into halls quietly so as not to raise alarms, and “grab seats at the front of the room but do not all sit together.” Rather, spread out in pairs to make it seem like the whole room opposes the Republican host’s positions. “This will help reinforce the impression of broad consensus.” It also urges them to ask “hostile” questions — while keeping “a firm hold on the mic” — and loudly boo the the GOP politician if he isn’t “giving you real answers.”

“Express your concern [to the event’s hosts] they are giving a platform to pro-Trump authoritarianism, racism, and corruption,” it says.

…“Even the safest [Republican] will be deeply alarmed by signs of organized opposition,” the document states, “because these actions create the impression that they’re not connected to their district and not listening to their constituents.”

Sperry reported OFA “plans to stage 400 rallies across 42 states this year to attack Trump and Republicans over ObamaCare’s repeal.”

Earlier this month, NBC News reported on OFA’s new actions and its partnership with Indivisible:

OFA has hired 14 field organizers in states home to key senators as part of its campaign to defend Obama’s signature healthcare law. To run that campaign, the group hired Saumya Narechania — the former national field director at Enroll America, which worked to sign people up for Obamacare — and a deputy campaign manager.

…OFA says more than 1,800 people have applied to its Spring Community Engagement Fellowship, a six-week training program, two-thirds of whom have not previously been involved with OFA.

And the group has teamed up with Indivisible, a buzzy newcomer to the progressive movement, to offer organizing training that began Thursday night with a video conference. A combined 25,000 people have registered to participate in those trainings, OFA said.

Indivisible’s DC branch was implicated in a scuffle last week that reportedly injured a 71-year-old staffer for Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) as well as reportedly knocking a 2-year-old to the ground.  Protesters claimed they were only delivering Valentine’s Day cards.

Indivisible is a part of a coalition of activist groups slated to hold a massive anti-Trump Tax March in Washington and at least 60 other locations on April 15.

Unreported by the news media is that most of the listed partners and support organizers of the march are openly financed by Soros or have close links to Soros financing, as Breitbart News documented last week.

Meanwhile, earlier this month, Politico profiled Indivisible and reported that “conservatives” are “spreading unfounded rumors” that the group is “being driven by wealthy donors like George Soros.”

Politico, however, seemingly failed to do even the most minimal research on the Indivisible leaders cited in the news outlet’s own profile.  Some of those personalities are openly associated with groups financed by Soros.

Politico further failed to note that the organizations cited in its article as helping to amplify Indivisible’s message are either financed directly by Soros or have close ties to groups funded by the billionaire.

Citing Angel Padilla, a co-founder of the group, Politico reported:

Dubbed “Indivisible,” the group launched as a way for Padilla and a handful of fellow ex-Democratic aides to channel their post-election heartbreak into a manual for quashing President Donald Trump’s agenda. They drafted a 26-page protest guide for activists, full of pointers on how to bird dog their members of Congress in the language of Capitol insiders.

The manual has since been downloaded over one million times. Indivisible says on its website that over 4,500 local groups across the nation have “signed up to resist the Trump agenda in nearly every congressional district in the country.”

The manual has been utilized to form the basis of a protest movement. The group’s website states: “What’s more, you all are putting the guide into action—showing up en masse to congressional district offices and events, and flooding the congressional phone lines. You’re resisting—and it’s working.”

Politico reported on “unfounded” rumors being spread about Soros’s involvement with Indivisible (emphasis added by this reporter):

Its handful of senior leaders count about 100 contributors to their national organizing work but insist that all are working on a volunteer basis. They know conservatives are spreading unfounded rumors that their success is being driven by wealthy donors like George Soros, which they flatly deny.

That paragraph was followed by the following quote from co-founder Padilla (emphasis again added by this reporter):

“It doesn’t matter who we take money from — we’re always going to get blamed as a Soros group, even if we don’t take money from Soros,” said Padilla, now an analyst with the National Immigration Law Center. “That’s one of the attacks and that’s fine.”

While “Indivisible” has yet to disclose its donors, Politico failed to inform readers that the National Immigration Law Center where the news outlet reported Padilla serves as an analyst is financed by Soros’s Open Society Foundations. The Center has received numerous Open Society grants earmarked for general support.

Also unmentioned by Politico is that Padilla previously served as an immigration policy consultant at the radical National Council of La Raza. Soros is a major La Raza donor.

Politico went on to detail how Indivisible has been aided by MoveOn.org and the ACLU.  The news website failed to tell readers that MoveOn.org and the ACLU are both financed by Soros, a relevant tidbit given Politico’s claim about “unfounded rumors” that Indivisibles’ success was being driven by Soros . 

The news website reported:

In addition, MoveOn.org and the Working Families Party joined with Indivisible for its first nationwide call on Jan. 22. Nearly 60,000 people phoned in that day, according to Levin and MoveOn organizing director Victoria Kaplan. Indivisible estimates that its second national call, on the impact of Trump’s immigration order with assistance from the ACLU and Padilla’s group, drew 35,000 people.

Politico also missed that, according to its Twitter account, another organizer of the conference call with MoveOn.org was the International Refugee Assistance Project, a project of the Urban Justice Center, another recipient of an Open Society grant.

Taryn Higashi, executive director of the Center’s International Refugee Assistance Project, currently serves on the Advisory Board of the International Migration Initiative of Soros’s Open Society Foundations.

Politico further reported on Indivisible’s ties to the organizers of last month’s anti-Trump Women’s March while failing to mention that Soros reportedly has ties to more than 50 “partners” of that march. Also, this journalist first reported on the march leaders’ own close associations with Soros.

Regarding Indivisible and the Women’s March, Politico reported:

Indivisible is also embracing collaboration with other major anti-Trump protest outlets. Leaders of the group were in communication with Women’s March organizers before their main event on Jan. 21, and that partnership will become official when the March unveils the third in its series of 10 direct actions that attendees have been asked to pursue in their communities.

Another Indivisible leader mentioned in the Politico article is Jeremy Haile. Not reported by Politico is that is Haile served as federal advocacy counsel for the Sentencing Project.  The Sentencing Project is reportedly financed by Soros’s Open Society Foundations, which has also hosted the Project to promote its cause.

Aaron Klein is Breitbart’s Jerusalem bureau chief and senior investigative reporter. He is a New York Times bestselling author and hosts the popular weekend talk radio program, “Aaron Klein Investigative Radio.” Follow him on Twitter @AaronKleinShow. Follow him on Facebook.

http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/02/19/obamas-organizing-action-partners-soros-linked-indivisible-disrupt-trumps-agenda/

Obama-linked activists have a ‘training manual’ for protesting Trump

An Obama-tied activist group training tens of thousands of agitators to protest President Trump’s policies plans to hit Republican lawmakers supporting those policies even harder this week, when they return home for the congressional recess and hold town hall meetings and other functions.

Organizing for Action, a group founded by former President Barack Obama and featured prominently on his new post-presidency website, is distributing a training manual to anti-Trump activists that advises them to bully GOP lawmakers into backing off support for repealing ObamaCare, curbing immigration from high-risk Islamic nations and building a border wall.

In a new Facebook post, OFA calls on activists to mobilize against Republicans from now until Feb. 26, when “representatives are going to be in their home districts.”

The protesters disrupted town halls earlier this month, including one held in Utah by House Oversight Committee Chairman Jason Chaffetz, who was confronted by hundreds of angry demonstrators claiming to be his constituents.

The manual, published with OFA partner “Indivisible,” advises protesters to go into halls quietly so as not to raise alarms, and “grab seats at the front of the room but do not all sit together.” Rather, spread out in pairs to make it seem like the whole room opposes the Republican host’s positions. “This will help reinforce the impression of broad consensus.” It also urges them to ask “hostile” questions — while keeping “a firm hold on the mic” — and loudly boo the GOP politician if he isn’t “giving you real answers.”

“Express your concern [to the event’s hosts] they are giving a platform to pro-Trump authoritarianism, racism, and corruption,” it says.

The goal is to make Republicans, even from safe districts, second-guess their support for the Trump agenda, and to prime “the ground for the 2018 midterms when Democrats retake power.”

The goal is to make Republicans, even from safe districts, second-guess their support for the Trump agenda.

“Even the safest [Republican] will be deeply alarmed by signs of organized opposition,” the document states, “because these actions create the impression that they’re not connected to their district and not listening to their constituents.”

After the event, protesters are advised to feed video footage to local and national media.

“Unfavorable exchanges caught on video can be devastating” for Republican lawmakers, it says, when “shared through social media and picked up by local and national media.” After protesters gave MSNBC, CNN and the networks footage of their dust-up with Chaffetz, for example, the outlets ran them continuously, forcing Chaffetz to issue statements defending himself.

The manual also advises protesters to flood “Trump-friendly” lawmakers’ Hill offices with angry phone calls and emails demanding the resignation of top White House adviser Steve Bannon.

A script advises callers to complain: “I’m honestly scared that a known racist and anti-Semite will be working just feet from the Oval Office … It is everyone’s business if a man who promoted white supremacy is serving as an adviser to the president.”

The document provides no evidence to support such accusations.

Protesters, who may or may not be affiliated with OFA, are also storming district offices. Last week, GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher blamed a “mob” of anti-Trump activists for knocking unconscious a 71-year-old female staffer at his Southern California office. A video of the incident, showing a small crowd around an opening door, was less conclusive.

Separately, OFA, which is run by ex-Obama officials and staffers, plans to stage 400 rallies across 42 states this year to attack Trump and Republicans over ObamaCare’s repeal.

“This is a fight we can win,” OFA recently told its foot soldiers. “They’re starting to waver.”

On Thursday, Trump insisted he’s moving ahead with plans to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act, which has ballooned health insurance premiums and deductibles. “ObamaCare is a disaster, folks,” he said, adding that activists protesting its repeal are hijacking GOP town halls and other events.

“They fill up our rallies with people that you wonder how they get there,” the president said. “But they’re not the Republican people that our representatives are representing.”

As The Post reported, OFA boasts more than 250 offices nationwide and more than 32,000 organizers, with another 25,000 actively under training. Since November, it’s beefed up staff and fundraising, though as a “social welfare” nonprofit, it does not have to reveal its donors.

These aren’t typical Black Lives Matter or Occupy Wall Street marchers, but rather professionally trained organizers who go through a six-week training program similar to the training — steeped in Alinsky agitation tactics — Obama received in Chicago when he was a community organizer.

Chicago socialist Saul Alinsky, known by the left as “the father of community organizing,” taught radicals to “rub raw the sores of discontent” and create the conditions for a “revolution.” He dedicated his book, “Rules for Radicals,” to “Lucifer.” Michelle Obama quoted from the book when she helped launch OFA in 2013.

Obama appears to be behind the anti-Trump protests. He praised recent demonstrations against Trump’s travel ban. And last year, after Trump’s upset victory, he personally rallied OFA troops to “protect” his legacy in a conference call. “Now is the time for some organizing,” he said. “So don’t mope” over the election results.

He promised OFA activists he would soon join them in the fray.

“Understand that I’m going to be constrained in what I do with all of you until I am again a private citizen, but that’s not so far off,” he said. “You’re going to see me early next year, and we’re going to be in a position where we can start cooking up all kinds of great stuff.”

Added the ex-president: “I promise you that next year Michelle and I are going to be right there with you, and the clouds are going to start parting, and we’re going to be busy. I’ve got all kinds of thoughts and ideas about it, but this isn’t the best time to share them.

“Point is, I’m still fired up and ready to go, and I hope that all of you are, as well.”

http://nypost.com/2017/02/18/obama-linked-activists-have-a-training-manual-for-protesting-trump/

Obama’s Shadow Government Is Organizing To Undermine Trump

The leaks that led to Michael Flynn’s resignation are just the beginning. Obama and his loyalists in and outside government are working to undermine Trump.

By John Daniel Davidson

Once out of office, ex-presidents usually fade into private life and stay out of politics. They write memoirs, serve on corporate boards, and start charitable foundations. George W. Bush retired to his ranch in Texas and, most recently, painted portraits of veterans wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bill Clinton was briefly thrust back into politics during Hillary’s two failed presidential campaigns, but most of his post-White House career consisted of flying around the world raising boatloads of money for his family’s now-defunct charity.

There are exceptions, of course. Jimmy Carter threw himself into international diplomacy, mediating an agreement in 1994 to return exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti, and generally agitating for a Palestinian state.

Then there is Obama. Less than a month out of office, the broad contours of Obama’s post-presidency career are already taking shape. Obama and his loyalists, it seems, will remain in the center of the political fray, officially and unofficially, in an organized effort to undermine the Trump administration.

The bizarre scandal now unfolding over the resignation of national security advisor Michael Flynn is a case in point. Flynn’s resignation was prompted by a series of coordinated and anonymous leaks from current and former Obama administration officials in our domestic intelligence agencies.

Regardless of any valid criticism of Flynn, the leaks are part of a larger, loosely organized effort now underway to preserve Obama’s legacy. This effort involves Obama-era officials still inside the federal government, former Obama staffers working in the private sector, and Obama himself.

This isn’t some conspiracy theory. After the election, Obama indicated he intends to stay involved in the political fray. In an email to his supporters on his last day in office, Obama encouraged them to stay engaged, promising “I’ll be right there with you every step of the way.” Less than two weeks later, he issued a statement saying he was “heartened” by anti-Trump protests over the executive order on immigration.

Obama Is Jumping Back Into The Political Fray

But there’s more to all this than Obama issuing solidarity statements to Trump protestors. For one thing, the former president isn’t moving back to Chicago. The Obama family will remain in Washington DC, within a couple miles of the White House, for the next two years as Obama’s youngest daughter finishes high school.

From there, Obama will help direct his new foundation, which he has said will be a “startup for citizenship.” That could mean a lot things, but in light of his other plans it suggests the Obama Foundation will be a political grassroots organization designed to mobilize progressive activists.

Obama has also announced he’ll be working with former Attorney General Eric Holder on a political action group called the National Democratic Redistricting Committee. Its goal is to get Democrats elected at the state and local level ahead of the next redrawing of congressional districts. Last month, Obama reportedly met with Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe to strategize about redistricting.

In addition to these pursuits, the former president will likely play a prominent role in a network of progressive nonprofits, most notably Organizing for Action, the political group that grew out of Obama’s first campaign. OFA has kept a low profile in recent years, and if Clinton had won it likely would have shut down.

But last week, OFA officials told NBC News the organization was ramping up operations nationwide in an effort to preserve Obama’s signature achievements like the Affordable Care Act. As part of that effort, the group recently hired 14 field organizers in key states, adding to a growing infrastructure that boasts more than 250 offices nationwide and more than 32,000 volunteers.

Former Obama Staffers Are Speaking Out

Obama of course isn’t alone in all this. Trump’s victory has mobilized his top aides and staffers to take action, too. Former Obama staffer Tommy Vietor told the Daily Beast that, had Clinton won, “I would have been inclined to feel comfortable that Obama’s legacy and the things we worked on were safe.”

Instead, Vietor, along with former Obama administration staffers Jon Favreau and Jon Lovett, are launching a new podcast, Pod Save America, under their new joint media venture, Crooked Media.

The purpose of the company should be fairly obvious. “In the battle between Donald Trump and the media, we are firmly on the side of the media,” Favreau told the Daily Beast, adding that he’s not interested in “the veneer of objectivity.” “We’re always going to be Obama guys, we’re very open and honest about that.”

Favreau has also been helping create Obama’s new foundation, whose mission, he says, “is to get people involved in civic life and get people engaged in politics.” Of Crooked Media, Favreau says, “I think we would very much like to be the media company version of that. So it’s certainly inspired by a lot of what Obama has talked about in terms of the media over the last several months.”

A host of other former Obama staffers have simply taken to social media to voice their opposition to Trump. One former senior administration official told Yahoo News, “There are more than a few of us who believe deeply in holding this administration’s feet to the fire—especially when they offer falsehoods to the American people and distort our record. We have an email chain going where we share impressions, etc.”

As the leaks keep flowing from our intelligence agencies and the tweets keep flying from former Obama officials, keep in mind that although we haven’t heard much from Obama himself yet, the Trump administration is going to keep feeling the disruptions of what amounts to a shadow government.

Obama had eight years in the White House to secure his legacy. Any efforts on his part to undermine his successor aren’t just an affront to the principles of our democracy, they’re an admission that he and his acolytes never put much stock in democracy to begin with.

http://thefederalist.com/2017/02/16/obamas-shadow-government-organizing-undermine-trump/

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Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 383-390

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 376-382

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 369-375

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 360-368

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 354-359

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 346-353

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 338-345

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 328-337

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 319-327

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 307-318

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 296-306

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 287-295

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 277-286

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 264-276

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 250-263

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 236-249

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 222-235

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 211-221

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 202-210

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 194-201

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 184-193

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 174-183

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 165-173

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 158-164

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows151-157

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 143-150

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 135-142

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 131-134

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 124-130

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 121-123

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 118-120

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 113 -117

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 112

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 108-111

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 106-108

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 104-105

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 101-103

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 98-100

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 94-97

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 93

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 92

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Show 91

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 88-90

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 84-87

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 79-83

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 74-78

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 71-73

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 68-70

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 65-67

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 62-64

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 58-61

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 55-57

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 52-54

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 49-51

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 45-48

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 41-44

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 38-40

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 34-37

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 30-33

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 27-29

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 17-26

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 16-22

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 10-15

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 1-9

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