The Pronk Pops Show 499, July 6, 2015, Story 1: Greeks Vote No To Creditors (IMF and ECB) Demands In Austerity Referendum! — Will Greece Exit Both Eurozone and European Union — 50 Ways to Leave your Creditor — Take This Debt and Shove It — Videos

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Pronk Pops Show 499  July 6, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 498  July 2, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 497  July 1, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 496  June 30, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 495  June 29, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 494 June 26, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 493 June 25, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 492 June 24, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 491 June 23, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 490 June 22, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 489 June 19, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 488 June 18, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 487 June 17, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 486 June 16, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 485 June 15, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 484 June 12, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 483 June 11, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 482 June 10, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 481 June 9, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 480 June 8, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 479 June 5, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 478 June 4, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 477 June 3, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 476 June 2, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 475 June 1, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 474 May 29, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 473 May 28, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 472 May 27, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 471 May 26, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 470 May 22, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 469 May 21, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 468 May 20, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 467 May 19, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 466 May 18, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 465 May 15, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 464 May 14, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 463 May 13, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 462 May 8, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 461 May 7, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 460 May 6, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 459 May 4, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 458 May 1, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 457 April 30, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 456: April 29, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 455: April 28, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 454: April 27, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 453: April 24, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 452: April 23, 2015 

Pronk Pops Show 451: April 22, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 450: April 21, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 449: April 20, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 448: April 17, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 447: April 16, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 446: April 15, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 445: April 14, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 444: April 13, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 443: April 9, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 442: April 8, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 441: April 6, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 440: April 2, 2015

Pronk Pops Show 439: April 1, 2015

Story 1: Greeks Vote No To Creditors (IMF and ECB) Demands In  Austerity Referendum! — Will Greece Exit Both Eurozone and European Union — 50 Ways to Leave your Creditor —  Take This Debt and Shove It — Videos

50 Ways to Leave your Lover – Paul Simon

PAUL SIMON LYRICS

“50 Ways to Leave Your Lover”

The problem is all inside your head
She said to me
The answer is easy if you
Take it logically
I’d like to help you in your struggle
To be free
There must be fifty ways
To leave your lover
She said it’s really not my habit
To intrude
Furthermore, I hope my meaning
Won’t be lost or misconstrued
But I’ll repeat myself
At the risk of being crude
There must be fifty ways
To leave your lover
Fifty ways to leave your lover[CHORUS:]
You Just slip out the back, Jack
Make a new plan, Stan
You don’t need to be coy, Roy
Just get yourself free
Hop on the bus, Gus
You don’t need to discuss much
Just drop off the key, Lee
And get yourself free
She said it grieves me so
To see you in such pain
I wish there was something I could do
To make you smile again
I said I appreciate that
And would you please explain
About the fifty ways
She said why don’t we both
Just sleep on it tonight
And I believe in the morning
You’ll begin to see the light
And then she kissed me
And I realized she probably was right
There must be fifty ways
To leave your lover
Fifty ways to leave your lover
eurogreek_elections_the_result__spiros_derveniotisGreek-referendum_ChappatteZeroHedge-Greece-Oxi-Votevote yes or nogreeks votenoreferendum

Keiser Report: Yanis Varoufakis ‘Shane’ of Greece (E780)

Keiser Report: Greece pivoting from debt slavery (E779)

‘Greek referendum results may cause domino effect in other European countries’

MORE than 61% of Greeks say ‘No’ in crucial bailout referendum final tally

Greeks Vote No In Referendum: More Than 60% Said No To Europe’s Latest Bailout Offer

Greece Votes NO!

Financial Turmoil Alert: Greece Votes No on Referendum!

Understanding the Financial Crisis in Greece

Greek Referendum: Their Yesterday, Our Tomorrow | True News

BBC Documentary || The Global Financial Crisis Of Greece – Documentary Films

Greece: Drone soars over thousands of ‘NO’ protesters as referendum looms

Greeks Vote In Crucial Referendum On EU Bailout

‘Greece should Grexit which is fantastic, they could restart their economy’ – Max Keiser

Greece crisis: No vote would mean euro exit, leaders warn

Bank exposure to Greece being evaluated

Why Does Greece Have So Much Debt?

Greece likely to exit euro & EU without deal with creditors – central bank

The Salvation of Greece. Prepare Yourself Accordingly.

What Pisses Me Off About Greece’s Debt Crisis

The Economic Collapse of Greece (full version 8 min). Whiteboard Animation by Angelow

Johnny Paycheck – Take This Job and Shove It

Eurozone struggles to find joint response to Greek referendum

Heads of governments at odds as Germany and European commission let Greece stew while France, Italy and Spain are impatient for a deal
Monday 6 July 2015 15.10 EDT Last modified on Monday 6 July 2015 19.55 EDT
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Germany and France scrambled to avoid a major split over Greece on Monday evening as the eurozone delivered a damning verdict on Alexis Tsipras’s landslide referendum victory on Sunday and Angela Merkel demanded that the Greek prime minister put down new proposals to break the deadlock.

As concerns mount that Greek banks will run out of cash, and about the damage being inflicted on the country’s economy, hopes for a breakthrough faded. EU leaders voiced despair and descended into recrimination over how to respond to Sunday’s overwhelming rejection of eurozone austerity terms as the price for keeping Greece in the currency.

Tsipras, meanwhile, moved to insure himself against purported eurozone plots to topple him and force regime change by engineering a national consensus of the country’s five mainstream parties behind his negotiating strategy, focused on securing debt relief. Tsipras also sacrificed his controversial finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, in what was seen as a conciliatory signal towards Greece’s creditors.

In Paris, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President François Hollande tried to plot a common strategy after Greeks returned a resounding no to five years of eurozone-scripted austerity. The two leaders were trying to find a joint approach to the growing crisis ahead of an emergency eurozone summit on Tuesday to deal with the fallout.

The prospects of a happy resolution of this crisis are rapidly diminishing
Chancellor George Osborne
But Merkel said there was no current basis for negotiating with the Greek side and called on Tsipras to make the next move.

As eurozone leaders prepared for today’s emergency summit in Brussels, the heads of government were at odds. France, Italy and Spain are impatient for a deal while Germany, the European commission and northern Europe seem content to let Greece stew and allow the euphoria following Sunday’s vote to give way to the sobering realities of bank closures, cash shortages and isolation.
At a joint press conference with the French president, Merkel says Greece can still negotiate with creditors, but that proposals must be made quickly to find a cash-for-reform deal
Greek banks are to remain closed until Thursday at the earliest, it was announced, with ATM withdrawals rationed to €60 daily.

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“The prospects of a happy resolution of this crisis are rapidly diminishing,” said the British chancellor, George Osborne, after speaking to some of the key policymakers. “If there is no signal from these meetings that Greece and the eurozone are ready to get around the table again, we can expect the financial situation in Greece to deteriorate rapidly.”

The commission had nothing positive at all to say about Sunday’s Greek referendum, while Germany’s increasingly hardline social democratic leader, Sigmar Gabriel, warned that Greece was on the brink of insolvency.

He accused Tsipras, the radical leftist prime minister who outmanoeuvred the rest of the eurozone with his plebiscite, of ruthlessly pursuing the Greek national interest at everyone else’s expense. His message suggested a Grexit was now inevitable as he stressed the need for EU humanitarian programmes to forestall social implosion in Greece.

Greece debt crisis: ECB tightens screw ahead of emergency eurozone summit – as it happened
The leaders of France and Germany say the door is still open to Greece, as banks are shuttered for two more days and a new finance minister sworn in
Read more
Tsipras is expected to table new bailout proposals on Tuesday to eurozone leaders meeting in Brussels after he ditched the flamboyant Varoufakis. Over five months of negotiations, Varoufakis, a leftwing economist and neophyte politician, has rubbed his interlocutors up the wrong way, persistently arguing he is right and everyone else is wrong when it comes to dealing with the Greek debt crisis.

The detail of Sunday’s voting patterns left no doubt about the devastating verdict and the challenges it now presents to Europe’s leaders. Around 80% of voters under the age of 34 voted no on Sunday.

Germany’s Gabriel said the Greeks had simply rejected the single currency rules, while Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister, delivered a cri de coeur lamenting the desperate situation the eurozone and the EU now found themselves in.

“Two political building sites need our work urgently, in European capitals and in Brussels,” he said. “If we stand still, prisoners of rules, regulations, and bureaucracy, Europe is over. Reconstructing a different Europe will not be easy … The first one is Greece, a country in very difficult social and economic conditions. Meetings tomorrow will have to indicate a conclusive solution to this emergency.”

Merkel has taken a hard line with Greece since Tsipras announced his snap referendum 10 days ago, while the French have been much more accommodating towards Athens. A brief statement issued after the leaders had dined together on Monday evening showed little sign of the two main EU leaders bridging their differences.

There were no signs either of movement from the eurozone towards the main demands from Athens – a new deal writing down the Greek debt mountain, as urged last week by the International Monetary Fund.

German government sources said there would be no debt reduction measures offered and that it was up to Greece, which ended negotiations with its creditors 10 days ago and called the referendum, to make the next move.

“In light of the decision by the Greek citizens, the conditions to start negotiations on a new aid programme are not met yet,” said Merkel’s spokesman, Steffen Seibert.

Valdis Dombrovskis, the most senior European commission official in charge of the euro, said the referendum result risked leaving everyone a loser. “The no result unfortunately widens the gulf between Greece and other eurozone countries … There is no easy way out of this crisis. Too much time and too many opportunities have been lost.”

A day of frantic politicking in Greece, and internationally, left few clues as to what happens next. Tsipras has persistently surprised and out-manoeuvred his opposite numbers, but without securing any net gains for a country in the throes of financial collapse. Greece’s bank holiday and the rationing of ATM withdrawals to €60 a day was extended until at least Thursday.

Analysis Greek referendum: smart response from Tsipras, but triumph may be brief
Larry Elliott
Larry Elliott Read more
The country’s banks are entirely dependent on the European Central Bank to keep standing and last night the ECB toughened it stance towards Greece’s banks by demanding they put up more collateral in return for the emergency liquidity allowance which has been keeping them afloat. The ECB said its government council is “closely monitoring the situation in financial markets and the potential implications for the monetary policy stance and for the balance of risks to price stability in the euro area”.

Tsipras spent much of the day with other Greek party leaders, resulting in the five-party national consensus behind his negotiating strategy committed to debt restructuring. Tsipras’s leftwing Syriza, and his rightwing nationalist coalition partner, Anel, were joined by centre-left Pasok, liberals To Potami, and centre-right New Democracy.
Now that Greece has returned an overwhelming no vote in the referendum, columnist Jonathan Freedland and economics editor Larry Elliott discuss the possible next moves for the European leaders
Tsipras’s ‘new’ proposals are likely to lean heavily on his recently tabled third bailout ideas, which call for €29bn in new loans over a two-year period under the eurozone’s ESM permanent bailout fund, combined with a debt swap that would see the ESM buy up Greece’s obligations to the European Central Bank and convert this into longer-term loans at cheaper rates. Greece would have to commit to many of the austerity measures that were roundly rejected by voters on Sunday.

Gabriel, however, emphasised the problems of devising a new bailout under the ESM, whose rules are more exacting than those for the eurozone instrument used for the previous bailouts since 2010.

The ESM rules say that a bailout can be considered for a eurozone country if its financial plight imperils the stability of the euro area as a whole. Many argue that this is not the case with Greece, that there is little risk of contagion and destabilisation of the broader currency area. But no one really knows.

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/06/eurozone-struggles-joint-response-greek-referendum

Greek ‘No’ Vote Poses Angela Merkel’s Biggest Challenge

German leader’s response will shape future eurozone, but options are limited

A protester holds a sheet with the Greek word for 'No' during an open house presentation of Germany's conservative Christian Democratic Union on Saturday in Berlin, while Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks in the background.ENLARGE
A protester holds a sheet with the Greek word for ‘No’ during an open house presentation of Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union on Saturday in Berlin, while Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks in the background. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

BERLIN—The resounding “no” vote in Greece on Sunday presents German ChancellorAngela Merkel with her toughest challenge since the eurozone crisis broke out five years ago.

Her choice is now between yielding to Greek Premier Alexis Tsipras and sweetening the bailout terms for his country, or sticking to her hard line—and her own voters’ sentiment—in refusing any further concession.

Both avenues are fraught with risks: Watering down the Greek bailout could spark a political rebellion at home and dilute the strict rules the eurozone has assembled in the past five years to ward off future crises.

Refusing to bend could see Greece exit from the euro and unleash economic and political chaos in the country.

Given how much Germany has shaped the management of the crisis—a mixture of emergency loans and unpopular economic overhauls in the affected countries—the strong “no” vote to the terms was a stinging blow.

On Monday, Ms. Merkel was to travel to Paris to consult with French President François Hollande. In a phone call Sunday night, where they agreed “that the vote of the Greek citizens is to be respected,” the two called for a summit of eurozone leaders Tuesday, according to her spokesman.

Yielding some ground on the terms of a new bailout, in particular by pledging some of the debt relief Greece and the International Monetary Fund have been asking for, could still save Greece from a devastating exit from the eurozone.

Yet while such a deal might secure the required approval of the German parliament thanks to opposition votes and those of Ms. Merkel’s Social Democratic coalition allies, it would face considerable opposition in the chancellor’s own conservative ranks. And it would still require a firm commitment to economic overhauls an emboldened Greek government is now unlikely to give.

Conversations with lawmakers in the past week suggest many conservatives might have rejected even the tough terms then under discussion. Any deal that requires lawmakers to pump more taxpayer money into Greece while seeing some of their past loans go up in smoke could spark a full-scale rebellion, lawmakers say.

“For a successful rescue operation, the one who wants to be rescued must let himself be rescued,” Gunther Krichbaum, the conservative chairman of parliament’s European Union Affairs Committee and advocate of a Greek exit from the eurozone, said last week. “As Greece obviously doesn’t want this, there’s no option left for those who want to rescue it.”

When parliament convened last week for a debate on Greece, Ms. Merkel’s cautious speech gathered tepid applause from the conservative benches—nothing like the thunderous ovations that greeted Wolfgang Schäuble, the chancellor’s uncompromising finance minister.

Broader public support for a fresh Greek bailout isn’t guaranteed either. While several polls published last week showed Germans were split on whether Greece should exit the euro, up to three-quarters rejected further concessions to Athens. Mr. Schäuble, the embodiment of German intransigence in Greece, received his highest rating ever.

A sweetened bailout could be particularly damaging for Ms. Merkel because it would invalidate the very rationale for Germany’s approach to the crisis: that it can only be fixed if uncompetitive economies are rebuilt and the eurozone’s fiscal rules never bent again.

In case of a Greek exit, German voters are sure to put the blame largely on Mr. Tsipras, as recent polls indicate they have done so far.

Given all that, principles and an instinct for self-preservation may persuade Ms. Merkel to opt for the second option and stick with her tough line, an outcome many analysts see as more likely.

In a research note published on Sunday, Deutsche Bank said the most probable result of a “no” vote would be the end of Greece’s euro membership, followed by the toppling of the Syriza government as economic hardship mounts.

Berlin officials have also warned about this scenario in case of a no.

Mr. Tsipras had “destroyed the last bridges across which Europe and Greece could have moved toward a compromise,” Vice Chancellor and Economics Minister Sigmar Gabriel was quoted as saying in an interview with the Tagespiegel daily, to be published on Monday.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/emerging-no-vote-in-greece-poses-merkels-biggest-challenge-1436123516

Greece votes No: The European Union is dying before our eyes

It’s not just disaffected pensioners: young Greeks have worked out that they don’t need the bloated EU

People shout slogans in front of the White Tower, city's landmark, in Thessaloniki

Photo: Sakis Mitrolidis/AFP

Despite the scaremongering and bullying from those in Brussels, we are waking today with Greece having delivered a resounding No.

That comes despite EU bosses saying that it would mean a Greek exit from the Euro, not to mention the heavy economic pressure placed on the Greek people to go along with the wishes of Brussels. It is a crushing defeat for those Eurocrats who believe that you can simply bulldoze public opinion.

Chief bully-boy Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, and other supposed leaders of the European Union did their best to terrify the Greek people into submitting to the wishes of the European Union. But they utterly failed. The fear espoused by the Yes campaign was rejected. Opinion polls that put the Yes side ahead just days before were way out, as thousands upon thousands of Greek citizens lined the streets chanting “Oxi”.

Where does Greece go from here? Well it seems to me that Alexis Tsipras cannot go on having his cake and eating it. A more prosperous Greece, ran by the Greeks rather than by the EU must surely face up to the reality that a euro exit is both inevitable and desirable in order for a long-term economic recovery to truly begin.

There is a bigger picture to consider, however. A huge generational dynamic exists, running through all of this. One poll from Antenna News in Greece found that 67 per cent of Greeks under the age of 35 voted No which shows just how much the seismic plates are shifting within European politics. The fact that young Greeks overwhelmingly rejected the Brussels dictat and voted No in huge numbers is of massive significance.

Whilst some of the older generation may still buy into the notion of the EU having brought peace to Europe, the younger generations are just not sold. And why should they be? The European Union today is causing massive resentment between European nations. Just look at how relations between Germany and Greece have deteriorated. Far from bringing peace, the EU now sows resentment.

Whatever fine aims there were fifty or sixty years ago have no relevance to the reality of life for young people right across the EU now, including in Greece. The EU’s old, outdated ideas have been rejected at the ballot box in exchange for a new approach and fresh thinking.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: Creditors will gain nothing from toppling Varoufakis

The result is a tired, stumbling European Union that is dying on its feet before our very eyes. Credibility for the project is fading fast as citizens right across Europe awaken to the reality of its authoritarian instincts that seek to run roughshod over public opinion.

With younger generations now turning against the EU project, we can see support for the EU’s dream of a United States of Europe fading fast. An outdated European Union has been found out and rejected emphatically by young Greeks in the 21st century.

It is all too clear to see why: both the euro single currency and the European Union itself have done great harm to the prospects of young people who are now realising that we do not need a single currency or a political union to be friends, neighbours and trading partners. Far more important than this European Union is the concept of national democracy, of which this Greek referendum and its result are a beaming example of.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11720081/Greece-votes-No-The-European-Union-is-dying-before-our-eyes.html

About EFSF

The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism by the euro area Member States in June 2010. The EFSF has provided financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The assistance was financed by the EFSF through the issuance of bonds and other debt instruments on capital markets.

A permanent rescue mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) started its operations on 8 October 2012. The ESM is currently the sole mechanism for responding to new requests for financial assistance by euro area Member States. It has provided loans to Spain and Cyprus.

The EFSF will not provide financial assistance to any further countries. The final ongoing EFSF assistance programme (for Greece) expired on 30 June 2015. However, even after this date, theEFSFwill continue to operate in order to:

– receive loan repayments from beneficiary countries;

– make interest and principal payments to holders of EFSF bonds;

– roll over outstanding EFSF bonds, as the maturity of loans provided to Ireland, Portugal and Greece is longer than the maturity of bonds issued by the EFSF.

The mission of both the EFSF and ESM is to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to countries of the euro area. The two institutions share the same staff and offices located in Luxembourg. 

European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF

DEFINITION of ‘European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF’

An organization created by the European Union to provide assistance to member states with unstable economies. The European Financial Stability Facility is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) managed by the European Investment Bank, a lending institution. The fund raises money by issuing debt, and distributes the funds to eurozone countries whose lending institutions need to be recapitalized, who need help managing their sovereign debt or who need financial stabilization.

INVESTOPEDIA EXPLAINS ‘European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF’

European countries have several options outside of the open market to seek financial help. Other than the European Financial Stability Facility, European countries can seek money from European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), which is guaranteed by the European Union’s budget, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These funding mechanisms are supported by the EU because, while not all countries have debt problems, the failure of one European economy can have a widespread effect on the health of other economies. Starting in 2013, the EFSF will be replaced by the ESM, or the European Stability Mechanism.

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http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/european-financial-stability-facility.asp#ixzz3f9SQyKAw

European Financial Stability Facility

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
European Union
Flag of the European Union
This article is part of a series on the
politics and government
of the European Union

The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is a special purpose vehicle financed by members of the eurozone to address the European sovereign-debt crisis. It was agreed by the 27 member states[1] of the European Unionon 9 May 2010, with the objective of preserving financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to eurozone states in economic difficulty.[2] The Facility’s headquarters are in Luxembourg City,[3] as are those of theEuropean Stability Mechanism.[4]Treasury management services and administrative support are provided to the Facility by the European Investment Bank through a service level contract.[5] Since the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, the activities of the EFSF are carried out by the ESM.[6]

The EFSF is authorised to borrow up to €440 billion,[7] of which €250 billion remained available after the Irish and Portuguese bailout.[8] A separate entity, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), a programme reliant upon funds raised on the financial markets and guaranteed by the European Commission using the budget of the European Union as collateral, has the authority to raise up to €60 billion.

Function

The mandate of the EFSF is to “safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance” to eurozone states.

The EFSF can issue bonds or other debt instruments on the market with the support of the German Finance Agency to raise the funds needed to provide loans to eurozone countries in financial troubles, recapitalise banks or buy sovereign debt.[9] Emissions of bonds would be backed by guarantees given by the euro area member states in proportion to their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank (ECB).

The €440 billion lending capacity of the Facility may be combined with loans up to €60 billion from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (reliant on funds raised by the European Commission using the EU budget as collateral) and up to €250 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain a financial safety net up to €750 billion.[10]

Had there been no financial operations undertaken, the EFSF would have closed down after three years, on 30 June 2013. However, since the EFSF was activated in 2011 to lend money to Ireland and Portugal, the Facility will exist until its last obligation has been fully repaid.[11]

Lending

The Facility can only act after a support request is made by a eurozone member state and a country programme has been negotiated with the European Commission and the IMF and after such a programme has been unanimously accepted by the Euro Group(eurozone finance ministers) and a memorandum of understanding is signed. This would only occur when the country is unable to borrow on markets at acceptable rates.

If there is a request from a eurozone member state for financial assistance, it will take three to four weeks to draw up a support programme including sending experts from the Commission, the IMF and the ECB to the country in difficulty. Once the Euro Group have approved the country programme, the EFSF would need several working days to raise the necessary funds and disburse the loan.[11]

Guarantee commitments

The table below shows the current maximum level of joint and several guarantees for capital given by the Eurozone countries. The amounts are based on the European Central Bank capital key weightings. The EU requested the eurozone countries to approve an increase of the guarantee amounts to €780 billion. The majority of the risk of the increase from original €440 billion falls on the AAA rated countries and ultimately their taxpayers, in a possible event of default of the investments of EFSF. The guarantee increases were approved by all Eurozone countries by 13 October 2011.[12]

The €110 billion bailout to Greece of 2010 is not part of the EFSF guarantees and not managed by EFSF, but a separate bilateral commitment by the Eurozone countries (excluding Slovakia, who opted out, and Estonia, which was not in Eurozone in 2010) and IMF.

In addition to the capital guarantees shown in the table, the enlarged EFSF agreement holds the guarantor countries responsible for all interest costs of the issued EFSF bonds, in contrast to the original EFSF structure, significantly expanding the potential taxpayer liabilities.[13] These additional guarantee amounts increase if the coupon payments of the issued EFSF bonds are high. On 29 November 2011, European finance ministers decided that EFSF can guarantee 20 to 30% of the bonds of struggling peripheral economies.[14]

Country Initial contributions Enlarged contributions
(see enlargement section)
Guarantee Commitments (EUR) Millions Percentage € per capita
[citation needed]
Guarantee Commitments (EUR) Millions Percentage
 Austria €12,241.43 2.78% €1,464.86 €21,639.19 2.7750%
 Belgium €15,292.18 3.48% €1,423.71 €27,031.99 3.4666%
 Cyprus €863.09 0.20% €1,076.68 €1,525.68 0.1957%
 Estonia €1,994.86 0.2558%
 Finland €7,905.20 1.80% €1,484.51 €13,974.03 1.7920%
 France €89,657.45 20.38% €1,398.60 €158,487.53 20.3246%
 Germany €119,390.07 27.13% €1,454.87 €211,045.90 27.0647%
 Greece €12,387.70 2.82% €1,099.90 €21,897.74 2.8082%
 Ireland €7,002.40 1.59% €1,549.97 €12,378.15 1.5874%
 Italy €78,784.72 17.91% €1,311.10 €139,267.81 17.8598%
 Luxembourg €1,101.39 0.25% €2,239.95 €1,946.94 0.2497%
 Malta €398.44 0.09% €965.65 €704.33 0.0903%
 Netherlands €25,143.58 5.71% €1,525.60 €44,446.32 5.6998%
 Portugal €11,035.38 2.51% €1,037.96 €19,507.26 2.5016%
 Slovakia €4,371.54 0.99% €807.89 €7,727.57 0.9910%
 Slovenia €2,072.92 0.47% €1,009.51 €3,664.30 0.4699%
 Spain €52,352.51 11.90% €1,141.75 €92,543.56 11.8679%
European UnionEurozone (16) without Estonia (°) €440,000.00 100% €1,339.02
European Union Eurozone (17) with Estonia €779,783.14 100%

(° Estonia entered the eurozone on 1 January 2011, i.e. after the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility in 2010). Greece, Ireland and Portugal are “stepping out guarantors”, except where they have liabilities before getting that status. Estonia is a stepping out guarantor with respect to liabilities before it joined the eurozone.

Management

The chief executive officer of the EFSF is Klaus Regling, a former Director General of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, having previously worked at the IMF and the German Ministry of Finance.

The Board of the European Financial Stability Facility comprise high level representatives of the 17 eurozone member states, including Deputy Ministers or Secretaries of State or Director Generals of the Treasury. The European Commission and the European Central Bank can each appoint an observer to the EFSF Board. Its chairman is Thomas Wieser, who is also chairman of the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee.[15]

Although there is no specific statutory requirement for accountability to the European Parliament, the Facility is expected to operate a close relationship with relevant committees within the EU.[11]

Developments and implementation

On 7 June 2010 the eurozone member states entrusted the European Commission, where appropriate in liaison with the European Central Bank, with the task of:

  • negotiating and signing on their behalf after their approval the memoranda of understanding related to this support;
  • providing proposals to them on the loan facility agreements to be signed with the beneficiary member state(s);
  • assessing the fulfilment of the conditionality laid down in the memoranda of understanding;
  • providing input, together with the European Investment Bank, to further discussions and decisions in the Euro Group on EFSF related matters and, in a transitional phase, in which the European Financial Stability Facility is not yet fully operational, on building up its administrative and operational capacities.[16]

On the same day the European Financial Stability Facility was established as a limited liability company under Luxembourg law (Société Anonyme),[17] while Klaus Regling was appointed as chief executive officer of the EFSF on 9 June 2010[18] and took office on 1 July 2010.[19] The Facility became fully operational on 4 August 2010.[20][21]

On 29 September 2011, the German Bundestag voted 523 to 85 to approve the increase in the EFSF’s available funds to €440 billion (Germany’s share €211bn). Mid-October Slovakia became the last country to give approval, though not before parliament speakerRichard Sulík registered strong questions as to how “a poor but rule-abiding euro-zone state must bail out a serial violator with twice the per capita income, and triple the level of the pensions – a country which is in any case irretrievably bankrupt? How can it be that the no-bail clause of the Lisbon treaty has been ripped up?”[22]

Granting of EFSF aid to Ireland

The Euro Group and the EU’s Council of Economics and Finance Ministers decided on 28 November 2010 to grant financial assistance in response to the Irish authorities’ request. The financial package was designed to cover financing needs up to €85 billion and would result in the EU providing up to €23 billion through the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and the EFSF up to €18 billion over 2011 and 2012.

The first bonds of the European Financial Stability Facility were issued on 25 January 2011. The EFSF placed its inaugural five-year bonds for an amount of €5 billion as part of the EU/IMF financial support package agreed for Ireland.[23] The issuance spread was fixed at mid-swap plus 6 basis points. This implies borrowing costs for EFSF of 2.89%. Investor interest was exceptionally strong, with a record breaking order book of €44.5 billion, i.e. about nine times the supply. Investor demand came from around the world and from all types of institutions.[24] The Facility chose three banks (Citibank, HSBC and Société Générale) to organise the inaugural bonds issue.[25]

Granting of EFSF aid to Portugal

The second Eurozone country to request and receive aid from EFSF is Portugal. Following the formal request for financial assistance made on 7 April 2011 by the Portuguese authorities, the terms and conditions of the financial assistance package were agreed by the Euro Group and the EU’s Council of Economics and Finance Ministers on 17 May 2011. The financial package was designed to cover Portugal’s financial needs of up to €78 billion, with the European Union—through the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism—, and the EFSF each providing up to €26 billion to be disbursed over 3 years. Further support was made available through the IMF for up to €26 billion, as approved by the IMF Executive Board on 20 May 2011.[26]

EFSF was activated for Portuguese lending in June 2011, and issued €5 billion of 10-year bonds on 15 June 2011, and €3 billion on 22 June 2011 through BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs International and The Royal Bank of Scotland. [27]

Enlargement

On 21 July 2011, the eurozone leaders agreed to amend the EFSF to enlarge its capital guarantee from €440 billion to €780 billion.[28][29] The increase expanded the effective lending capacity of the EFSF to €440 billion. This required ratifications by all eurozone parliaments, which were completed on 13 October 2011.[12][30]

The EFSF enlargement agreement also modified the EFSF structure, removing the cash buffer held by EFSF for any new issues and replacing it with +65% overguarantee by the guaranteeing countries. The increase of 165% to the capital guarantee corresponds to the need to have €440 billion of AAA-rated guarantor countries behind the maximum EFSF issued debt capital (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal do not guarantee new EFSF issues as they are recipients of Euroland support, reducing the total maximum guarantees to €726 billion).[31]

Once the capacity of EFSF to extend new loans to distressed Euroland countries expires in 2013, it and the EFSM will be replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (once it is ratified, see Treaties of the European Union#Eurozone reform). However, the outstanding guarantees given to EFSF bondholders to fund bailouts will survive ESM.

On 27 October 2011 the European Council announced that the member states had reached agreement to further increase the effective capacity of the EFSF to €1 trillion by offering insurance to purchasers of eurozone members’ debt.[32] European leaders have also agreed to create one or several funds, possibly placed under IMF supervision. The funds would be seeded with EFSF money and contributions from outside investors.[33]

Greek bailout

As part of the second bailout for Greece, under a retroactive Collective action clause, 100% of the Greek-jurisdiction bonds were shifted to the EFSF, amounting to €164 billion (130bn new package plus 34.4bn remaining from Greek Loan Facility) throughout 2014.[11]

Rating

The Facility aimed for ratings agencies to assign a AAA rating to its bonds, which would be eligible for European Central Bank refinancing operations.[34] It achieved this in September 2010 when Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s awarded it AAA and Moody’s awarded it Aaa,[35] making it easier for it to raise money. The rating outlook was qualified as stable.[36] On 16 January 2012 the Standard and Poors (S&P) lowered its rating on the European Financial Stability Facility to AA+ from AAA; the downgrade followed the 13 January 2012 downgrade of France and eight other euro-zone nations which has sparked worries that EFSF will have further difficulties raising funds.[37] In November 2012, Moody’s downgraded it.[38]

Controversies

The EFSF enlargement process of 2011 proved to be challenging to several Eurozone member states, who objected against assuming sovereign liabilities in potential violation of the Maastricht Treaty of no bailout provisions. On 13 October 2011, Slovakia approved EFSF expansion 2.0 after a failed first approval vote. In exchange[clarification needed], the Slovakian government was forced to resign and call new elections.

On 19 October 2011, Helsingin Sanomat reported that the Finnish parliament passed the EFSF guarantee expansion without quantifying the total potential liability to Finland. It turned out that several members of the parliament did not understand that in addition to increasing the capital guarantee from €7.9 billion to €14.0 billion, the Government of Finland would be guaranteeing all of the interest and capital raising costs of EFSF in addition to the issued capital, assuming theoretically uncapped liability. Helsingin Sanomat estimated that in an adverse situation this liability could reach €28.7 billion, adding interest rate of 3.5% for 30-year loans to capital guarantee. For this reason the parliamentary approval process on 28 September 2011 was misleading, and may require a new Government proposal.[39][40][dated info]

Operations

As of January 2012 the EFSF had issued 19 bn euro in long-term debt and 3.5 bn in short-term debt.[41]

  • 25 January 2011 5.0 bn euro 5-yr bond
  • 15 June 2011 5.0 bn euro 10-yr bond
  • 22 June 2011 3.0 bn euro 5-yr bond
  • 7 November 2011 3.0 bn euro 10-yr bond
  • 13 December 2011 1.9719 bn euro 3-month bill
  • 5 January 2012 3.0 bn euro 3-yr bond
  • 17 January 2012 1.501 bn euro 6-month bill

Bailout programs for EU members (since 2008)

The table below provides an overview of the financial composition of all bailout programs being initiated for EU member states, since the Global Financial Crisis erupted in September 2008. EU member states outside the eurozone (marked with yellow in the table) have no access to the funds provided by EFSF/ESM, but can be covered with rescue loans from EU’s Balance of Payments programme (BoP), IMF and bilateral loans (with an extra possible assistance from the Worldbank/EIB/EBRD if classified as a development country). Since October 2012, the ESM as a permanent new financial stability fund to cover any future potential bailout packages within the eurozone, has effectively replaced the now defunct GLF + EFSM + EFSF funds. Whenever pledged funds in a scheduled bailout program were not transferred in full, the table has noted this by writing “Y out of X”.

EU member Time span IMF[42][43]
(billion €)
World Bank[43]
(billion €)
EIB / EBRD
(billion €)
Bilateral[42]
(billion €)
BoP[43]
(billion €)
GLF[44]
(billion €)
EFSM[42]
(billion €)
EFSF[42]
(billion €)
ESM[42]
(billion €)
Bailout in total
(billion €)
Cyprus I1 Dec.2011-Dec.2012 2.5 2.51
Cyprus II2 May 2013-Mar.2016 1.0 9.0 10.02
Greece I+II3 May 2010-Jun.2015 48.1 (20.1+19.8+8.2) 52.9 144.6 245.63
Greece III4 Jul.2015-Mar.2016 (remainder of 1st program) (new commitments) 4
Hungary5 Nov.2008-Oct.2010 9.1 out of 12.5 1.0 5.5 out of 6.5 15.6 out of 20.05
Ireland6 Nov.2010-Dec.2013 22.5 4.8 22.5 18.4 68.26
Latvia7 Dec.2008-Dec.2011 1.1 out of 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 out of 2.2 2.9 out of 3.1 4.5 out of 7.57
Portugal8 May 2011-Jun 2014 26.5 out of 27.4 24.3 out of 25.6 26.0 76.8 out of 79.08
Romania I9 May 2009-Jun 2011 12.6 out of 13.6 1.0 1.0 5.0 19.6 out of 20.69
Romania II10 Mar 2011-Jun 2013 0.0 out of 3.6 1.15 0.0 out of 1.4 1.15 out of 6.1510
Romania III11 Oct 2013-Sep 2015 0.0 out of 2.0 2.5 0.0 out of 2.0 2.5 out of 6.511
Spain12 July 2012-Dec.2013 41.3 out of 100 41.3 out of 10012
Total payment Nov.2008-Mar.2016 120.9 6.05 1.1 7.3 13.4 52.9 46.8 189.0 50.3 487.75
1 Cyprus received in late December 2011 a €2.5bn bilateral emergency bailout loan from Russia, to cover its governmental budget deficits and a refinancing of maturing governmental debts until 31 December 2012.[45][46][47] Initially the bailout loan was supposed to be fully repaid in 2016, but as part of establishment of the later following second Cypriot bailout programme, Russia accepted a delayed repayment in eight biannual tranches throughout 2018-2021 – while also lowering its requested interest rate from 4.5% to 2.5%.[48]
2 When it became evident Cyprus needed an additional bailout loan to cover the government’s fiscal operations throughout 2013-2015, on top of additional funding needs for recapitalization of the Cypriot financial sector, negotiations for such an extra bailout package started with the Troika in June 2012.[49][50][51] In December 2012 a preliminary estimate indicated, that the needed overall bailout package should have a size of €17.5bn, comprising €10bn for bank recapitalisation and €6.0bn for refinancing maturing debt plus €1.5bn to cover budget deficits in 2013+2014+2015, which in total would have increased the Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio to around 140%.[52] The final agreed package however only entailed a €10bn support package, financed partly by IMF (€1bn) and ESM (€9bn),[53] because it was possible to reach a fund saving agreement with the Cypriot authorities, featuring a direct closure of the most troubled Laiki Bank and a forced bail-in recapitalisation plan for Bank of Cyprus.[54][55]
The final conditions for activation of the bailout package was outlined by the Troika’s MoU agreement in April 2013, and include: 1) Recapitalisation of the entire financial sector while accepting a closure of the Laiki bank, 2) Implementation of the anti-money laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions, 3) Fiscal consolidation to help bring down the Cypriot governmental budget deficit, 4) Structural reforms to restore competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, 5) Privatization programme. The Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio is on this background now forecasted only to peak at 126% in 2015 and subsequently decline to 105% in 2020, and thus considered to remain within sustainable territory. The €10bn bailout comprise €4.1bn spend on debt liabilities (refinancing and amortization), 3.4bn to cover fiscal deficits, and €2.5bn for the bank recapitalization. These amounts will be paid to Cyprus through regular tranches from 13 May 2013 until 31 March 2016. According to the programme this will be sufficient, as Cyprus during the programme period in addition will: Receive €1.0bn extraordinary revenue from privatization of government assets, ensure an automatic roll-over of €1.0bn maturing Treasury Bills and €1.0bn of maturing bonds held by domestic creditors, bring down the funding need for bank recapitalization with €8.7bn – of which 0.4bn is reinjection of future profit earned by the Cyprus Central Bank (injected in advance at the short term by selling its gold reserve) and €8.3bn origin from the bail-in of creditors in Laiki bank and Bank of Cyprus.[56] The forced automatic rollover of maturing bonds held by domestic creditors were conducted in 2013, and equaled according to some credit rating agencies a “selective default” or “restrictive default”, mainly because of the fact that the fixed yields of the new bonds did not reflect the market rates – while maturities at the same time automatically were extended.[48]
3 Many sources list the first bailout was €110bn followed by the second on €130bn. When you deduct €2.7bn due to Ireland+Portugal+Slovakia opting out as creditors for the first bailout, and add the extra €8.2bn IMF has promised to pay Greece for the years in 2015-16, the total amount of bailout funds sums up to €245.6bn.[44][57] The first bailout resulted in a payout of €20.1bn from IMF and €52.9bn from GLF, during the course of May 2010 until December 2011,[44] and then it was technically replaced by a second bailout package for 2012-2016, which had a size of €172.6bn (€28bn from IMF and €144.6bn from EFSF), as it included the remaining committed amounts from the first bailout package.[58] All IMF amounts are used to finance budget deficits and the ongoing refinancing of maturing public debt. The payment from EFSF has been earmarked to finance €34.6bn for the Greek debt PSI, €48.2bn for bank recapitalization,[57] €11.3bn for a second PSI debt buy-back,[59] while the remaining €50.5bn is used for budget deficits and the ongoing refinancing of maturing public debt.[60] The programme was scheduled to expire in March 2016, after IMF had extended their programme period with extra “reimbursement of interests” tranches scheduled from January 2015 to March 2016, while the Eurogroup at the same time opted to conduct their reimbursement of interests outside its bailout programme framework – so that it could end in December 2014. Due to the inability of the Greek government to comply with the agreed payment terms, both IMF and the Eurogroup opted to freeze their programmes since August 2014. To avoid a technical expiry, the Eurogroup postponed the expiry date for its frozen programme to 30 June 2015, paving the way for the payment terms first to be renegotiated and then finally complied with to ensure completion of the programme by then. If Greece manage to complete its current Eurogroup bailout programme by 30 June 2015, it is envisaged IMF will transfer the remaining part of its programme to become part of a new joint follow-up third bailout programme covering the period July 2015 to March 2016, in which ESM will commit a so far unspecified new extra amount of funds.
4 It is envisaged, that once Greece completes its I+II bailout programme with the Eurogroup, then a new third follow-up bailout programme will be launched, which will comprise new additional ESM commitments paid by the Eurogroup – along with IMF transferring the “remainder of its 2015-16 programme” to become part of this new follow-up bailout programme. As of May 2015, the size and duration of this follow-up progamme is still unknown, but it is envisaged as minimum to span from July 2015 to March 2016.
5 Hungary recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €4.4bn bailout support scheduled for October 2009-October 2010.[43][61] IMF paid in total 7.6 out of 10.5 billion SDR,[62] equal to €9.1bn out of €12.5bn at current exchange rates.[63]
6 In Ireland the National Treasury Management Agency also paid €17.5bn for the program on behalf of the Irish government, of which €10bn were injected by the National Pensions Reserve Fund and the remaining €7.5bn paid by “domestic cash resources”,[64] which helped increase the program total to €85bn.[42] As this extra amount by technical terms is an internal bail-in, it has not been added to the bailout total. As of 31 March 2014 all committed funds had been transferred, with EFSF even paing €0.7bn more, so that the total amount of funds had been marginally increased from €67.5bn to €68.2bn.[65]
7 Latvia recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €3.0bn bailout support originally scheduled for 2011.[66][67]
8 Portugal completed its support programme as scheduled in June 2014, one month later than initially planned due to awaiting a verdict by its constitutional court, but without asking for establishment of any subsequent precautionary credit line facility.[68] By the end of the programme all committed amounts had been transferred, except for the last tranche of €2.6bn (1.7bn from EFSM and 0.9bn from IMF),[69] which the Portuguese government declined to receive.[70][71] The reason why the IMF transfers still mounted to slightly more than the initially committed €26bn, was due to its payment with SDR’s instead of euro – and some favorable developments in the EUR-SDR exchange rate compared to the beginning of the programme.[72] In November 2014, Portugal received its last delayed €0.4bn tranche from EFSM (post programme),[73] hereby bringing its total drawn bailout amount up at €76.8bn out of €79.0bn.
9 Romania recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €1.0bn bailout support originally scheduled for 2011.[74][75]
10 Romania had a precautionary credit line with €5.0bn available to draw money from if needed, during the period March 2011-June 2013; but entirely avoided to draw on it.[76][77][43][78] During the period, the World Bank however supported with a transfer of €0.4bn as a DPL3 development loan programme and €0.75bn as results based financing for social assistance and health.[79]
11 Romania had a second €4bn precautionary credit line established jointly by IMF and EU, of which IMF accounts for SDR 1.75134bn = €2bn, which is available to draw money from if needed during the period from October 2013 to 30 September 2015. In addition the World Bank also made €1bn available under a Development Policy Loan with a deferred drawdown option valid from January 2013 through December 2015.[80] The World Bank will throughout the period also continue providing earlier committed development programme support of €0.891bn,[81][82] but this extra transfer is not accounted for as “bailout support” in the third programme due to being “earlier committed amounts”. In April 2014, the World Bank increased their support by adding the transfer of a first €0.75bn Fiscal Effectiveness and Growth Development Policy Loan,[83] with the final second FEG-DPL tranch on €0.75bn (worth about $1bn) to be contracted in the first part of 2015.[84] No money had been drawn from the precautionary credit line, as of May 2014.
12 Spain’s €100bn support package has been earmarked only for recapitalisation of the financial sector.[85] Initially an EFSF emergency account with €30bn was available, but nothing was drawn, and it was cancelled again in November 2012 after being superseded by the regular ESM recapitalisation programme.[86] The first ESM recapitalisation tranch of €39.47bn was approved 28 November,[87][88] and transferred to the bank recapitalisation fund of the Spanish government (FROB) on 11 December 2012.[86] A second tranch for “category 2” banks on €1.86n was approved by the Commission on 20 December,[89] and finally transferred by ESM on 5 February 2013.[90] “Category 3” banks were also subject for a possible third tranch in June 2013, in case they failed before then to acquire sufficient additional capital funding from private markets.[91] During January 2013, all “category 3” banks however managed to fully recapitalise through private markets and thus will not be in need for any State aid. The remaining €58.7bn of the initial support package is thus not expected to be activated, but will stay available as a fund with precautionary capital reserves to possibly draw upon if unexpected things happen – until 31 December 2013.[85][92] In total €41.3bn out of the available €100bn was transferred.[93] Upon the scheduled exit of the programme, no follow-up assistance was requested.[94]

See also

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Financial_Stability_Facility

Greece’s Debt Due: What Greece Owes When

Greece is negotiating with its eurozone creditors to get more aid before the indebted government runs out of cash. Here’s what Greece owes, when.

Last updated July 6, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. ET

|

Published Feb. 19, 2015 at 2:09 p.m. ET

Debt Due by Holder in billions

€0€20€40€60€80€100€120€140€160€180€200€220€240€260€280€300

€15
€21
€27
€34
€53
Total: €131

Individual Repayments

*The IMF’s basic rate is 1.05%, but there are surcharges of between two and three percentage points for large and longstanding loans of the type Greece has received.

†These loans, called an Extended Fund Facility, charge a basic rate of 1.05%, but there are surcharges of between two and three percentage points for large and longstanding loans of the type Greece has received.

‡Greece pays 0.5% plus a short-term rate that is now near zero.

Notes: Debt doesn’t include debt held by ‘holdout’ creditors from the 2012 default. EFSF loans that amortize are spread over their years of maturity; EFSF loans that are designed to roll over are assumed to do so.

Sources: Greece’s Public Debt Management Agency; International Monetary Fund; the Irish Statute Book; European Commission

http://graphics.wsj.com/greece-debt-timeline/

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